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Abstract
The safety of embedded systems is becoming more and more important nowa-
days. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a widely used technique for analyzing the safety
of embedded systems. A standardized tree-like structure called a Fault Tree (FT)
models the failures of the systems. The Component Fault Tree (CFT) provides
an advanced modeling concept for adapting the ordinary FTs to the hierarchical
architecture model in system design. Minimal Cut Set (MCS) analysis is a method
that works for qualitative analysis based on the FTs. Each MCS represents a min-
imal combination of component failures of a system called basic events, which may
together cause the top-level system failure. The ordinary representations of MCSs
consists of plain text and data tables with little additional supporting visual and
interactive information. Importance analysis based on FTs or CFTs estimates the
contribution of each basic event to a top-level system failure. The resulting impor-
tance values of basic events are typically represented in summary views, e.g., data
tables and histograms. There is little visual integration between these forms and
the FT (or CFT) structure. The safety of a system can be improved using an iter-
ative process, called the safety improvement process, based on FTs taking relevant
constraints into account, e.g., cost. Typically, relevant data regarding the safety
improvement process are presented across multiple views with few interactive asso-
ciations. In short, The ordinary representations cannot effectively facilitate these
analyses.
We propose a set of visualization approaches for addressing the issues above
mentioned in order to facilitate those analyses in terms of the representations.
Contributions:
• To support the MCS analysis, we propose a matrix-based visualization that
allows detailed data of the MCSs of interest to be viewed while maintaining
a satisfactory overview of a large number of MCSs for effective navigation
and pattern analysis. Engineers can also intuitively analyze the influence of
MCSs of a CFT.
• To facilitate the importance analysis based on the CFT, we propose a hy-
brid visualization approach that combines the icicle-layout-style architectural
views with the CFT structure. This approach facilitates to identify the vul-
nerable components considering the hierarchies of system architecture and
investigate the logical failure propagation of the important basic events.
• We propose a visual safety improvement process that integrates an enhanced
decision tree with a scatter plot. This approach allows one to visually investi-
gate the detailed data related to individual steps of the process while main-
taining the overview of the process. The approach facilitates to construct
and analyze improvement solutions of the system safety.
Using our visualization approaches, the MCS analysis, the importance analysis,
and the safety improvement process based on the CFT can be facilitated.
Zusammenfassung
Sicherheit ist ein zentraler Begriff in der heutigen Entwicklung von komplexen
eingebetteten Systemen. Die Fehlerbaumanalyse ist eine weit verbreitete Technik,
mit deren Hilfe gefa¨hrliche Systemausfa¨lle, unter Verwendung einer standard-
isierten baumartigen Struktur, genannt Fehlerbaum, modelliert und analysiert
werden ko¨nnen. Der Komponentenfehlerbaum stellt eine Weiterentwicklung dieses
Konzeptes dar. Er erga¨nzt die traditionellen Ansa¨tze um zusa¨tzliche Aspekte,
welche es erlauben Fehlerba¨ume entsprechender Analyse zugrundeliegenden
Systemarchitektur zu modularisieren. Als Komplement der Fehlerbaumanalsye
erlaubt die Minimal Cut Set (MCS) Analyse die detailierte Betrachtung mo¨glicher
Ausfallszenarien mit Hilfe sogenannter Minimaler Schnittmengen (im englischen
Minimal Cut Sets genannt). Die standardisierten Darstellungsvarienten von
MCS sind vorwiegend listen- und tabellenbasiert, die in ihrer urspru¨nglichen
Form nur wenig Anhaltspunkte fu¨r detailliertere Analysen bieten. Basierend
auf der (Komponenten-) Fehlerbaumanalyse scha¨tzt die “Importance Analysis”
hingegen die Beitra¨ge von einzelnen Teilsystemausfa¨llen zum sicherheitskritischen
Gesamtsystemausfall ab. Die Ergebnisse werden in der Regel mittels aggregierten
Darstellungen, bestehend aus mehreren Tabellen- und Histogrammansichten
untersucht und bewertet. Es gibt nur wenig visuelle Korrelationen zwischen diesen
unterschiedlichen Repra¨sentationen. Die Sicherheit eines Systems kann in einem
iterativen Prozess verbessert werden. Der Sicherheitsverbesserungsprozess basiert
auf Beru¨cksichtigung der einschla¨gigen Beschra¨nkungen, wie z.B. den Kosten.
Die relevanten Daten bezu¨glich des Sicherheitsverbesserungsprozesses sind meist
u¨ber unterschiedliche Ansichten verteilt und entkoppelt und fu¨r detaillierte
Untersuchungen wenig geeignet.
Beitra¨ge:
• Es wurde eine matrixbasierte Visualisierung fu¨r die MCS Analyse entwickelt,
die es gleichzeitig erlaubt, die Musteranalyse und die Untersuchung der de-
taillierten Daten bezu¨glich der Zusammensetzung der MCSs vorzunehmen.
Die Einflu¨sse von MCSs ko¨nnen intuitiv analysiert werden.
• Im Rahmen der Importance Analysis wird eine Visualisierung pra¨sentiert,
die die Architektursichten im Icicle Layout mit der Struktur des Komponen-
tenfehlerbaums kombiniert. Die Visualisierungsmethode erlaubt die Unter-
suchung der wichtigen Systemkomponenten und die Ausbreitung der einzel-
nen kritischen Teilsystemausfa¨lle zu analysieren.
• Die entwickelte Methode zur Visualisierung eines Sicher-
heitsverbesserungsprozesses integriert einen erweiterten Entscheidungsbaum
mit einem Scatter Plot. Die Methode erlaubt die detaillierten Informationen
u¨ber einzelne Schritte des Verfahrens hinweg zu untersuchen und trotzdem
den U¨berblick u¨ber den Prozess zu behalten. Die Methode erleichtert
Lo¨sungen zur Verbesserung der Sicherheit eines Systems zu konstruieren
und zu analysieren.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Today, embedded systems are very popular in everyday life. Safety plays an impor-
tant role in the design of embedded systems. Safety refers to a state of a system
where the danger to a person or property is below an acceptable value [10, 92, 96].
An embedded system is treated as a safety-critical system whose failure might lead
to unacceptable consequences and endanger human life, substantial economic loss,
or cause extensive environmental damage [118]. Common examples of safety-critical
systems are cars, medical equipments, airplanes, and nuclear power plants. Safety
analysis is often referred to as being a process whose goal is to provide a reliable
assessment of the risks of a system. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a widely used
safety analysis technique that deductively constructs tree-like models called Fault
Trees (FTs). In order to effectively adapt FTs to the system architectural model, an
advanced modeling concept called Component Fault Trees (CFTs) was proposed.
Sub-trees of a FT are modularized as a CFT component according to system archi-
tectural components.
There are two main categories of analyses based on FTs (also CFTs): qualitative
analysis and quantitative analysis. Minimal Cut Set analysis (MCS analysis) is an
important method of qualitative analysis. Each MCS consists of a minimal combi-
nation of the failures of components (called Basic Events) that may together cause
a specific system failure. The MCS analysis provides all possible scenarios (MCSs)
that individually lead to the specific undesired failure. The importance analysis and
sensitivity analysis are commonly used quantitative analyses of the FTA. The im-
portance analysis investigates the respective contributions of basic events to the
undesired system failure. Additionally, in order to identify the most appropriate im-
provement solution(s) for the system design with respect to safety, engineers usually
apply an iterative safety improvement process.
There are few suitable visualization methods to represent the results of these
analyses. Even though a great deal of effort has been vested in novel methods for the
analyses, there has been very little contribution to the representations of the results.
The representation concepts of the MCS analysis consist of plain text and tables
with few supporting visualizations and interactions. The representation concepts of
the importance analysis concentrate on the ordinary data-aggregated forms, such as
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Figure 1.1: The research area of the dissertation. We propose concepts that facilitate
the FTA with the help of information visualization techniques.
tables, histograms, and pie charts. For the safety improvement process, the related
data are usually represented over separate views (most of them are tables) without
visually and interactively associating with the decision process of the improvements.
In this way, engineers need to manually look up the desired data in separate views.
To sum up, the currently applied representation concepts of the MCS analysis,
the importance analysis, and the safety improvement process require a great deal of
additional effort and reduce the effectiveness of the analyses because of the lack of
the appropriate representations. We aim to facilitate these safety analyses by using
the suitable visualization methods and interaction techniques. Figure 1.1 illustrates
the research area of the dissertation. In this chapter, the contributions of the work
and the structure of the dissertation are briefly described.
1.2 Contributions
For the MCS analysis, we propose an enhanced matrix-based visualization that has
the following benefits:
• satisfactory overview of a large number of MCSs while investigating detail
information;
• effective highlighting concepts for quickly exploring the significant information;
• integrated representation of failure propagation for analyzing the influence of
MCSs along the CFT structure.
Our matrix view facilitates the identification of the important information from
large-scale MCS data and the analysis of the effect of MCSs along CFT structure.
To enhance the representation of the quantitative importance analysis, we pro-
pose a hybrid visualization approach integrating the icicle layout with the CFT
structure. This approach has the following advantages:
• clear and concise representation for exploring the result of the importance
analysis by taking the hierarchical model of the system design into account;
• flexible representations and interactions for investigating the failure propaga-
tion of the important basic events;
• adaptable view for analyzing the importance of a large number of basic events.
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Our visualization works on identifying the critical CFT components according to the
important basic events as well as analyzing the failure propagation of the important
basic events.
In order to support the safety improvement process, we propose an approach
that visualizes and integrates the significant data relevant to the safety improvement
process using a combination between an enhanced decision tree and a scatter plot.
The benefits of the visualization approach focus on the following aspects:
• visual representations of the significant data for intuitively analyzing the data;
• a satisfactory overview of the sequential design modifications while investigat-
ing the detailed data of specific modifications;
• flexible visual context of the logical CFT structures adapting to the procedure
of the safety improvement process.
Our approach facilitates the safety improvement process by visualizing and integrat-
ing graphical properties of significant data.
1.3 Content
Chapter 2 introduces the fundamentals of safety analysis and the essentials of in-
formation visualization, as well as the previous work including the currently used
representation concepts for safety analysis and the visualization techniques related
to our work. The motivations and the application examples depicting the moti-
vations are described in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 conceptually introduces the design
concepts of our visualization approaches. Chapter 5 presents the matrix-based vi-
sualization for the MCS analysis. Visualization methods for visually enhancing the
importance analysis are introduced in Chapter 6. The visualization approaches for
facilitating the safety improvement process are proposed in Chapter 7. Chapter 8
briefly describes the tool environment of ViSSaAn that was implemented according
to the visualization approaches introduced in the previous chapters. Finally, a gen-
eral conclusion is provided for the proposed visualization concepts and the future
work is discussed in Chapter 9.
Chapter 2
Background and Related Work
2.1 Safety and Reliability Analysis
The fundamentals of safety and reliability analysis are introduced in this section.
The section is based on the lecture of “Safety and Reliability of Embedded Systems”
conducted by Prof.Liggesmeyer at the University of Kaiserslautern [126].
2.1.1 Basic Concepts
2.1.1.1 Quality
Quality is defined as “a degree to which a set of inherent characteristics fulfills
requirements” by ISO9000 [98]. The quality of a system is assessed by evaluating the
quality characteristics of the system [56, 96, 98]. A characteristic is a distinguishing
feature [98], e.g., reliability of a car.
2.1.1.2 Failure and Fault
IEC 61508 [92] defines the terms failure and fault as follows:
• Failure: “termination of the ability of a functional unit to perform a required
function.”
• Fault: “abnormal condition that may cause a reduction in, or loss of, the ca-
pability of a functional unit to perform a required function.”
2.1.1.3 Reliability
Reliability is defined as “the probability that an item can perform a required function
under given conditions for a given time interval” by IEC 60050 [90]. Reliability is
an important quality characteristic of embedded systems. The life distribution of a
system F (t) is the probability that lifetime T is less or equal to time t. It means
that a system has already failed by t.
F (t) = P (T ≤ t)
There are the following assumptions for the distribution:
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• F (t = 0) = 0, i.e., the system is intact.
• limt→∞ F (t) = 1, i.e., system sometimes fails.
Reliability R(t) is the probability that at time t no failure has occurred:
R(t) = 1− F (t)
The life distribution F (t) is also called the unreliability, failure probability, or prob-
ability of failure.
2.1.1.4 Risk
Risk is defined as “combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the
severity of that harm” by IEC 61508 [92]. The frequency of harm may be the failure
probability or failure rate.
Risk = H ∗ S
, where H is the expected frequency of an event that may cause harm, and S is the
expected severity of the harm.
2.1.1.5 Safety
Safety is defined as a state of a system that is “freedom from unacceptable risk” by
IEC 61508 [92].
2.1.1.6 Safety Analysis
Safety analysis is a process that evaluates the risks of a system and aims at the
acceptance of those risks [119,124].
2.1.1.7 Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a logical safety analysis method that evalu-
ates risks of the complex systems using probability theory [140,142]. NASA [140,142]
illustrates the typical task flow of PRA (Figure 2.1) and depicts the task flow as
follows:
• Objectives definition. The goals of the PRA and the undesirable conse-
quences need to be determined.
• System familiarization. The system must be known well with respect to
the design and operational information.
• Initiating events identification. All initiating events that may cause the
defined undesirable consequences must be identified.
• Structuring scenarios. An accident scenario describes a case that an initial-
ing event causes an undesirable consequence. Using the inductive Event Tree
(ET), each accident scenario is modeled as a series of events that starts with
an initiating event and has sequentially caused intermediate events as well as
a final undesirable consequence.
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Figure 2.1: Typical task flow of PRA [142].
• Logic modeling. For a specific intermediate event in an accident scenario, the
failures of this event are modeled as a Fault Tree (FT) (section 2.1.2). A FT
illustrates how the given event is caused by a set of logically connected basic
events. The constructed FTs are connected as a whole model for quantifying
the accident scenarios.
• Data collection and analysis. The data that is used in the PRA process
must be collected and processed.
• Quantification and integration. The constructed FTs are logically con-
nected and quantified for determining the frequency of occurrence of the un-
desirable consequences.
• Uncertainty analysis. Uncertainty analysis measures the confidence in the
quantification results based on FTs. The commonly used method is Monte
Carlo simulation.
• Sensitivity analysis. Sensitivity analysis measures the relations between the
changes of the inputs of PRA and the resulting impacts on the risk.
• Importance ranking. Importance ranking (importance analysis) identifies
the major failures that contribute the most to risk.
2.1.1.8 Risk Acceptance and Risk Reduction
Risk Acceptance represents that the actual risk is below or equal to the specific ac-
ceptable value. It provides a decision whether the risk of a system or a component is
acceptable, i.e., whether the system or the component is safety. The commonly used
methods are MEM (Minimal Endogenous Mortality) [37], GAMAB (Globalement
Au Moins Aussi Bon) [37], ALARP (As Low as Reasonably Practicable) [88], and
SIL (Safety Integrity Level) [92].
Risk Reduction identifies ways to reduce the potential loss associate with the
actual risks. It is used to achieve the goal of the safety analysis. Risk acceptance
and risk reduction are important strategies in the risk management [99].
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(a) A FT consists of three basic
events that are connected by an
AND-gate and an OR-gate.
(b) FT with the semantic meaning.
Figure 2.2: Fault Tree.
2.1.2 Fault Tree Analysis
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is an effective technique of safety and reliability analysis
for embedded systems. The FTA was proposed for the Minuteman Launch Control
System in 1961 [63], and then defined in international standards [55,91,92,142,143].
This is a deductive analysis method allowing to trace the causes of an undesired
system state back to its roots. The FTA is based upon the usage of so-called Fault
Trees (FTs). The FTA contains qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis for
FTs. The FTA is mainly applied to the following aspects [142]:
• understanding of the logic leading to a specific failure.
• analysis of the possible scenarios of the low-level failures that sufficiently cause
a specific failure.
• priority of the failures leading to a specific failure.
• optimization of resources.
• improvements of the vulnerabilities of the system safety.
2.1.2.1 Fault Tree
Fault Tree (FT) is the core of the FTA (Figure 2.2 (a)). A FT is represented as a
tree-like structure that consists of minimal three types of basic elements: Top Event,
Basic Event, and Gate.
• The top event (TE) is the root (output) of the FT and represents the specific
failure of a system.
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• The basic events (BEs) are leaf nodes of the FT and represent the failures
that may cause a top event to occur. A basic event will no longer be refined.
Engineers may assign a failure probability to a basic event. The failure prob-
ability of a top event can be calculated according to the failure probabilities
of its basic events. There are variants of basic events including Conditioning
Events, Undeveloped Events, and House Events.
• The gates are the intermediate nodes of the FT that logically connect elements
of the FT. There are various types of gates that represent different logical
relations among elements. The basic types of gates are the OR-gate and the
AND-gate. The OR-gate represents that its output event occurs only if at least
one of the input events occurs. The AND-gate represents that its output event
occurs only if all input events simultaneously occur. Other types of gates,
e.g., the Priority-AND gate and the Exclusive-OR gate, are variants of the
AND-gate and the OR-gate [142].
Additionally, there are two kinds of elements for modularization of the FT: Transfer
In and Transfer Out. There are two styles for the graphical symbols of the FT:
US [142] (Figure 9.1) and European [91]. Figure 2.2 (a) shows an example of the FT.
There are three basic events “BE1”, “BE2” and “BE3”. The basic events “BE2” and
“BE3” are connected by an AND-gate “G2”. The basic event “BE1” is connected
with the failure coming from “G2” by an OR-gate “G1”. The failure coming out
from “G1” is represented by the top event.
Besides qualitatively representing relations among elements of FTs, gates can
also perform boolean calculation for the output failure probabilities. The failure
probability of the AND-gate P is the product of failure probabilities of all input
elements pi. The probability is formulated as
P =
n∏
i=1
pi
The failure probability of the OR-gate P is formulated as
P = 1−
n∏
i=1
(1− pi)
The FTA provides a deductive method to construct a FT starting at a specific
undesired failure, i.e., the top event. The FTA iteratively determines the causes of
the specific failure, i.e., basic events. In the process, the FTA uses gates to connect
the causes found. A FT represents the logical interrelationships of basic events that
cause the specific failure, i.e., the top event of the FT. Figure 2.2 (b) shows a FT
that has semantic meaning. The top event of the FT represents the failure “Laptop
is not available”. This problem may be caused either by the failure of “Laptop
hardware is defective (BE1)” or by the failure “Power supply system is not available
(G2)” because both failures are connected by the OR-gate “G1”. The failure “Power
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supply system is not available (G2)” may be caused when the failures of “Battery
is defective (BE2)” and “Adapter is defective (BE3)” simultaneously occur because
they are connected by the AND-gate “G2”. In this way, the basic failures (i.e., basic
events) that may cause the top event are identified and their logical relations are
represented by logical gates.
After generating a FT, it still needs the suitable methods to quantitatively and
qualitatively analyze the FT. Qualitative analysis focuses on the combinations of
basic events that may lead to the top event. Quantitative analysis works on investi-
gating the failure probability of the top event, and the estimation of basic events.
A FT may be large when the analyzed system is complex. Ericson et al. [94]
provided a rule: small FT (<100 events), medium FT (100 to 1,000 events), and
large FT (> 1,000 events). The events include basic events, variants of basic events
(e.g., House Events), and gates (as intermediate events).
2.1.2.2 Component Fault Tree
For modeling a complex system in the design phase, engineers usually divide the
system into architectural components (i.e., technical components) by applying a
hierarchical decomposition concept to the system architecture [43, 76]. The system
architectural components may be recursively divided into sub-components.
The traditional modularization concept allows FTs to be organized according
to the contained sequence of failure influences into different modules, where each
module represents an independent sub-tree [55,108]. However, this concept does not
allow FT modules to be used the same way as is possible for system architectural
components in the system design. Additionally, because a failure may influence the
top event in multiple scenarios, engineers usually build multiple basic events for the
failure over different sub-trees of the FT. In this way, the “repeated events” issue is
introduced in the FT construction.
To solve these issues, Kaiser et al. [107,108] proposed an extended modeling con-
cept called Component Fault Trees (CFTs) by taking the hierarchical system archi-
tecture into account. With respect to safety analysis, a system can be modeled using
CFT components instead of modules. Figure 2.3 demonstrates an example with re-
spect to the transformation from a FT to a CFT consisting of four CFT components.
The system-level component “C1” represents the risk of a system. This component
contains other (sub-)CFT components that represent risks of the subsystems (i.e.,
the architectural components of the system). The repeated basic events “Power Unit
Down” are merged to form the component “Power Unit”. This solves the issue of the
repeated events. The basic events representing “CPU Down” respectively belong to
the component “Main Controller” and “Auxiliary Controller”. The CFT component
“Power Unit” inputs the failure into both the upper components via in/out ports.
Each CFT component corresponds to a system architectural component. With
the help of in- and out-ports, engineers may treat each CFT component as a black
box without considering the details. Components are influenced or influence others
only via ports. A CFT may output data to multiple successors. Thus, the CFT
is no longer a tree, but a directed acyclic graph (DAG). A CFT component may
iteratively contain other components like the relations between the architectural
components in the system hierarchical model. Thus, the CFT provides two types
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(a) Fault tree. (b) Component fault tree corresponding to the
fault tree of (a).
Figure 2.3: Component Fault Tree (example from [108]).
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Figure 2.4: The multi-level nesting of the CFT components. Component “C2” is
nested in component “C1” and “C1” is nested in the system-level CFT component
“C0”.
of structures: the nesting relations of CFT components and the logical structure of
the CFT component (shorter form: “CFT structure” or “logical structure”), which
represents the logical data flow. For example, in Figure 2.3, the system-level CFT
component contains the other three components that are connected by a logical
structure. Figure 2.4 demonstrates a CFT that has a multi-level nesting structure.
The CFT Component “C2” is nested in component “C1” and “C1” is nested in the
system level CFT component “C0”.
In some cases, multiple technical components of a system may be modeled as
CFT components that have the same logical structure, i.e., the same interface spec-
ification. These CFT components share the same structure (including the failure
probabilities of nodes in the structure) and have different inputs and outputs. This
supports the reusability of CFT components.
2.1.2.3 Failure Propagation
Failure propagation of a basic event represents the causal dependencies between fail-
ure mechanisms and the way that a failure of the basic event propagates through the
system. The failure propagation is represented along a critical path that starts with
an initial basic event, goes through the sequentially caused intermediate failures and
ends at the top event. For the qualitative analysis, the critical path concept works
on investigating how the top event is step-by-step achieved from the specific basic
events. For the quantitative analysis, the critical path concept may represent the
quantitative failure propagation, i.e., how basic events contribute their failure prob-
abilities to that of the top event by logical gates. An example presented in Figure 2.5
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Figure 2.5: Critical path of the specific basic event “BE2”. The path sequentially
presents “BE2”, “G2”, “G1”, and “TE”.
shows the critical path of the specific basic event “BE2”. The critical path contains
the basic event “BE2”, the AND-gate “G2”, the OR-gate “G1”, and the top event.
The failure “Battery empty” (basic event “E2”) may cause an intermediate failure
“Power supply system unavailable” by the AND-gate “G2”. Then, the intermediated
failure leads to the failure of the top event “Laptop unavailable” by the OR-gate
“G2”.
2.1.3 Minimal Cut Sets
Minimal Cut Set (MCS) analysis [64, 67, 110, 111, 139, 199, 214] provides a method
based on FTs. An MCS is a smallest combination of basic events that can together
cause a top event to occur. The result of the MCS analysis consists of all possible
MCSs. Each MCS can be treated as a specific scenario that can lead to the top event.
An example shows MCSs of a FT having an AND-gate and an OR-gate (Figure 2.6).
The occurrence of the top event is formulated as a logical representation: (BE1 ∨
BE2)∧BE3 (Figure 2.6 (a)). It can be transformed to (BE1∧BE3)∨ (BE2∧BE3).
Thus, there are two MCSs: MCS1 = {BE1, BE3} and MCS2 = {BE2, BE3} (Figure
2.6 (b)). The count of basic events of an MCS is called order of the MCS [159] or
size of the MCS [111]. In the above example, the order of MCS1 is 2, because it
contains two different basic events. The order of an MCS is inversely proportional to
its safety. An MCS with order 1 is very critical for a system, because the top event
may be triggered by only one basic event (single failure).
Besides the qualitative analysis, engineers may also perform the quantitative
analysis for FTs. The failure probability of an MCS is product of failure probabilities
of the contained basic events (BEs):
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Figure 2.6: Minimal Cut Sets. (a) FT. (b) MCSs of the FT. MCS1 = {BE1, BE3}
and MCS2 = {BE2, BE3}. The order of MCS1 is 2, because it contains two basic
events.
PMCS =
∏
BEs∈MCS
PBEi
Failure probability of a top event is the sum of the failure probabilities of MCSs of
the top event. It is formulated as
PTopEvent =
∑
MCSs
PMCSi
The dominant cut sets is the cut sets that contribute significantly to the top event
probability [142]. The basic events of the dominant cut sets should be prioritized.
A given FT will have a finite number of unique MCSs; however, the scale of MCSs
may be very large [142]. An example given by [143] was that a FT with 299 basic
events and 324 gates had more than 64 million MCSs. According to the rules of the
CFT analysis, the MCS method is adaptable to analyzing CFTs as well.
In addition, the MCS analysis can be used to identify the critical basic events
with respect to the number of occurrence. A basic event may contribute to a specific
undesired system failure (top event) by means of multiple scenarios (MCSs). In this
way, a basic event that appears in many MCSs can be considered as a critical basic
event.
2.1.4 Importance Analysis
Importance analysis is a widely used quantitative measure based on FTs [48,89,93,
136, 137, 142, 159]. Vesely et al. suggested that, in general, more than 90% of the
failure probability of a top event was due to less than 20% of the basic events [142].
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This implies that engineers only need to focus on a small subset of basic events
having major contribution. To identify those, the importance analysis estimates the
respective contributions of basic events with regard to the failure probabilities of
basic events and the logical relations between basic events. The importance analysis
is usually used in three areas [195]:
• (Re)design of the system: adding or removing system components.
• Test and maintenance: optimizing the test and maintenance strategy.
• Daily configuration control: estimating the effect when a component fails.
As a result, the importance analysis assigns each basic event a value of im-
portance. The widely used methods of importance analysis are Fussell-Vesely im-
portance [68, 136, 137, 159], Birnbaum importance [25, 136, 137], Criticality mea-
sure [136,137,159], Risk Reduction Worth (RRW) [38] and Risk Achievement Worth
(RAW) [136,137].
The most commonly used Fussell-Vesely (FV) measure [68,137,159] assigns each
basic event an importance value between zero and one: the larger the value, the
more important the basic event. The sum of the importance of all basic events of
a system may be greater than one since, in some cases, simultaneous failures of
multiple sub-systems may cause the system failure [51]. With the help of MCSs, the
FV importance of the basic event E can be formulated as
FVE =
∑
PMCSs E
PT
, where PMCSs E is probability of an MCS that contains basic event E, and PT is
probability of the top event T .
2.1.5 Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analysis is a method for estimating the relations between changes of
inputs and resulting changes of the output. This method is widely applied in various
domains. In the safety analysis domain, sensitivity analysis based on FTs investigates
the resulting impacts on top event caused by the changes of basic events [48,50,93,95,
136,142,149]. Sensitivity analysis usually is used for the following aspects [48,50,149]:
• Investigation of the impacts on the top event when modifying basic events.
• Identification of the safety vulnerabilities of system design.
• The appropriate improvement solutions for safety vulnerabilities.
For the first aspect, the sensitivity of basic events is usually used to analyze
the accuracy of failure probabilities of basic events. For obtaining the sensitivity
of basic events, engineers first change the failure probability of each basic event by
the same sensitivity factor. According to the changes of the basic events one at a
time, engineers separately investigate the impacts of the failure probability of the
top event. Finally, engineers can identify the most sensitive basic events that cause
the largest impact of the top event. In many cases, some importance measures, e.g.,
Birnbaum importance, can be used to analyze the sensitivity of basic events. The
second and third application aspects of the sensitivity analysis are implemented by
combining with the importance analysis. The consolidated process for improving
safety of systems is described in section 2.1.6 next.
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2.1.6 Safety Improvement Process
In order to efficiently identify the ways for improving the system safety, engineers
usually carry out an iterative process combining the importance analysis and the sen-
sitivity analysis by simulating a series of modifications of the system design according
to the system vulnerabilities. This method was described in [34,42,48–50,138,159].
Contini et al. [48–50] extended the method in order to perform the parallel analysis
of multiple FTs. Caputo et al. [34] applied the method in the Borexino Experiment.
Murtha [138] described an application of the method in vehicle design.
The design modification commonly involves the aspect by replacing the vulner-
able parts of the system by ones having a better failure performance (substitution
concept) or adding identical redundant parts (redundancy concept). Finding satis-
factory modifications in general is a non-trivial task underlying several constraints
and restriction for which formal methods are not always available. Each iteration of
the safety improvement process consists of mainly three steps (Figure 2.7):
1. Perform the importance analysis to identify the basic event having the highest
contribution.
2. Find the hardware component related to that basic event and modify the
system design by replacing the component by another one featuring a better
quality or by introducing identical ones in order to increase redundancy (Figure
2.8).
3. Update the FT model according to the design modification and calculate the
new failure probability of the top event. If the failure probability of the top
event is reduced to an acceptable range, we stop the improvement process,
otherwise go back to step 1 for next iteration.
There may be alternative modifications because of multiple modification ideas
aiming at the identical important basic event (Figure 2.8), and multiple im-
portant basic events (Figure 2.9). If required, engineers need to determine the
optimal modification taking the effect of the modification and the constraints
of modification into account, e.g., the costs of the modifications.
As a result of the safety improvement process, engineers can obtain one or more
improvement solutions (Figure 2.10). Each solution consists of a series of design mod-
ifications. Choosing the proper one is a trade-off between the constraints regarding
the improvement and the safety improvement that actually has been achieved. An
important assumption is that basic events are stochastically independent so that
the change of a basic event does not influence other basic events. An application
example in section 3.2.3.1 shows an iteration of the improvement process.
2.1.6.1 Decision Criteria
To a complex system, the number of possible solutions might be very large. Usually,
there are two ways to reduce the amount of solutions:
• Optimizing the modifications in the construction process of solutions. When
multiple modifications are identified, engineers may determine the optimal
one(s) and refuse the inappropriate alternatives.
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Figure 2.7: The safety improvement process. Step 1: analyze the importance of basic
events and identify the most important one. Step 2: modify system design according
to the most important basic events. Step 3: update the FT and calculate the new
failure probability of the top event. If the new value is acceptable, stop the safety
improvement process, otherwise go to step 1.
Figure 2.8: Different modification ideas of an important basic event. The commonly
used modification concepts are the substitution concept and the redundancy concept.
Figure 2.9: Multiple important basic events. More than one basic event has an
importance similar to the largest importance value.
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Figure 2.10: Multiple solutions. The alternative design modifications may constitute
multiple improvement solutions.
• Reducing the constructed solutions. When multiple available solutions exist,
engineers may identify the optimal one(s).
The objective of the optimization of solutions determines the criterion of modi-
fications. The commonly used criteria are described as follows:
• Identify the improvement solution consisting of the fewest modifications. In
some cases, in order to keep the system stable in the improvement process,
engineers want to modify as few components as possible. In this case, a solution
needs to be found with fewest modification steps. A modification that causes
the most reduction of the failure probability of the top event should be treated
as the optimal one.
• Identify the most cost-effective improvement solution. This criterion takes the
cost of modifications into account. To efficiently use the resource, the most
cost-effective modification should be considered as the optimal one.
2.2 Representation Concepts of Safety Analysis
2.2.1 Representation Concepts of the CFT
2.2.1.1 Single CFT
Although documents standardize the graphical symbols of the FTs [91,142] (Figure
9.1), there are still additional elements for CFTs: CFT component and ports (Figure
2.3). The CFT components are represented as rectangles in the logical structures
of the parent CFT components. The in- and out-ports are represented as small
triangles. The tool ESSaRel [193] implements the CFT analysis using the standard
graphical symbols defined in [108].
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Figure 2.11: Example of the representation method of CFTs (produced using ES-
SaRel [193]). The structure of the system-level CFT (view (1)) and those of the
sub-CFT components (view (2) and view (3)) are shown in separate views.
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Figure 2.12: Visualization Concept of Fault Forest (produced by [26]). Sunburst
layout represents the single CFT. The sunbursts are connected by curve lines to
form a fault forest.
The logical structures of the (sub-)CFT components are presented over separate
views (Figure 2.11). When double-clicking a rectangular symbol representing a sub-
CFT component, the structure of this sub-CFT component will be shown in an in-
dividual view. The views in Figure 2.11 appear in the following way: double-clicking
the leftmost rectangular symbol representing the sub-CFT component “SC8” in view
(1), view (2) appears and show the structure of the sub-CFT component “SC8”; then
double-clicking the rectangular symbol representing the sub-sub-CFT component
“SC12” in view (2), view(3) appears and presents the structure of the component
“SC12”.
2.2.1.2 Multiple CFTs
Logical connections of multiple CFTs forms a network structure called a Fault For-
est. A visualization concept of fault forest was proposed in [26] (Figure 2.12). The
concept uses a sunburst diagram to represent the single CFT and connects the sun-
bursts with curve edges. In a sunburst view, the central ring represents the top event
and the segments represent the internal nodes of the logical structure of CFT. The
logical connections between a node and the child nodes in the CFT are represented
as a segment and the child segments. Colors are used to encode the failure probabil-
ity of the CFT nodes. With the help of this visualization, engineers may analyze the
individual CFTs and the logical connections of CFTs with respect to the multiple
top events.
2.2.2 Representation Concepts of MCS
The currently applied representation concepts of MCSs concentrate on text or tab-
ular forms.
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2.2.2.1 Plain Text
The textual forms list MCSs and their basic events with basic information in plain
text. Advanced functions, e.g., sort, depend on the text editors. The CFT analysis
tool ESSaREL [193] presents MCSs in plain text (Figure 2.13). In each paragraph,
it shows an MCS with its ID, and the IDs and labels of the included basic events. It
also shows the general information of the current analysis, such as an ID of the top
event and count of the MCSs. In some cases, failure probabilities and the orders of
MCSs may be presented optionally in plain text [162].
2.2.2.2 Data Table
Data tables are able to more clearly represent the information of the MCSs than
through using plain text, and provide possibilities for data manipulations [6,100,101]
(Figure 2.14). Data tables present MCSs in rows and the associated information in
columns. Besides the IDs of MCSs, the tables usually also show probability, contri-
bution, and the order of MCSs in columns while the possibly used basic events are
listed in subsequent columns. Engineers may manipulate data in data tables with
few additional visualization properties, e.g., sorting of MCSs. Additionally, MCSs
may be truncated regarding the order or the failure probability in order to filter out
the unimportant MCSs. The data table concepts provided by most of the FTA tools
are quite similar.
Some tools use separate tables to show the MCSs and their basic events, e.g.,
Faulttree+ [100]. When selecting an MCS from a data table that summarizes all
MCSs, the basic events included by the MCS are displayed in another table that
shows detailed data of each basic events (Figure 2.15). Additionally, the general
information associated with MCSs may be presented outside the table, e.g., the
name of the FTA, probability of the top event and statistical information of MCSs.
2.2.2.3 Critical Path Highlighting
Besides the representation concepts that aggregate the information of MCSs, a rep-
resentation concept regarding the critical path in coordination with MCSs is also
provided [29, 100, 161, 186]. The concept does not compactly integrate the overview
of MCSs with the FT structure, but rather provides an interactive coordination.
When selecting an MCS from the data table, the critical paths of the basic events
included by the MCS are highlighted by colored border (Figure 2.16).
2.2.2.4 3D Visualization Concept
A three-dimensional visualization concept of the MCS analysis, called CakES, was
proposed in [4, 5] (Figure 2.17). This visualization worked on integrating the 3D
CAD models of a system with the MCS analysis. This shows the corresponding
relations between the 3D models of the physical parts and the MCSs according to the
commonly related basic events. The MCSs are represented as cylinders and arranged
in a 3D circle layout in three different hierarchies with respected to the criticality
of MCSs. Colors are assigned to the cylinders based on the failure probabilities of
MCSs. When analyzing an MCS, the corresponding cylinder rises from its hierarchy,
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Figure 2.14: Data table representation for MCSs - 1 (produced using RAMComman-
der [6]). MCSs are listed in rows and sorted by the failure probability (the column
“Q mean”). The associated data as well as the basic events are presented in columns.
and shows the 3D models of the physical parts related to the basic events of the
MCS. The commonly used interactions for 3D views, e.g., rotating, are also provided
for this concept.
2.2.3 Representation Concepts of the Importance Analyses
2.2.3.1 Data Table
The result of the importance analysis of the FTA is a set of importance values of
basic events. The result is usually summarized and represented using a data table
by most of the FTA tools [6,48,50,100,161,186]. The basic events are represented in
rows and the importance values as well as the basic information of basic events, e.g.,
the failure probability, are represented in columns. For each basic event, the data
tables may show the results of multiple importance measures in respective columns.
2.2.3.2 Graphical Concepts
For any importance measure, the result is a typical 2-dimensional array data. The
graphical forms are suitable to represent the data-aggregated result [6, 48, 50, 162,
186]. The most commonly used forms are the histogram and the pie chart (Figure
2.19). Besides these forms, there are still commonly used alternative graphical con-
cepts to represent the result of the importance analysis either in 2D or in 3D forms
(Figure 2.20), such as the scatter plot, and the area chart. BlockSim [162] (Figure
2.21) assigns colors to the histogram according to the failure probability of basic
events. Additionally, BlockSim proposed a variant of pie chart called “square pie
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2.17: The 3D representation of MCSs: CaKES (produced by [5]). MCSs are
represented as 3D cylinders. Cylinders are hierarchically arranged in a circle layout
and assigned with colors according to the failure probabilities of MCSs. (a) The view
of MCSs. (b) The view of 3D models of physical parts related to the specific MCS.
(c) The overall 3D model of a robot.
Figure 2.18: Data table representation for the importance analysis (produced using
RAMCommander [6]). The table presents the importance values of basic events with
respect to different important measures.
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Figure 2.19: Graphical representations for the importance analysis (produced using
RAMCommander [6]). Using the histogram, the importance of basic events can be
assessed according to the length of the bars. The pie chart graphically represents
the relative magnitude of the importance of basic events.
Figure 2.20: Alternative graphical representations for importance of basic events
(produced using RAMCommander [6]).
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(a) Histogram with colors. (b) Square pie chart.
Figure 2.21: Colored histogram and the square pie chart (concepts from BlockSim
[162]).
chart” that anticlockwise arranges the basic events in descending order with respect
to the importance values of basic events.
2.2.4 Representation Concepts of the Safety Improvement
Process
The safety improvement process consolidates the importance analysis and the sensi-
tivity analysis for identifying the improvement solutions of the system safety. During
the safety improvement process, engineers require data from various aspects, e.g.,
the data of design modifications, the importance of basic events, and the FT dia-
gram. Besides FT structures, most FTA tools usually provide separate views for the
data. Data relevant to the importance analysis may be represented by various forms
that are introduced in section 2.2.3. Data associated with the design modifications
and the risk reduction are usually represented using data tables, e.g., the failure
probability of the modified basic events, new failure probability of the updated top
event, types of modifications, cost of modifications. There are few visually and in-
teractively associations among the views. In each step of the safety improvement
process, engineers need to manually access the data from the views according to the
requirements.
Project CISA [48, 50] arranged data of the design modifications in the separate
views using the ordinary representations. Besides the FT view and the importance
analysis, most data was textually presented in data tables. An indented decision tree
was used to represent the summary of improvement solutions (Figure 2.23). A design
modification was represented as a square where the letter represents the type of
the modification: R represented redundancy concept and E represented component
substitution. The label next each square showed the ID of the related basic event as
well as the ID of the design modification (in the bracket). The separate data views
were logically linked to the decision tree. When selecting a node from the tree, the
data associated with the node was shown in additional views.
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Figure 2.23: The indented decision tree arranging the improvement solutions (con-
cept from [50]). Squares represent design modifications. The letters inside the squares
represent types of the modifications. The label next each square shows the ID of the
related basic event as well as the ID of the design modification (in the bracket).
2.2.5 Other Representation Concepts of Safety Analysis
2.2.5.1 Risk Matrix
In order to qualitatively estimate risk, the risk matrix was proposed and defined
in [97,141,147]. The frequency of occurrence and severity of harm are classified into
different levels (Figure 2.24). Colors are assigned to the levels in order to encode the
criticality of risk.
2.3 Information Visualization
This section, the fundamentals of information visualization are introduced. The in-
troduction is guided following the lecture of “Topics in Information Visualization
and Visual Analytics” conducted by Dr. Dirk Zeckzer at the University of Kaiser-
slautern [210] and the book “Readings in information visualization: using vision to
think” [35].
2.3.1 Graph Drawing
Graph is defined in mathematics as a pair G = (V,E), where V is a finite set of
vertices and E is a finite set of edges. Each edge e ∈ E connects a pair of vertices
(v1, v2) ∈ V for representing the relation in between. If the edges have directions, the
graph is called a directed graph, else an undirected graph. When a directed graph has
no cycles, the graph is called a directed acyclic graph (DAG). A tree is a connected
acyclic graph. A graph is called weighted graph when edges have weights that express
the strength of relations between vertices. A graph is called a bipartite graph when
there are only two disjoint sets of vertices.
Graph drawing is a research area that focuses on the algorithms of graph that
usually work on the layouts of node-link diagrams taking readability of graphs into
account [191]. The commonly used layouts are:
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Figure 2.24: Risk matrix. Frequency of occurrence and severity of harm are respec-
tively classified into different levels. Colors encode the levels.
• Reingold-Tilford layout [160, 203] (Figure 2.25 (a)) is the commonly used al-
gorithm for drawing rooted-trees. This algorithm represents a tree by layering
the nodes according to their parent-child relations in a specific direction, e.g.,
top-down orientation. This clearly reflects the hierarchy of data.
• Radial layout [58, 59, 85] (Figure 2.25 (b)) uses a polar coordinate instead of
the Cartesian coordinate to represent trees. The root node of a tree is placed in
the center of the radial plot and hierarchies are represented by radius. Nodes
are placed on the concentric circles according to their hierarchies.
• Balloon tree layout [127, 135] (Figure 2.25 (c)) is a particular radial tree that
places nodes around their parent node rather than the concentric circles.
• Force-directed layout [60,65,109,192] (Figure 2.25 (d)) is also called the spring
layout. The graph is treated as a physics model. The distance between nodes
depends on the calculated attraction force and the repulsive force.
• Circular layout [57] (Figure 2.25 (e)) places graph nodes on a circle. This
effectively reduces the node overlapping.
• Hierarchical graph layout [15, 53, 183] (Figure 2.25 (f)) represents directed
acyclic graphs (DAGs) taking the hierarchy of graphs into account. This layer
can be determined from either structural properties or a specified attribute of
nodes.
2.3.2 Visualization
Visualization is a process that represents relations or data as a visible form. This
is an important branch of the computer graphics. Visualizations can be primarily
classified into two types:
• Scientific visualization: visualizing spatial data.
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(a) Reingold-Tilford layout. (b) Radial layout.
(c) Balloon layout. (d) Force-directed layout (produced by Prefuse
[77]).
(e) Circular layout (f) Hierarchical graph layout.
Figure 2.25: Graph layouts.
32 2.3. INFORMATION VISUALIZATION
• Information visualization: visualizing abstract (non-spatial) data.
Visualization is widely applied in science, engineering, and education fields. This
facilitates the data exploration and improves the understanding of concepts and
processes in visual ways. This also supports to intuitively represent the hidden in-
formation.
2.3.3 Information Visualization
Information visualization was defined as follows:
• “The use of computer-supported, interactive, visual representations of abstract
data to amplify cognition” [35].
• “Information visualization utilizes computer graphics and interaction to assist
humans in solving problems” [156].
• “Information visualization is a set of technologies that use visual computing to
amplify human cognition with abstract information” [148].
Information visualization is typically applied in the following fields [210]:
• Statistics: visualizing the statistical data for discovering patterns.
• Social network: visualizing social relations between people.
• File system: visualizing the structure of the computer file systems.
• Software: visualizing the software architecture, evolution, and runtime data.
• Biology: visualizing the gene sequence.
• Schedule: visualizing work schedule, and train and airplane scheduling.
• Data Mining: visualizing the results of data-mining process with respect to
clustering, classification, and association of data.
Information visualization facilitates analysis work with the benefits [210]:
• Intuitive data representation.
• Interactive data exploration.
• Effective pattern analysis and relation discovering in large datasets.
2.3.4 Reference model of Information Visualization
Chi et al. proposed the reference model of information visualization [35, 40, 41, 163]
(Figure 2.26). This model describes the process that transforms the raw data into
the graphical representations.
2.3.4.1 Data Transformation
Raw data is the unprocessed dataset collected from the source. The raw data cannot
be used directly for visualization because errors or missing values may exist. Thus, it
needs to transform the raw data into the case-by-variables table that is the relational
description of the data. The case-by-variables table is based on the mathematical
relation consisting of a set of tuples [35]:
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Figure 2.26: Reference model of information visualization (concepts from [35,210]).
Student ID N 1 2 3 4 5 6
Age Q 26 24 22 23 24 25
Sex N M M F F M F
Major N Math. CS. CS. Math. Phy. Math.
Table 2.1: Example of the case-by-variables table. The rows are values of variables
and the columns represent cases. The first column presents the variables of the cases.
The second column represents the types of the variables.
{〈V alueix, V alueiy, ...〉 , 〈V aluejx, V aluejy, ...〉 , ...}.
A case is represented as a tuple that consists of the values of the variables of the case.
The variables have three basic types: Nominal (N), Ordinal (O), and Quantitative
(Q). A particular type of variable is Link that describes the relationship among
cases. These types are the metadata and may be added to the table. The data
transformation may lose or gain information from the raw data according to the
analysis. For example, the statistical data can be derived from the raw data and
added to the table. Figure 2.1 shows an example of a case-by-variables table that
describes the dataset “Students”. Each student is a case that has four variables: ID,
Age, Sex, and Major. A case is formulated as:
Casei = 〈IDi, Agei, Sexi,Majori〉.
2.3.4.2 Visual Mapping
Then, the case-by-variables table is mapped into the visual structure that graphi-
cally represents the data using spatial substrates, marks, and graphical properties.
Determining the spatial substrate is the first step of the visual mapping. A spatial
substrate is represented as a visualization layout that uses spatial positions to en-
code the variables, e.g., matrix view, node-link diagram. Card et al. [35] concluded
the use of space in four ways:
• 1D, 2D, 3D.
• Multiple dimensions (> 3).
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Figure 2.27: Ranking of marks and graphical properties (concept from [132]). The
propertied in the gray rectangles are not suitable for representing this type of data.
• Trees.
• Networks.
The dimensions of data depends on the number of its attributes. The visual struc-
ture of one-dimensional data are usually embedded in 2D or 3D layouts. The two-
dimensional data are commonly represented using a structure having two axes, e.g.,
scatter plot. The three-dimensional data may be represented either in a 3D space
or by combining a 2D layout with an additional graphical property, e.g., color. The
multiple dimensional data are similar to 3D data, which are represented by inte-
grating 2D/3D layout with use of graphical properties or by combination of layouts.
Trees and networks represent the relations among data objects. Trees represent the
hierarchical structure, i.e. the parent-child relationship. There are two basic repre-
sentation concepts for trees: node-link diagram and space-filling diagram. Networks
are commonly represented by node-link diagrams. The matrix-based layout is an
alternative representation for networks. The representations of trees and networks
are introduced in section 2.4 regarding the previously proposed visualizations.
A spatial substrate only represents limited variables. It still needs to apply marks
and graphical properties to the visual structure. The commonly used marks and
graphical properties are [35]:
• marks: points, lines, areas, and volumes;
• graphical properties: connection, enclosure, position, length, angle, slope, den-
sity, color saturation, color hue, texture, shape.
Mackinlay [35,132] proposed a ranking for the marks and graphical properties with
respect to quantitative data, ordinal data, and nominal data (Figure 2.27). This is a
top-to-bottom ranking, e.g., the property “position” is preferred for all three kinds
of data.
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2.3.4.3 View Transformation
The view transformation works on dynamically exploring the visually encoded data
using interactions that involve three main aspects [35]: use of locations, viewpoint
control, and distortion of visual structures. The commonly used interactions are
introduced in section 2.3.5.
2.3.5 Interactions
2.3.5.1 Direct Manipulation
Shneiderman introduced this interaction in [168]. The user is allowed to directly
select, move, rotate and resize a visual object. In order to identify the selection, the
selected objects are usually highlighted. This concept provides easily understandable
operations and rapid visual feedback.
2.3.5.2 Dynamic Queries
Dynamic queries [3] allow the user to explore the visualized data by dynamically
adjusting query conditions using interfaces. Usually, the user interactively modifies
parameters of the visualization by changing sliders or buttons for different query
conditions. This technique instantly responds to the query and graphically represents
the results.
2.3.5.3 Panning
Panning is an interaction that allows the user to smoothly move the display space
of a large image in order to show the particular part of the image that is currently
out of the screen. Usually, the user is allowed to directly drag the display space until
the desired part is visible.
2.3.5.4 Zooming
(Geometric) Zooming allows to enlarge or shrink the display space of an image while
maintaining the size of the image. Zooming supports the user to dynamically switch
views between the overview of a large image and the specific part of the image.
2.3.5.5 Semantic Zooming
Semantic zooming displays the detailed semantic content inside the (zoomed) geo-
metric shape of a visual object (Figure 2.30). This concept supports to view more
semantic data of the visual object rather than the detailed geometric information.
Summers et al. [184, 185] proposed the continuous semantic zooming for the rela-
tional structures. This allows to view the detailed semantic information of the specific
visual object while maintaining the relational structures among the objects as the
context. Semantic zooming usually cooperates with the Focus+Context concept.
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Figure 2.28: Fish-eye menu (produced us-
ing Prefuse [77]). The most interesting
number “36” has the largest size. The size
of other numbers depend on the distance
to the number “36”. The larger the dis-
tance is, the smaller the size is.
Figure 2.29: Details-on-Demand con-
cept. The pop-up view is displayed
only when being requested for pre-
senting the details of the desired node.
2.3.5.6 Details-on-Demand
Details-on-Demand [170] is a technique for the balance between overview and details.
This allows the details of visual objects to be hidden until the user desires to view
(Figure 2.29). The technique is usually implemented as follows: select an object in an
overview and then show the detailed information of this object using a pop-up view.
Details-on-Demand concept efficiently uses the limited screen space to represent
large datasets by reducing the amount of the detailed information.
2.3.5.7 Degree-of-Interest (DOI) Distortion
Degree-of-Interest (DOI) distortion was proposed in [66]. The DOI distortion
presents more details for the important items and less details for the unimportant
items. It needs to define the level of detail (LOD) and the DOI function. The LOD
describes how much detail of an item needs to be shown. The DOI function deter-
mines how a visible item is rendered according to its LOD. A famous application is
the fish-eye technique [66] (Figure 2.28).
2.3.5.8 Focus+Context
Focus+Context technique that applies the DOI concept is widely used in human-
computer interaction design [1, 19, 20, 35]. Focus+Context allows to dynamically
zoom the focused content while maintaining the context information (Figure 2.30).
The most commonly used application is that the user investigates the detailed data
while maintaining the overview as the context for navigation.
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Figure 2.30: Focus+Context concept. The focused object is geometrically zoomed in.
By combining with semantic zooming concept, the semantic content of the focused
object is shown.
Figure 2.31: Brush-and-Linking concept. There are two scatter plots for representing
the identical three-dimensional dataset. The red nodes represents the same object
in two plots.
2.3.5.9 Hyperbolic Space
Hyperbolic space technique [122] maps visual structures from euclidean space to
hyperbolic space that is represented as a sphere. In the center of the sphere, the
visual objects keep large size. The larger the distance of an object from center of the
sphere is, the smaller the size of the object has. The hyperbolic space is infinitely
large at the edge of the sphere. When selecting the interesting object, the object
will be moved to the center of the sphere and have a large size.
2.3.5.10 Brushing-and-Linking
Brushing-and-linking technique allows the synchronization among different views
that present the identical dataset (Figure 2.31). When engineers make a change
in any view, the change is dynamically reflected in the other views. This helps to
represent the multidimensional data. The user may simultaneously analyze data
with different points of view in order to find more meaningful information than
independently analyzing the views.
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Figure 2.32: Matrix-based visualization for social networks (produced by [80]). Rows
and columns represent persons and colored cells represent the social relations be-
tween the persons. Colors encode communities.
2.4 Related Visualizations
This section introduces the visualizations that are related to our work.
2.4.1 Matrix-based Visualization
The matrix-based visualization [23,24] is commonly used for representing the array
data whose relations are respectively represented in rows and columns. An important
property of the matrix is the orderability [22–24, 174, 175]. The matrix layout is
widely used in many domains: telecommunication [1], software architecture [17, 52,
196], social network [80–82,197] (Figure 2.32), biology [114,115].
2.4.1.1 Interactions on Matrix Visualization
Rao et al. [153, 158, 189] provided Table Lens technique by applying the Fo-
cus+Context concept with DOI distortion and semantic zooming to a table that
represented large-scale tabular data (Figure 2.33). It may reduce the required dis-
play space by shrinking the row height of the table. Data values were graphically
represented by bars inside cells that need less display space and is more intuitive
than texts. In order to exactly identify the data values, users were allowed to flexibly
enlarge the focused rows and read the detailed values in textual form. This way, ta-
ble lens maintained a good overview of the data by graphical representations while
providing detailed values for the focused data. Table lens technique was extended
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Figure 2.33: Table Lens (produced by [158]). Row height is shrunk in order to reduce
the required display space. Bars graphically represent the data values. Detailed text
data of the focused rows are presented in the enlarged rows.
Figure 2.34: Multi-resolution of matrix (concept from [74]). Cells represent the time-
series measurements of CPU utilization. Colors encode the results of the measure-
ments.
by combining visualizations and interactions according to different application as-
pects [104,115,179,188].
Scaling (or Zooming) of matrix layout shrinks or enlarges the row height as well
as column width in order to balance overview and detail of the visible content. Flexi-
ble scaling may enhance the use of matrix layout. The scaling concept that uniformly
changed the row height or/and column width was proposed in the work [1,61,196].
Hao et al. [72–74] proposed a matrix visualization for time-series data with the
scaling based on the degree of interest (DOI) (Figure 2.34). Cells of the matrix rep-
resented the measurements of CPU utilization. The cells were arranged according
to the time series. Colors encoded the results of the measurements. The DOI con-
cept was used to determine the size of the cells with respect to their occurrence
time. Frank van Ham [196] proposed a matrix with a multilevel scaling concept for
representing the call-relations among components of large software systems. A cell
represented a call between two components or self-calling of an identical component.
The semantic zooming may be used for the matrix to present the detailed calling
relations between sub components of two components. Graham et al. [71] proposed
a matrix visualization for the project matching between users and potential partner
for forming a project. The detail data of the assessors can be displayed using tables
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Figure 2.35: Nearest neighbor graphs are embedded in cells of a correlation matrix
for representing results of clustering (produced by [202]).
inside cells. With the help of the semantic zooming concept, the visualization system
shows a set of detailed relations between the specific data.
2.4.1.2 Hybrid Layout
The matrix-based visualization can be combined with other visualizations. Scatter
plot matrix [36] embedded 2D scatter plots in each matrix cell in order to represent
multivariate data. Each embedded plot represented two- or more-dimensional data
depending on the corresponding cell. Von Landesberger et al. [202] embedded node-
link diagrams that represented the nearest neighbor graphs into matrix cells in order
to represent clustering results (Figure 2.35). Shen and Ma [167] used lines to link
matrix cells for representing complex paths. Henry et al. [81] added curved lines on
the table head of a matrix-based visualization in order to represent the relationships
among persons in social network.
2.4.2 Node-link Diagram
Node-link diagram (Figure 2.25) is a well-known visualization layout consisting of a
set of nodes and a set of links. Nodes are connected using links in order to represent
relations among nodes. The structure of the node-link diagram depends on the
particular semantic meaning or the structural rules [182]. This diagram is suitable
to represent trees and networks.
The node-link diagram is widely applied in many domains. Plaisant et al. [154]
proposed the SpaceTree that provided a dynamic scaling for branches in order to
adapt to the limited display space. Becker et al. [18] used node position to represent
the geographical data on the map and used lines to represent the data transfer of
the telecommunication network. Heer et al. [78] visualized social networks using
the node-link diagram that the portraits of contacts were attached to nodes for
the intuitive identification (Figure 2.36). The node-link diagram was also applied to
decision trees in [145,194,205,211].
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Figure 2.36: Node-link diagram (produced by [78]). This visualizes the social network
where nodes represent persons and links represent social relations.
In many applications, the node-link diagram is combined with other visualiza-
tion methods in order to represent complex data relations that are difficult to be
visualized using a single layout. The matrix visualizations were integrated with the
node-link diagrams in [165] and [82] in order to effectively reducing the line cross-
ing. Zhao et al. [212] proposed a hybrid visualization where the treemap represented
the hierarchies of large-scale data and node-link diagrams showed the topology of
the data (Figure 2.37). Holten [86] proposed a composed visualization where the
sunburst layout represented the hierarchies of the data and node-link diagrams rep-
resented relations among data objects. Boutin et al. [27, 28] applied silhouettes to
node-link diagrams in order to represent the hierarchy information of networks. Hao
et al. [75] presented a node-link diagram in a hyperbolic space in order to effectively
investigate the interesting data objects in a large data warehouse. Jankun-Kelly
and Ma [102] used a radial plot for representing the hierarchies of the network and
used node-link diagrams for illustrating connections of nodes. The primary topology
of networks were represented using node-link diagrams and the additional relations
among nodes were represented by an additional set of edges in [84,123]. Shneiderman
and Aris [171] represented the classified data objects in plots and used additional
links to draw the relations between data objects.
2.4.3 Space-filling Representations
The commonly used layouts representing trees are node-link diagrams and space-
filling diagrams (Figure 2.38). Space-filling diagrams use position or containment to
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Figure 2.37: Elastic Hierarchies combines treemaps and node-link diagrams (pro-
duced by [212]).
Figure 2.38: Tree visualization (concept from [13]). Different layouts represent iden-
tical data. (a) Node-link diagram (organizational chart). (b) Sunburst Layout (tree
ring). (c) Icicle diagram. (d) Treemap.
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 43
Figure 2.39: Icicle diagram representing the file system (produced using Protovis
[155]).
represent the hierarchical relations instead of edges of node-link diagrams. Space-
filling techniques provide better space-efficiency than node-link diagrams while they
are not good at representing the topology of trees. This section we introduce the
space-filling techniques: treemap, sunburst layout, and icicle diagram.
2.4.3.1 Icicle Diagram
The icicle diagram (also called icicle plot) provides a compact visualization layout for
representing the tree structure [117,121]. It uses stacked rectangles to represent the
data hierarchy (Figure 2.38 (c), Figure 2.39). The child rectangles are placed under
the parent rectangle. The length of leaf rectangles may be proportional according
to a quantitative attribute of leaf nodes. According to the length, leaf nodes may
be intuitively estimated and compared by this applied attribute. The length of a
rectangle is the total of the length of its child rectangles. Thus, the rational relations
between data sets may be represented by length of rectangles. When the length of
a leaf rectangle is identical, the length of a non-leaf rectangle reflects the number of
its child leaf nodes. Icicle diagram may have either vertical or horizontal orientation.
There are applications of the icicle diagram in various fields: Icicle diagrams
were applied to decision trees [9,14,128] (section 2.4.4). In medical research, Wong-
suphasawat et al. [207] represented the patient care data using icicle diagrams where
hierarchies represented the sequence of the treatment and each hierarchy aggregated
the patients at the same treatment step. Chevalier et al. [39] proposed a visual ap-
proach for C++ code analysis using the icicle-diagram-style syntax tree. Sifer [173]
used icicle diagram to represent the hierarchical data websites, e.g., page structure,
file type.
2.4.3.2 Sunburst Layout
The sunburst (also called “tree ring”) is a radial space-filling technique for tree
structure (Figure 2.38(b), Figure 2.40). Root is at the center and hierarchies are
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Figure 2.40: Sunburst layout representing the file system (produced using Protovis
[155]).
represented as concentric circles. It can be treated as the radial icicle layout using
polar coordinates instead of Cartesian coordinates.
Andrews et al. [7] used two linked semi-circle sunburst layouts for the file system,
one represented the system overview and another represented the desired subsystem.
The InterRing project [208] provided various interactions for the sunburst layout,
particularly multi-focus distortions. Stasko and Zhang [180] represented hierarchies
of file systems using the sunburst layout and used colors to encode file types. Keim et
al. [112] provided a visualization approach for monitoring the data flow of computer
networks that sunburst hierarchies respectively represented the source, destination,
and other attributes, e.g., message. Patton et al. [151] visually analyzed the security
of computer networks by representing the hierarchical clustered attack data using
the sunburst layout. Herbert et al. [83] proposed a color-filled sunburst layout to
visualize the data of the economic model “Minority Game”.
2.4.3.3 Treemap Layout
Treemap layout represents the hierarchical data by recursively subdividing the given
rectangle area [169] (Figure 2.38 (d), Figure 2.41). Treemap efficiently utilizes the
space and provides a good overview of the hierarchical data. The quantitative at-
tribute of the leaf nodes is represented using areas. There are various algorithms for
treemaps, e.g., squared treemaps [30], ordered treemaps [172], modifiable treemaps
[200], nested treemaps [105], quantum treemaps [21], cascaded Treemaps [131], and
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Figure 2.41: Treemap layout representing the file system (produced using Protovis
[155]).
cushion treemaps [198]. Balzer et al. proposed the Voronoi Treemaps [12] that used
polygonal shape, e.g., triangle or circle, instead of the traditional rectangular shape
for more flexible adaptation of treemaps.
The treemap was applied in different domains. Heitzmann et al. [79] provided a
treemap visualization for representing file systems and additionally used colors to
encode user access permissions. Holten et al. [87] visualized the hierarchical elements
of a software system using the treemap for analysis of system metrics. Lommerse et
al. [130] proposed a visualization method for software analysis that represented the
nesting of source code syntax using the treemap. Jin and Banks [103] visualized the
competition trees on a tennis match using the treemap. The treemap were also used
for representing the gene ontology data in biology research [11] and the stock-market
data [106,206].
2.4.4 Decision Tree Visualization
A decision tree is a tree-like predictive model that iteratively partitions a dataset
to subsets according to partitioning rules. The root is the original data. The tree
edges represent the rules and the non-root nodes represent the outcomes of different
rules. By defining a set of partitioning rules, the desired subsets can be identified. A
decision tree contains two kinds of basic information: the overall tree structure and
the information attached to each node.
The decision tree applications focus on effectively and efficiently building and
exploring a decision tree [190]. The point of building a decision tree is that users
are able to quickly identify which node should be partitioned. Exploring a decision
tree may facilitate an understanding of the decision-making process. The visually
enhanced decision tree provides helpful information to support further decisions.
The decision tree is widely used for facilitating decision-making in various do-
mains [8, 9, 14, 190]. Many systems provide visualized nodes of decision trees using
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Figure 2.42: The node-link decision tree representing data classification (produced
by [194]). Data are visualized and integrated in the nodes for supporting the split.
Figure 2.43: The icicle-style decision tree representing the classification process of
credit data (produced by [128]).
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Figure 2.44: Decision tree associated with star coordinates and parallel coordinates
for representing the classification results (produced by [190]).
properties, such as colors and bars. The simplest visualization way is the indentation
diagram that represent the decision tree using a Windows Explorer-like layout. For
example, Ankerst et al. [8, 9] provided a decision tree to present the partitioning
process in data mining. The decision tree arranged the partitioning steps. Nodes
represented the attributes that were used for splitting the data. Colors qualitatively
encoded the classes of data.
The node-link diagram is widely applied to the decision tree visualization that
provides an intuitive tree layout [145, 205, 211]. Van den Elzen et al. [194] used a
top-to-bottom decision tree for data classification (Figure 2.42). The nodes repre-
sented the steps of the classification process. The resulting data of any step were
visualized and attached to the corresponding node in order to support the next step
of the classification. Pham et al. [152] used a sunburst layout to organize the deci-
sion tree for the visualization of machine-learning algorithm. The icicle diagram was
applied to decision trees in [9, 14, 128]. This can provide a clear hierarchical struc-
ture without using much display space. The icicle diagram can effectively represent
the node size according to the quantitative values of nodes. Liu and Salvendy [128]
applied the icicle-style decision tree to the visualization of the classification process
(Figure 2.43). Project PaintingClass [190] integrated parallel coordinates and star
coordinates with a decision tree for exploring classified multi-dimensional data (Fig-
ure 2.44). The root node represented a visual projection of the data in the training
set of the classification process. A non-terminal node worked on a projection that
maps from multi-dimensional space into a two-dimensional display. Barlow et al. [14]
proposed a visualization concept consisting of linked views to represent the decision
information in data-mining process.
Chapter 3
Motivation
3.1 Problems and Objectives
This chapter describes the problems of the ordinary representation concepts for the
analyses based on the FT and CFT. The objectives of our work are to address the
problems by applying suitable visualization approaches.
3.1.1 MCS Analysis
MCSs are commonly represented using plain text and tabular forms (section 2.2.2).
The representation methods show only the basic MCS information and a lot of hid-
den information is not visible. Engineers need to discover it by themselves. When the
amount of MCSs is larger, e.g., one thousand MCSs, the ordinary representations
reduce the efficiency of the MCS analysis. The problems of the ordinary represen-
tations of MCSs are summarized as follows and examples corresponding to these
problems are demonstrated in section 3.2.1:
• Weak representations for the relations between MCSs and basic
events. Engineers cannot effectively analyze the specific basic events with
respect to the MCS analysis. In this case, engineers do not know what fail-
ure scenarios of the system may manifest when the basic events occur. The
logical relations between the basic events included by a specific MCS cannot
intuitively represented. Example 1 in section 3.2.1.1 depicts the problem.
• Unsatisfactory overview of a large-scale MCS dataset. Engineers can
view only a small part of the MCSs and cannot explore patterns based on the
overview of MCSs. In addition, navigation of MCSs is not efficient with the
lacking context. Example 1 in section 3.2.1.1 describes the issue.
• Inefficient identification of the important information. Without suit-
able indications, engineers need to manually identify the important informa-
tion from MCSs. The identification may take a great deal of effort, particularly
when the number of MCSs is large. Example 2 in section 3.2.1.2 shows the
problem.
• Weak analysis for the failure propagation. The views of MCSs and the
CFT structure are separate. In this case, engineers need to frequently switch
views in order to identify the failure propagation of MCSs because of the
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loss of the suitable association. Additionally, because of the nesting of the
CFT components (described in section 3.1.2), engineers need to sequentially
go through the parent CFT components for identifying a specific basic event.
Example 3 (section 3.2.1.3) illustrates the problem.
Our objective is to design a visualization approach that facilitates the analy-
sis of MCSs. The effective analysis based on relations between MCSs and basic
events should be possible. Pattern analysis based on the overview of a large number
of MCSs should be possible. Engineers should be allowed to quickly identify the
important information whose detail should be possibly investigated. In addition, en-
gineers should be able to effectively analyze the failure propagation of MCSs while
maintaining the overview of MCSs as the context information.
3.1.2 Importance Analysis
For the importance analysis, the importance values of basic events are usually rep-
resented in data-aggregated forms, e.g., tables and charts (section 2.2.3). The issues
of the representation concepts are briefly summarized as follows and application
scenarios demonstrate the issues in section 3.2.2.
• Weak association between the importance of basic events and the FT
(or CFT) structures. The data-aggregated forms provide a summary view of
the importance of basic events while the FT (or CFT) structure represents the
logic relations between basic events. There are few integrations between the
data-aggregated forms and the FT (or CFT) structure. In two cases, engineers
have to frequently switch views in between:
– analyze the failure propagation along the FT (or CFT) structure with
respect to the important basic events that are identified in the data-
aggregated forms.
– assess the importance of the specific basic events when focusing on the
FT (or CFT) structure.
Example 1 in section 3.2.2.1 depicts the problem.
• Weak patterns analysis. Overview of the importance of basic events may
represent patterns. Engineers cannot effectively associate the overview with the
FT (or CFT) structure for identifying further patterns. An important pattern
is the distribution of the important basic events over the FT modules (or CFT
components). This allows the critical FT modules (or CFT components) that
contain the important basic events to be analyzed. An additional pattern is
the logic relations between the important basic events. Example 2 in section
3.2.2.2 demonstrates the issue.
• Few effective concepts for representing the deeper-nested CFT com-
ponents. We apply the CFT in our work because of its advanced properties,
particularly the corresponding relation between the CFT component and the
system architectural component. Thus, we discuss the representation issues of
the CFT rather than those of the traditional FT. Due to the nesting of CFT
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components, when locating a specific basic event, engineers need to sequen-
tially go through all the direct and indirect parent CFT components of the
basic event until the basic event is found. It may waste much effort if the basic
event is included by a deeper-nested CFT component. This issue hampers the
analysis for the failure propagation of the important basic events, which de-
picts the effects of the occurrence of the important basic events. Additionally,
because the structures of CFT components are displayed in separate views,
it is difficult for engineers to obtain a continuous critical path between the
desired basic event and the top event. It is particularly ineffective when si-
multaneously analyzing multiple critical paths. Example 3 in section 3.2.2.3
illustrates the problem.
As a goal, we need to design a visualization approach that associates the impor-
tance of basic events with the CFT structure. Engineers should be able to analyze
patterns, particularly with respect to the critical CFT components. Our approach
needs to facilitate the identification of the vulnerable system architectural compo-
nents corresponding to the critical CFT components. In addition, the analysis for
influence of the important basic events should be possible, which includes the identi-
fication of the influenced CFT components and the analysis of the failure flow along
the CFT structure.
3.1.3 The Safety Improvement Process
The ordinary representation concepts of the safety improvement process separate
the relevant data across several individual views (section 2.2.4). The significant
data are mostly presented in data-aggregated forms, e.g., tables. There are also
particular views, such as FT structures, and the decision trees. The views may be
linked and interactively show the data of the improvement process. The issues of
the representation concepts are summarized as follows and depicted using examples
in section 3.2.3.
• Weak integration between the sequence of modifications and the
detailed data of modifications. It is difficult for engineers to investigate
the detailed data of the specific modification, e.g., cost of the modification,
when focusing on the overall sequence of modifications in the decision tree.
In this case, engineers have to switch to other views for the required data. In
the whole analysis process, the view switching is possibly very frequent and
requires a great deal of additional effort.
• Few visualizations of the significant data associated with modifi-
cations. The textually represented data are not intuitive for understanding
modifications, particularly for comparing modifications.
• Few interactive associations between data attached to the improve-
ment solutions and the FT (or CFT) structure. Engineers cannot in-
teractively analyze the logic function of the basic event corresponding to the
specific modification. Additionally, the effect of a design modification can-
not be intuitively reflected. In this case, engineers cannot quickly analyze the
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Figure 3.1: Example 1 for the MCS analysis (produced using [193]). The identifica-
tion of the partner basic events for the specific basic event “C1.M1.SC8.E5”. The
first identified partner basic event “C1.M1.SC7.E32” is included by MCS “cutset
17”.
impacts upon the intermediate failures along the critical path of the corre-
sponding basic event. When simultaneously analyzing multiple modifications,
the issue will be more critical.
Our goal is to design a visualization approach that can graphically represent the
significant data and integrate the graphical representations into the safety improve-
ment process. Engineers should be able to quickly investigate the detailed data of
modifications while maintaining the sequential relations between the modifications.
In this way, engineers may focus on the analysis process without needing to waste
energy for the data look-up. Additionally, patterns of the safety improvements with
respect to the CFT components should be explored. For example, the distribution
of the basic events involved by a specific solution over the structure of the FT (or
CFT).
3.2 Examples
The issues of the currently used representation concepts for the MCS analysis, the
importance analysis, and the safety improvement process are summarized in section
3.1. In this section, application scenarios are demonstrated to describe the issues.
3.2.1 Examples of MCS Analysis
3.2.1.1 Application Scenario 1 for the MCS Analysis
In many cases, identifying the related MCSs and related basic events for a specific
basic event is a significant aspect in the MCS analysis [136]. The result of the
analysis shows in which scenarios this basic event may cause the top event to occur.
For example, for a given basic event “E1” that is critical and difficult to improve.
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Figure 3.2: Example 1 for the MCS analysis (produced using [193]). The second
resulting MCS is identified after scrolling the text. It includes the partner basic
event “C1.M1.SC7.E35”.
The related MCSs are: MCS1 = {E1, E2} and MCS2 = {E1, E3}. In this case,
engineers need to concentrate on addressing the partner basic events, i.e., “E2” and
“E3”. Usually engineers can not get support from the ordinary representations for
this analysis.
An application scenario is presented with respect to this issue. Additionally, the
scenario also demonstrates the issues of the ordinary representation concept when
analyzing a large number of MCSs. In this scenario, all 118 MCSs are represented
using plain text (Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2). The basic event “C1.M1.SC8.E5” is
critical and difficult to address. The objective of the example is to identify the
MCSs that include the given basic event and the partner basic events. We achieve
the objective by the following steps:
1. We identify the first MCS including the given basic event. The MCS “17” is
identified as a result (Figure 3.1).
2. We analyze this MCS and find that it includes the partner basic event
“C1.M1.SC7.E32”.
3. We scroll the text in order to identify more relevant MCSs. The MCS with
the ID “23” is then identified. It includes the basic event “C1.M1.SC7.E35”
(Figure 3.2).
4. We repeat the identification from step 1 to 3 until all the relevant MCSs and
their basic events are found. Finally, we find all 39 MCSs and 66 basic events.
According to the application example, we conclude that the textual forms do
not intuitively represent the relations between the specific basic events and MCSs.
Tabular forms have the same problem because table columns do not represent the
fixed basic events, but the index of elements (i.e., basic events) of each MCS, i.e., a
column may present different basic events for different MCSs. Another shortcoming
is that the textual forms do not provide a satisfactory overview of a large number
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Figure 3.3: Example 2 for the MCS analysis. There are 880 MCSs overall in the data
table.
of MCSs. We have to frequently scroll the text for navigating and identifying the
desired MCSs. In this case, engineers need additional effort for the analysis process.
3.2.1.2 Application Scenario 2 for the MCS Analysis
In order to preferentially address the major failure scenarios, it needs to assess the
criticality of MCSs. The commonly used representation concepts provide very few
highlighting methods for the estimation of MCSs. An example is presented in order to
depict the problem. In this example, MCSs and the associated data are represented
in a table (Figure 3.3). We define the criteria for the criticality of the MCSs. MCSs
are treated as the most critical MCSs when they have failure probabilities larger
than “0.01”. MCSs are treated as the secondary critical MCS when they have failure
probabilities between “0.01” and “0.001”. The goal is to identify and classify the
most critical MCSs and secondary critical MCSs.
In order to fulfill the goal, we manually compare the textual failure probability
of each MCS with the thresholds for estimating the criticality of the MCS. As
a result, we finally find 55 most critical MCSs and 120 secondary critical MCSs.
Without intuitive representations for the criticality of MCSs, it takes additional
effort for estimating MCSs by investigating the textual values. Based on the example,
we conclude that it is inefficient to identify the desired MCSs using the ordinary
representation methods because of the loss of suitable highlighting methods.
3.2.1.3 Application Scenario 3 for the MCS Analysis
This example describes the shortcomings of the ordinary representation concepts
with respect to the analysis of the failure propagation. MCSs and the CFT com-
ponents are represented over separate views and there are few context of MCSs.
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Figure 3.4: Example 3 for the MCS analysis. Data table of MCSs.
Figure 3.5: Example 3 for the MCS analysis (produced using [193]). The system
level CFT component “C1.M2”.
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Figure 3.7: Example 3 for the MCS analysis (produced using [193]). The sub-CFT
component “SC3”.
Figure 3.8: Example 3 for the MCS analysis (produced using [193]). The sub-CFT
component “SC4”.
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In addition, due to the nesting relations of the CFT components, for identifying
a specific basic event, engineers have to sequentially go through all the direct and
indirect parent CFT components.
The objective of the example is to identify the critical paths of basic events that
are included by the MCS “cutset 0”. We only investigate the failure propagation
inside the direct parent CFT components of the basic events in the example. We
present the example using the tool ESSaRel [193]. We perform the following steps
to accomplish the objective:
• We analyze the MCS “cutset 0” using the text editor. We find that this
MCS includes three basic events (Figure 3.4). The first one has the ID
“C1.M2.SC1.E32”. According to the naming rules, the ID of a basic event
comprises of the IDs of the parent CFT components and its ID (i.e., the last
part). Thus, we know that the first identified basic event is directly contained
by component “SC1” that is the sub-component of component “C1.M2”.
• We switch views to the system-level component “C1.M2” (Figure 3.5).
• By double-clicking the rectangle symbol representing the sub-component
“SC1”, we switch to an individual view displaying the logical structure of
the CFT component (Figure 3.6).
• We locate the basic event “E32” and its critical path.
• We switch to the text editor (Figure 3.4). We find that the second relevant
basic event is “C1.M2.SC3.E3”.
• We switch to the system-level component “C1.M2” again (Figure 3.5).
• By double-clicking the rectangle symbol representing component “SC3”, we
switch to an individual view displaying the logical structure of the CFT com-
ponent (Figure 3.7).
• We locate the basic event “E3” and its critical path.
• We switch to the text editor (Figure 3.4). We find that the last relevant basic
event is “C1.M2.SC4.E1”.
• We switch to the system-level component “C1.M2” again (Figure 3.5).
• By double-clicking the rectangle symbol representing component “SC4”, we
switch to an individual view displaying the logical structure of the CFT com-
ponent (Figure 3.8).
• We locate the basic event “E1” and its critical path.
By using the ordinary representation concept, we have to switch different views
between MCSs and CFT components, and between different CFT components. Ad-
ditionally, when afterwards investigating the logical relations between the three basic
events, we have to additionally investigate component “SC2” (the upper sub com-
ponent in Figure 3.5). The frequent view switching takes a great deal of efforts.
3.2.2 Examples of the Importance Analysis
3.2.2.1 Application Scenario 1 for the Importance Analysis
In many cases, engineers purpose to assess the importance of desired basic events
when they focus on the logic structure of a FT. The ordinary representation concepts
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(a) FT structure. “Module 3” contains two basic events: “B3” and “B10”.
(b) Table for the importance of basic events.
Figure 3.9: Example 1 for the importance analysis (produced using [6]). We need
to switch views between the FT structure and the data table in order to assess the
importance of the basic events that are identified in the FT structure.
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of the FT structure do not directly represent the importance of basic events. This
example describes this issue. The goal of the example is to compare the importance
of basic events of the module “Module 3”. We fulfill this goal by the following steps:
1. We identify the first basic event in “Module 3” of FT (Figure 3.9). The result-
ing basic event is “B3”.
2. We switch to the table for the importance of basic events and investigate the
importance of the basic event “B3”. The result is 0.0119627.
3. We switch views to the FT structure again for identifying the next basic event
of “Module 3”. The resulting basic event “B10” is identified.
4. We switch back to the table and find that the importance of “B10” is
0.0598126.
5. We compare both basic events and conclude that the basic event “B10” is
more important than the basic event “B3”.
In the process of the example, it takes much more effort to frequently switch
views. The issue will be more critical when a lot of basic events in the FT structure
need to be compared. This problem also occurs by CFTs in the same way.
3.2.2.2 Application Scenario 2 for the Importance Analysis
Importance analysis based on FTs (or CFTs) usually provides the summary in-
formation and the possible ranking of basic events according to the importance of
basic events. When analyzing the importance of basic events by associating the sum-
mary information and FT structures, engineers may identify patterns with respect
to the distribution of importance of basic events over the FTs (or CFTs). For exam-
ple, which modules (or CFT components) contain the important basic events, and
which important basic events are contained in a specific module.
We provide an example of depicting the issue. In the example, the important basic
event is defined as a basic event that has an importance value greater than 0.04.
The importance of basic events are summarized in a table and ranked in descending
order. The goal is to identify the distribution of the important basic events over the
modules of a FT and the logical relations between the important basic events. The
following steps are needed in order to achieve the goal:
1. We view the table for the importance of basic events (Figure 3.10 (a)) and
find that the basic event “B22” is the most important.
2. We switch to the FT structure and locate the basic event “B22” (Figure 3.10
(b)). We find that “Module 5” contains the basic event. We manually mark
the basic event up in the FT structure.
3. We repeat step 1 and step 2 to identify other important basic events and locate
them in the FT structure.
As a result, according to the marks we made in the process, we can obtain a dis-
tribution of the important basic events in the FT structure. we find that “Module
5” contains the basic events “B21” and “B22”, and “Module 4” contains the basic
event “B8”. Basic events “B21” and “B22” are connected by an OR-gate.
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(a) Data table for the importance of basic events.
(b) FT structure. The basic event “B8”, “B21”, and “B22” are the important basic events.
Figure 3.10: Example 2 for importance analysis (produced using [6]).
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According to the example, we conclude that by the commonly used data-
aggregated forms, it is difficult to effectively reflect the distribution of basic events
over the FT structures. In the process, we need to manually mark up the result-
ing basic events that we found in the FT structure, otherwise we will forget them
when afterwards analyzing other important basic events. In this case, it is difficult
to intuitively analyze the logical relations between multiple important basic events
in the FT and the distributions of them over the FT unless these basic events are
manually marked. The issue becomes more serious for some advanced demands, such
as an overview of critical paths of multiple important basic events. This problem is
also serious for CFTs. This is even more critical because of the nesting relations and
separate views of CFT components (described in Example 3.2.2.3) .
3.2.2.3 Application Scenario 3 for the Importance Analysis
In the CFT, when locating a basic event, engineers have to go through all the
direct and indirect parent CFT components because of the nesting relations between
CFT components. Additionally, it is difficult to obtain a continuous critical path
because CFT components are separately represented over several views. The issues
are illustrated using this application example. The goal of the example is to identify
the most important basic event “C1.M1.SC18.SC4.E32” and analyze its critical path.
In the example, the ID of a basic event represents the location of the basic event.
The ID of the important basic event “C1.M1.SC18.SC4.E32” may be divided into
the following parts: “C.M1” is the system-level CFT component, “SC18” is the sub-
component, “SC4” is the more deeper sub-component of “SC8”, and “E32” is the
local ID of the basic event in component “SC8”. We need the following steps to
achieve the goals:
1. We view the system-level CFT component “C1.M1” and find the rectangle
symbol representing the (sub-)component “SC18”(Figure 3.11 (1)).
2. We switch to component “SC18” (Figure 3.11 (2)). We find the rectangle
symbols representing the (sub-)component “SC4”.
3. We switch to component “SC4” and find the desired basic event “E32” (Figure
3.11 (3)).
4. Then, we investigate the critical path of the basic event by tracing back from
the view (3) to the view (1). We may separately review the partial critical
paths in different views (Figure 3.12).
• We identify the partial path along the structure of component “SC4”
in the view (3): E32 → G5 → out-port. We need to analyze the parent
components of “SC4” in order to identify the remaining path.
• We switch to component “SC18” (the view (2)) that is the direct parent
component of “SC4”. We continue the path from the rectangular symbols
representing component “SC4”: G3 → out-port.
• We finally go to the view of the system-level component “C1.M1” (the
view (1)) that directly contains component “SC18”: G6 → G1 → Top
Event.
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The example depicts two main issues. First, in order to identify the basic event
“E32”, we have to sequentially go through its indirect parent components “C1.M1”
and “SC18”. By the ordinary representation of the CFT, it is difficult to directly view
the basic event in its direct parent component “SC4” without considering the higher-
level parent components. However, in some cases, when analyzing an important
basic event, engineers only focus on its direct parent component because this basic
event directly influences only this CFT component. In this case, investigating all the
higher-level parent components wastes a lot effort. When analyzing an important
basic event whose direct parent component is deeper nested in the CFT structure, the
issue will be more critical. Second, we cannot analyze the continuous critical path in
one view. The representation concept using separate views reduces the effectiveness
of the analysis for the failure propagation of the basic events. When simultaneously
analyzing multiple critical paths, the issue will be more serious.
3.2.3 Examples of the Safety Improvement Process
Because the ordinary representation concepts separate the data over individual
views, engineers need to frequently switch views according to the associations be-
tween the data. In this way, efficiency and effectiveness of the safety improvement
process is reduced because the significant context information is missing. The in-
formation related to the safety improvement process mainly involves two aspects:
the construction of solutions and the analysis of solutions. The section presents the
application scenarios with respect to these two aspects.
3.2.3.1 Application Scenario 1 for the Safety Improvement Process
The example illustrates the issues of the currently applied representation methods
when constructing an improvement solution. The objective of the example is to
identify a new optimal design modification in one iteration of the safety improve-
ment process. The actual failure probability of the top event is “0.0976”. We define
the goal value of the improvement as “0.04”. We need to identify the most cost-
effective modification when there are multiple modification alternatives. We fulfill
the objective by the following steps:
1. We perform the important analysis and analyze the resulting histogram of the
importance of basic events (Figure 3.13). We find that the basic event “B22”
is the most important.
2. There are two modification alternatives (according to the domain knowledge).
We simulate the first design modification alternative “M1” that substitutes
the old part having a failure probability of “0.06” with a new one having
a failure probability of “0.02”. The cost of this modification is 5 units. We
update the FT according to the modification in order to simulate the change
of the system risk (Figure 3.14). The failure probability of the top event is
reduced from “0.0976” to “0.0592”. The cost-effectiveness of the modification
alternative is stored in a data table.
3. We simulate the second modification alternative “M2” that applies a parallel
redundancy by adding one identical hardware component. Before performing
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Figure 3.13: Example 1 for the safety improvement process (produced using [6]).
Histogram represents the importance of basic events. The basic event “B22” is the
most important basic event.
the simulation, we have to reset the FT to the unchanged initial state.
4. We update the FT structure according to the redundant concept (Figure 3.15).
The updated failure probability of the top event is reduced from the initial
value “0.0976” to “0.0435”. The cost of the modification is 10 units.
5. We switch to the data table of the modifications “M1” (Figure 3.16 (a)). The
cost-effectiveness is “130.21”.
6. We switch to the data table of the modifications “M2” (Figure 3.16 (b)). The
cost-effectiveness is “184.84”.
7. We compare both values and finally find that modification “M2” is more cost-
effective. Then we select the redundancy modification and refuse the substitu-
tion method.
8. We compare the new failure probability of the system and the goal value. The
new failure probability “0.0435” is still larger than the goal value of “0.04”.
Thus, we need to perform further iteration of the system improvement starting
from step 1.
According to the example, we conclude that the separated data views increase
the efforts when constructing solutions. And the analysis may be interrupted when
looking up data in different views.
3.2.3.2 Application Scenario 2 for the Safety Improvement Process
The example presents an application scenario focusing on the analysis of the con-
structed solutions. In this example, there are four existing solutions. The objective
can be separated into three ordered sub-tasks:
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.16: Example 1 for the safety improvement process. Data tables for the
modifications “M1” and “M2”. The cost-effectiveness of modification “M2” is larger.
Hence, the redundancy concept is preferred.
Figure 3.17: Example 2 for the safety improvement process. Data table for the im-
provement solutions. Solution “S4” has the minimal total cost.
Figure 3.18: Example 2 for the safety improvement process. The decision tree repre-
sents the sequential modifications. Solution “S4” consists of the modifications “M2”
and “M2.2”.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.19: Example 2 for the safety improvement process. Data tables for different
design modifications.
• Identify the solution having the lowest cost;
• Identify the modification, which causes the largest reduction of failure proba-
bility of the top event in the identified solution;
• Locate the related basic event in the FT structure.
We accomplish the objective by the following steps:
1. We view the data table summarizing solutions in order to identify the solution
having the minimal total cost (Figure 3.17). Solution “S4” is identified as a
result.
2. We switch to the decision tree view that arranges the modifications (Figure
3.18). As a result, we find that the modifications “M2” and “M2.2” belong to
solution “S4”.
3. We switch to the data table for modification “M2” (Figure 3.19 (a)). The
failure probability of the top event is “0.0384”.
4. We switch to the data table for modification “M2.2” ((Figure 3.19) (b)). The
failure probability of the top event is “0.012”.
5. We compare the probability values and find that “M2” causes the larger impact
on the top event.
6. We switch to the data table for modification “M2”. We identify that the cor-
responding basic event is “B10”.
7. We switch to the FT structure view in order to locate the basic event “B10”
and its critical path (Figure 3.20).
We conclude that reviewing the existing solutions using the separate views is
an inefficient way. Frequently switching views may bother the analysis process. The
textual values are not intuitive for the comparisons. We need to manually identify
the basic events corresponding to the solution in the FT view. When we purpose
to simultaneously investigate multiple modifications, even multiple solutions, the
required efforts may exponentially increase.
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Chapter 4
Design Concepts for Visual
Structures
In the dissertation, we propose visualization approaches in order to support three
analyses based on the CFT analysis: the MCS analysis, the importance analysis, and
the safety improvement process. Visual mapping is the core step of the reference
model of information visualization (section 2.3.4), which transforms data to the
fundamental structure of a visualization (i.e., a spatial layout). This chapter focuses
on the visual mapping and conceptually discusses the design of the visual structures
of our visualizations, particularly the spatial substrates. The details of graphical
properties and interactions are discussed in Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7.
The common design rules for our visualization approaches are defined with respect
to the following aspects:
• Readability and space efficiency. The estimation of layouts has two sig-
nificant aspects: readability and space efficiency. The readability describes
how correctly and fast the user can find the answers from a visualization
[69,120,146,187,213]. The space efficiency is aimed at the rational utilization
of screen space. In our work, readability is the primary consideration of the
design decision and the space efficiency is the meaningful complement.
• Dimensionality of visualization. The decision of the dimensionality is an open
question in information visualization. Two-dimensional layouts are most com-
monly used. The third dimension is applied to the particular data that cannot
be effectively represented using only two dimensions. The evaluations between
2D and 3D visualizations were discussed in [44, 46, 116, 125, 150, 166, 177, 181,
204] with respect to various aspects. However, the results were dependent on
the tasks and settings of the evaluations, and thus were not identical. It is
difficult to conclude the general principles for determining dimensionality. We
basically prefer the 2D layout in our work, unless there are particular require-
ments for the third dimension.
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Figure 4.1: The relations between MCSs and basic events.
Element N MCS1 MCS2 ... MCSn BE1 BE2 ... BEm
Type of Element N
Relation Link
Failure Probability Q
Unreliability level O
Number of relations Q
Table 4.1: The case-by-variables table for the MCS data.
4.1 Regarding the MCS Analysis
4.1.1 Data
According to the definition of the MCS analysis (section 2.1.3) and the motivations
of our work (section 3.1.1), the required raw data (shorter form “R”) of the analysis
is collected with respect to the following aspects:
• Analysis of the inclusion relations between MCSs and basic events.
– R1: the inclusion relations between MCSs and basic events.
• Estimation of MCSs and basic events.
– R2: the failure probability of MCS.
– R3: the failure probability of basic event.
• Investigation of the failure propagation of MCSs.
– R4: the CFT structure.
4.1.2 Data Transformation
Based on the principles of the reference model (section 2.3.4), we transform the raw
data into case-by-variables tables. Although the content of the case-by-variables
table depends on the specific task of the MCS analysis, we list the essential data
with respect to the MCS analysis in Table 4.1 in order to determine the visual
structure. The table has the following variables:
• Variable “Element” represents the element of an MCS dataset with the ID.
An element may be a MCS or a basic event.
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• Variable “Type of Element” is derived in order to distinguish the elements. A
type may be “MCS” or “basic event”.
• Variable “Relation” (referring to R1) has the type Link and represents the in-
clusion relations between MCSs and basic events (Figure 4.1). For an MCS, the
value of this variable is a set of basic events, e.g., MCS4 = {BE2, BE3, BE5}
(Figure 4.1), and for a basic event, the value of the variable “Relation” is a
tuple of MCSs that include this basic event, e.g., BE1 = {MCS1,MCS3}.
• Variable “Failure Probability” (referring to R2, R3) is the native properties
of the MCSs and basic events. We use the constant failure probability in our
work.
• Variable “Unreliability level” is derived in order to qualitatively estimate the
failure probability.
• A statistical variable, “Number of relations”, is derived for the total links
of each element. This may represent the order of an MCS or the number of
occurrence of a basic event.
The failure propagation of MCSs (referring to R4) is a particular piece of data
that depends on the structure of the CFT (Table 4.5). The data are independent on
MCSs, so a visual structure needs to be designed for the failure propagation that
can be effectively composed with the visualization of MCSs.
4.1.3 Visual Mapping
4.1.3.1 Design of the Layout
The relations between MCSs and basic events may be described as data consisting
of two disjoint sets (i.e., a two-mode data) (Figure 4.1): an MCS set and a basic
event set, whose relations can be represented as a bipartite graph, or a bipartite
network graph. According to the definition of the graph G = (V,E), MCSs and
basic events are vertexes and the inclusion relations are edges. A network is usually
represented using either the node-link diagram or the matrix layout [18]. As a final
result, the 2D Cartesian matrix layout is selected. The decision process is depicted
in the following paragraphs.
4.1.3.1.1 Benefits and shortcoming of the layouts. Basically, an important
reason of selecting the matrix layout is that the rows and columns can naturally
represent MCSs and basic events. The other reasons depend on the well-known
benefits and shortcomings of the layouts:
• node-link diagram
– benefit: intuitive representation of edges; less display space requirement.
– shortcoming: overlapping of vertexes; crossing of edges.
• matrix layout
– benefit: no overlapping of vertexes; no crossing of edges; orderability.
– shortcoming: weak representation of the complex connections; large dis-
play space requirement.
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The node-link diagram can display more elements in the same display space than
the matrix layout can. However, along with the benefit, the visual clutter caused by
crossing of links and node overlapping also appears. In some cases, the interaction
“details-on-demand”, which dynamically shows links of the selected nodes, may
partly solve the issue. However, it also reduces the benefit of the overview of the
relations between nodes.
Several studies compared the readability of the matrix layout and the node-link
diagram using scientific experiments. Ghoniem et al. [69, 70] compared the layouts
in different aspects, e.g., “node count”, and “finding link”. The evaluation also took
the effects of different algorithms of the node-link diagram into account. To examine
whether the above evaluation was also meaningful for complex graphs, Keller el
al. [113] evaluated the matrix layout and the node-link diagram using the directed
graphs with semantic structures, e.g., geographical location, instead of the random
undirected graphs. The evaluations concluded that the matrix layout was better
suited for large and dense graphs (>100 nodes) and the node-link diagram was
more effective for small and sparse graphs. However, the node-link diagram was
more effective for the task of “finding path” that was related to identifying a path
between two nodes, regardless of whether the graph was large or small. The matrix
layout was not good at representing the complex paths, particularly when identifying
the indirect neighbors.
The evaluations provided evidence for determining the layout of our visualization.
Because the MCS data may contain thousands of MCSs as well as basic events,
representing large graphs is a significant point for our design. Since the density of
graphs depends on MCSs generated for the specific systems, we do not take the
density of graphs into account.
First, we consider the readability of the inclusion relations in the MCS data. The
above evaluations revealed that the matrix layout was more effective for the task
of “finding link” that is related to the identification of the relations between MCSs
and basic events. The evaluations [22–24,175] showed that the intrinsic orderability
of the matrix layout can increase the readability of the quantitative properties and
thus outperform the node-link diagram. Using the reorderable matrix, engineers may
instantaneously rank the vertexes (i.e., MCSs or basic events) by the sequence of
rows or columns.
Second, we consider the comparability of the quantitative properties of the MCS
data. MCSs may be estimated and compared according to the quantitative variables,
e.g., the failure probability. The edge-crossing of the node-link diagram reduces
the comparability. The node degree (i.e., the number of the connected links) can
intrinsically represent the order of the MCS and the number of occurrence of the
basic event. In common application, the nodes with large degrees may be treated as
the important elements. However, in the MCS analysis, the criterion is inverse for
MCSs. A critical MCS usually has a relatively small order. This criterion represents a
meaning that is against the visual perception of the node-link diagram. Additionally,
the links of the unimportant nodes may cause the serious crossing issue and interfere
with the identification of the links of the important nodes. Moreover, the degree of
a node may also represent the number of occurrence of a basic event when the node
represents a basic event. The larger the number of occurrence of a basic event is,
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the important the basic event is. This criterion differs from that of MCSs. Thus,
we cannot simultaneously assign the inverse semantic meanings to the node degree.
Considering the reasons above described, we select the matrix layout rather than
the node-link diagram.
4.1.3.2 Cartesian Coordinate vs. Radial Layout
We above discuss the matrix layout based on a Cartesian coordinate. The matrix
layout can be alternatively represented using the radial coordinates.
Diehl et al. [31,54] investigated the readability of the matrix layout using Carte-
sian coordinates and radial coordinates. The studies considered not only the basic
layouts but also the additional visual context and graphical properties that may
increase the readability, e.g., color of border, in order to comprehensively compare
the matrix layouts using different coordinates. The results showed that the Carte-
sian matrix layout brought both better accuracy and higher perception speed of the
tasks with respect to the identification of positions. The authors suggested that the
Cartesian matrix layout should be the first choice, unless there were clear reasons for
using the radial matrix layout. The evaluations also estimated the readability of the
two dimensions in each layout, i.e., row vs. column in the Cartesian matrix layout as
well as sector vs. ring in the radial matrix layout. The results showed that there was
no significant difference between the readability of row and that of column in the
Cartesian layout. In contrast, in the radial layout, the sector significantly outper-
formed the ring. The cross-comparison showed the ranking of the readability of the
four dimensions: sector > row = column > ring. The authors suggested that the
Cartesian matrix layout had a better readability when the data of both dimensions
were almost equally important, and the radial matrix layout was worth selecting
when users only focused on one dimension.
We decide to apply the Cartesian matrix layout. The primary motivation is the
better effectiveness of the Cartesian layout. In addition, the Cartesian layout pro-
vides almost the same readability for rows and columns. This property is beneficial
for the MCS analysis because MCSs and basic events have equal significance in
principle when analyzing their relations.
In short, according to the above-mentioned points, the 2D Cartesian matrix
layout is finally determined as the basic visualization layout for the MCS data.
4.1.3.3 Complements of the Layout
Besides the relations between MCSs and basic events, there are still variables (Table
4.1), e.g., “Failure Probability”. These variables are significant to estimate MCSs
and basic events. In order to represent these variables, we combine two additional
tables with the matrix layout according to IDs by the composition principle [132]
(Figure 4.2). In this way, the composed matrix layout has two additional columns (on
the left) representing the failure probability and order of MCSs, with the additional
rows (at the bottom) representing the failure probability and number of occurrence
of basic events. An important benefit is that the matrix layout may have a more
flexible orderability according to different variables.
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Figure 4.2: Composition of the matrix layout and the tables for properties. The left
table is combined with the matrix according to the IDs of MCSs. The lower table is
combined with the matrix according to the IDs of basic events.
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Element N → row/column
Type of Element N → position
Relation Link → filling
Failure Probability Q → length
Unreliability level O → color hue
Number of relations Q → length
Table 4.2: Graphical properties for the MCS data.
4.1.3.4 Graphical Properties
we determine the graphical properties of the vari ables of the MCS data (Table 4.2).
We use the “filling (or called density)” of cells to represent the variable “Relation”.
This is the commonly used method for representing the co-occurrence between the
row and column in a matrix layout. Because bar graphs are suitable to embed in
matrix cells, we use graphical property “bar length” to visualize the quantitative
variables: “Failure Probability” and “Number of relation”. In order to clearly identify
the unreliability levels of MCSs and basic events, we use the color hue to encode this
ordinal variable. The details of the graphical properties are described in Chapter 5.
4.1.3.5 Visualization of the Failure Propagation
In order to represent the failure propagation of MCSs, the CFT structure needs to
be integrated in the matrix layout. Considering the the definition and convention of
the CFT, we apply the Cartesian hierarchical network layout to the CFT structure.
The design concept is similar to the design of the visualization of the CFT structure
for the importance analysis argued in section 4.2.3.2. Because the CFT structure is
complex and needs a lot of display space, it is not suitable to show the complete
structure. We need to find a way to to dynamically show the CFT structure. The
possible concepts are the Focus+Context and Overview+Detail. An evaluation [16,
45] showed that the Focus+Context was more effective than the Overview+Detail. In
addition, the Focus+Context provides more continuous and integrated information.
Thus, we use the Focus+context concept to enlarge the focused cell of the matrix
layout, and the semantic zooming concept to show the corresponding parts of the
CFT structure in the enlarged cell. The details of the interactions are introduced in
section 5.1.7.
4.2 Regarding the Importance Analysis
4.2.1 Data
The importance analysis based on the CFT is aimed at estimating the risk contri-
bution of each basic event to the top event. Because CFT components are modeled
according to the hierarchical system architectural model, the critical CFT compo-
nents directly correspond to the vulnerable system components. A CFT consists of
two types of structures: the nesting relations between CFT components and the CFT
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Basic Event N BE1 BE2 ... BEn
Importance value Q
Table 4.3: The case-by-variables table for the importance of basic events.
Element N Component1 ... Componentn BE1 ... BEm
Containing relation Link ... φ ... φ
Table 4.4: The case-by-variables table for the containing relations in the CFT.
structure (or logical structure) representing the data flow. Figure 2.3 shows an ex-
ample that the sub-components (marked with colors) are nested in the system-level
CFT, which are connected by a logical structure. Figure 2.4 shows a CFT having a
multi-level nesting structure. The hierarchies of the nesting structure correspond to
the hierarchies of the system architectural model in principle. Thus, the vulnerable
system components can be located in the system model by means of identifying the
corresponding critical CFT components in the nesting structure. The CFT structure
is the basis for the analysis of the failure flow regarding the important basic events.
According to the motivations introduced in section 3.1.2, the required data (shorter
form “R”) is summarized with respect to the following aspects:
• Estimation of basic events using the importance analysis.
– R1: the importance of basic events.
• Locations of CFT components by considering the system architectural model.
– R2: the inclusion relations between CFT components and basic events.
– R3: the nesting relations between CFT components.
• Analysis of the failure flow of the important basic events.
– R4: the structures of CFT components with failure probabilities.
4.2.2 Data Transformation
We transform the required data into case-by-variables tables. Table 4.3 focuses on
the quantitative importance of basic events (referring to R1). We use the Fussell-
Vesely importance measure [68] to calculate the importance of basic events. Table
4.4 describes the containing relations in the CFTs. Variable “Containing relation”
represents that a CFT component may include basic events and other (sub-)CFT
components. We use this variable for both required data “R2” and “R3” because
the two relations may be combined and represented as a tree: the system-level CFT
component is the root, sub-CFT components are non-leaf nodes, and basic events
are leaves. The failure flow depends on the logical structures of CFT components
(referring to R4) that is described in Table 4.5.
4.2.3 Visual Mapping
We first consider the analysis of the critical CFT components. This analysis depends
on the distribution of the important basic events over CFT components. In this case,
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CFT Element N BE1 ... Gate1 ... In−port1 ... Out−port1 ...
Type of Element N
Failure Probability Q
Logical Connection Link
Table 4.5: The case-by-variables table for the CFT structure.
Node-Link Treemap Sunburst Icicle Matrix Radial Tree
Readability of hierarchical data + − − + − −
Space efficiency − + + + − −
Table 4.6: Summary of the benefits and shortcomings of hierarchical layouts.
the information of the nesting relation is more significant than that of the logical data
flow. Thus, we decide to integrate the importance of basic events (Table 4.4) with
the containing relation (Table 4.3). By taking the large-scale CFTs into account,
we decide to design a compact view for the nesting relations in order to maintain a
suitable overview of the distribution of the important basic events. We dynamically
present the failure flow of the requested basic events in order to efficiently utilize the
screen space. In this section, we first talk about the design of the visualization layouts
for the nesting relations between CFT components, and then argue the visualization
concepts for the failure flow; finally we discuss the layout composition strategies for
the final spatial substrate.
4.2.3.1 Layout of the Architectural View
The containing relations described in Table 4.4 can be interpreted as a tree struc-
ture. The importance value is a quantitative attribute attached to basic events. We
design an architectural view associating the importance of basic events with the con-
taining relations between CFT components. We determine the basic layout of the
architecture view by taking three aspects into account: readability of hierarchical
data, space efficiency, and composition of layouts. Basically, the main categories of
representations for trees are the node-link diagram, the treemap layout, the sunburst
layout, and the icicle diagram. Additionally, we also consider two particular layouts:
the matrix-based visualization and the radial tree.
We first consider the commonly used layouts: the node-link diagram, the treemap,
the sunburst layout, and the icicle diagram. Barlow et al. [13] evaluated the read-
ability of these layouts with respect to the ease of interpretation, comparison of leaf
sizes, as well as the participants’ preference. The results showed that the icicle dia-
gram and the node-link diagram were more readable for 2D hierarchical structures.
There were few differences between the icicle diagram and the node-link diagram
regarding readability.
We then consider the space efficiency of the layouts. McGuffin et al. [134] per-
formed a mathematical evaluation for the space efficiency of 2D tree representations.
The authors proposed a set of metrics in regard to the representations of nodes and
labels. The results showed that the compact layouts, i.e., the treemap, the icicle
diagram, and the sunburst layout, had similar space efficiency that was much better
than the space efficiency of the node-link diagram.
We then consider the matrix layout and the radial tree. Previous evaluations
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(a) Icicle Diagram (b) Diagram for the nesting relations between CFT
components
Figure 4.3: Concept of the icicle-diagram-style architectural view.
[69,70,113] concluded that the task of “path finding” cannot be effectively performed
using the matrix layout. However, our analysis tasks are just strongly related to
the identification of paths in trees. A path between the root (i.e., the system-level
CFT component) and a specific node (i.e., a specific sub-component) represents the
location of this component in the nesting structure of the CFT. Additionally, the
space requirement of the matrix layout is even larger than that of the node-link
diagram. Thus, the matrix layout is not suitable. The radial tree has an unfavorable
space efficiency [134] and worse readability [32] than the Cartesian tree has.
The benefits and shortcomings of the layouts are briefly summarized in Table
4.6 with respect to the readability of hierarchical data and space efficiency. The
icicle diagram is the best choice that can not only effectively represent hierarchical
relations, but also efficiently use screen space for visualizing large data.
An important consideration of our design is the feasibility of the layout compo-
sition between the architectural view and the CFT structure. We discuss this point
in section 4.2.3.4. The results show that the icicle diagram is more suitable than
other layouts regarding the layout composition.
Finally, as a result, we apply the icicle diagram to the architecture view (Figure
4.3). Rectangles of the architectural view represent CFT components. Hierarchies of
the rectangles represent the nesting relations between CFT components. The archi-
tectural view may be used to represent not only the system-level CFT component,
but also the sub-CFT components. The architectural view of a CFT component may
be treated as the combination of the architectural views of the sub-CFT components
(Figure 4.5 (a)).
4.2.3.1.1 Leaf nodes. We represent basic events (i.e., leaf nodes of the tree
structure) as small rectangles under the rectangles for their parent CFT components.
We apply the variant of the icicle diagram, called iceray diagram [157], where the
orientation of the list of leaf-rectangles is perpendicular to the parent rectangle
(Figure 4.4 (b)). By the icicle concept, the diagram may be too long to effectively
analyze when there are thousands of basic events. By the iceray concept, the length
of a rectangle depends on the number of its sub-CFT components that is usually
much smaller than the count of the directly and indirectly included basic events. On
the other hand, the leaf node lists under different parent rectangles may share the
vertical space, so that the height of the iceray diagram usually does not increase very
quickly. Additionally, the iceray diagram is favorable for distinguishing basic events
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(a) Icicle tree: horizontal leaf node list (b) Iceray tree: vertical leaf node list
Figure 4.4: The icicle concept and the iceray concept.
and CFT components because their rectangles are listed in different orientations.
An important property of the icicle diagram is the proportional length of rectan-
gles according to the specific attribute of the leaf nodes. However, the proportional
relations between rectangles play an important role in the importance analysis, nei-
ther with respect to the quantitative importance value nor regarding the number of
basic events. Moreover, losing this property in the iceray diagram does not lead to
information loss in the importance analysis.
4.2.3.2 Representation of the Logical Failure Flow
The representation of failure flow depends on the CFT structure that is treated as
a DAG network. We need a visualization layout that is able to effectively represent
complex paths of the failure flow and logical relations between basic events. We had
two alternative concepts:
• directly represent failure flow in the architectural view using additional links
as ArcTrees [144] did.
• individually represent failure flow and compose the representation with the
architectural view.
The first concept needs to integrate the failure flow into the architectural view by
adding necessary elements and links, e.g., gates. This may either strongly change
the structure of the architectural view or add new elements in a crowded space,
usually under the corresponding rectangles. In the case of changing the structure
of the architectural view, the analysis based on the nesting relations between CFT
components may be interrupted. By another concept, in a crowded space, it would
be difficult for us to apply a global unidirectional orientation to these new added
elements like the orientation of the ordinary structure of CFT components. This
hampers the analysis of failure flow along the complex critical paths and the analysis
of the logical relations between the important basic events. In addition, the new
added links may cause serious visual clutter on the architectural view, particularly
when presenting the paths across different hierarchies. Using this representation
concept, we can neither represent the intuitive failure flow, particularly for multiple
important basic events, nor maintain a satisfactory view for the containing relations
between CFT components. The individual representation can provide a clear CFT
structure for representing failure flow without hindering the architectural view.
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Architecture (upper) CFT (upper)
Architecture (lower) case 1 (Fig. 4.5 (a), (b)) case 3 (Fig. 4.5 (e))
CFT (lower) case 2 (Fig. 4.5 (c), (d)) case 4 (Fig. 4.5 (f))
Table 4.7: The layout composition cases. Combination between architecture view
and CFT structure with respect to the view position: upper part and lower part.
Figure 4.5 shows examples of the combination cases.
In short, although the integrated representation may represent the failure flow
in a space-efficient manner, the topology of the critical path is not intuitive. In
contrast, the individual representation is more intuitive, but this requires more space.
Because our goal is to effectively analyze the complex failure flow, the intuition is
more meaningful for us. Thus, we decide to individually visualize the failure flow and
compose this visualization with the architectural view. The logical relations between
basic events are meaningful in the context of the analysis of failure flow. For this
reason, we present the whole logical CFT structure of the requested CFT component
rather than the only part related to the failure flow. Additionally, this helps engineers
to estimate the importance of basic events when analyzing the structures of the
specific CFT components.
We need to determine the basic visualization layout for the CFT structure. The
DAG is commonly represented using the node-link diagram and the matrix-based
visualization [18]. The characteristics of both concepts are briefly described in sec-
tion 4.1.3.1.1. The previous evaluations [69,70,113] compared the readability of both
layouts. The results showed that the node-link diagram was more effective for rep-
resenting the complex paths in network graphs. For this reason we prefer to use the
node-link diagram in order to guarantee the intuitive critical path of the failure flow.
Nodes of a network graph can be placed according to either the semantic mean-
ing or the structural rules. First, we consider the semantic meaning depending on
the attribute of nodes. In our work, the most important attribute is the importance
of basic events. Section 4.2.3.5 argues that a common graphical property is needed
for the importance values in both the architectural view and the CFT structure. The
position of node is obviously inappropriate to use as the common graphical prop-
erty. Thus, we arrange nodes according to the CFT structure rather than semantic
meaning.
The CFT structure has a global unidirectional orientation from basic events to
the top event. Layering nodes may facilitate the analysis of the critical path of failure
flow. Thus, we use a hierarchical network [15,53,133,183] for the CFT structure. We
also consider whether the radial layout is suitable. The study [32] that evaluated the
readability of the Cartesian layout and the radial layout of hierarchical data. The
results showed that the traditional Cartesian layout was more readable. In addition,
we apply the top-to-bottom direction to the Cartesian node-link diagram by taking
the convention of the CFT analysis into account.
4.2.3.3 Layout Composition
We need a suitable way to compose the node-link CFT structure and the architec-
tural view. Zhao et al. [212] talked about all possibilities of the layout composition
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Figure 4.5: Cases of the layout composition between the architectural view and the
logical CFT structure. (a) Architectural view of the CFT component “C1” that is
a combination of the (sub-)architectural views of the sub-components. (b) Showing
the architectural view of “C3” outside the main architectural view. (c) Showing the
structure of “C3” with the inside composition strategy. (d) Showing the structure
of “C3” with the outside composition strategy. (e) Showing the structure of the
top-level component “C1”. (f) Showing the structure of “C3” when the structure of
“C1” has been shown (i.e., (e) is the previous state of (f)).
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between the node-link diagram and the treemap based on a defined taxonomy. Rufi-
ange et al. [165] also argued a taxonomy of the compound visualization layouts and
discussed the composition between the matrix layout and the node-link diagram.
We consider all possible cases of the combination between the architectural view
and the CFT structure (Table 4.7) in order to comprehensively analyze the composi-
tion. Although we focus on the combination between the architectural view and the
CFT structure, we still list the particular cases in the table: combination of different
(sub-)architectural views, and combination of different node-link CFT structures.
Both cases play important roles for the layout composition. Figure 4.5 shows the
conceptual examples based on the composition cases. To easily understand the con-
cepts, we do not represent basic events (i.e., leaf nodes) in the examples. The con-
cepts are available in practical applications when considering the basic events. We
discuss the possible composition cases summarized in Table 4.7 and select suitable
composition methods according to the requirements of the importance analysis.
Case 1 describes that an architectural view of a CFT component can be treated
as the combinations of the architectural views of the sub-components. For example,
in Figure 4.5 (a), the main architectural view of “C1” includes the (sub-)architectural
views for the sub-components: “C2” and “C3”. The architectural view of “C3” in-
cludes the views of the sub-components “C4” and “C5”. An alternative composition
is described in Figure 4.5 (b) that pulls the view of “C3” out of the parent architec-
tural view. This alternative concept is not appropriate for our visualization because
the composed view does not provide any new information for the importance anal-
ysis, however, this takes additional space.
Case 2 may appear when analyzing the logical structure of the sub-CFT com-
ponents. For example, when showing the logical structure of “C3” in Figure 4.5
(a), the architectural views of the sub-components “C4” and “C5” are embedded
into the logical structure of “C3” (Figure 4.5 (c) and (d)). This way, engineers are
allowed to investigate the data of the sub-components and the deeper nested sub-
sub-components (“C6”, “C7”, “C8”, and “C9”) while maintaining the structure of
“C3”. Referring to [165, 212], we have two alternative strategies for composing the
architectural view and the CFT structure: the inside composition strategy (Figure
4.5 (c)) and the outside composition strategy (Figure 4.5 (d)).
Using the inside composition, the CFT structure is shown inside the enlarged
rectangles of the architectural view, whereas using the outside composition, the CFT
structure is shown outside and linked to the architectural view. Regarding the icicle
diagram, the inside composition is not suitable because enlarging a rectangle will
cause a height increase of the whole hierarchy. When displaying CFT structures
in multiple hierarchies, the height of the architectural view may greatly increase.
Simultaneously, the length of the icicle diagram may also greatly increase. In this
case, the readability and the space efficiency may be strongly reduced. In contrast,
the outside composition (Figure 4.5 (d)) adapts well to the icicle diagram. When
showing the logical structure of “C3”, a small rectangular indicator is drawn in the
architectural view to replace the part representing the component “C3” (Figure 4.5
(d)). Without this replacement, the data of the CFT component “C3” (i.e., the sub-
component “C4” and “C5”) in the architectural view of “C1” and those in the logical
structure of “C3” are duplicate. Using this concept, the confusion of the duplicate
CHAPTER 4. DESIGN CONCEPTS FOR VISUAL STRUCTURES 85
data is addressed and the repeatedly occupied display space can be recycled.
Case 3 may occur when showing the logical structure of the top-level component
“C1”, the structure of “C1” directly replaces the previous architectural view (Figure
4.5 (e)).
Case 4 describes the combination between logical structures of different CFT
components. In Figure 4.5 (e), the logical structure of “C1” has been displayed.
Based on this structure, we then display the logical structure of the component
“C3” in Figure 4.5 (f). Both of the node-link CFT structures are merged into a
whole.
4.2.3.4 Discussing alternative Layouts of the Architectural View with
respect to Layout Composition
We also consider the feasibility of the layout composition between the CFT structure
and the alternative layouts of the architectural view, i.e., the treemap, the sunburst
layout, and the node-link diagram. The node-link diagram is first rejected because
there will be confusion when using the node-link diagram to represent both the
containing relations and the logical failure flow. The inside composition strategy is
not possible for the treemap and the sunburst layout because of the aspect ratio
problems.
We then discuss the outside composition strategy with respect to the matter
of space recycling for the architectural views represented using the treemap and
the sunburst layout. For displaying the logical structure of a sub-component when
we recycle the corresponding rectangle (for treemap) or sector (for sunburst) in
the parent architectural view, the aspect ratios (of the treemap and the sunburst
layout) need to be recalculated and the structure of this architectural view may
greatly change. This may lead to confusion between the new view and the old view.
If we do not recycle the space, our visualization could be very space-inefficient. A
deeper-nested sub-component may repeatedly occupy space when showing the CFT
structures of the direct or indirect parent components in the manner of Figure 4.5
(c). Additionally, the algorithms of the treemap need an initial rectangle as an input.
It is difficult to determine an appropriate initial rectangle for the architectural view
of a sub-component, in which the shapes of rectangles are the same as those in the
parent architectural view. In short, the treemap and the sunburst layouts are not
suitable to combine with the node-link CFT structure.
4.2.3.5 Importance Bar
We need a common graphical property for the importance of basic events in order
that engineers may compare the importance of basic events both in the architectural
view and in the CFT structure. According to the preference of graphical properties
(Figure 2.27), length is a suitable graphical property to represent the quantitative
data. We propose a rectangular graphical property called the importance bar (Figure
6.1) for representing the basic event with the importance value. The importance bar
has a fixed border and a color-filled part encoding the importance value. We embed
importance bars into the CFT structure below the basic event nodes. In the archi-
tectural view, we use the importance bars to replace the initial leaf-rectangles. This
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way, the global comparison of the importance is possible regardless of whether the
importance values are represented in the architectural view or in the CFT structure.
4.3 Regarding the Safety Improvement Process
4.3.1 Data
According to the motivations (section 3.1.3), the goal of the visualization of the
safety improvement process is to visually facilitate the identification of the improve-
ment solution(s) consisting of a series of design modifications. The improvement
process concentrates on two phases: construction of solutions and analysis of solu-
tions.
4.3.1.1 Data with respect to the Construction of Solutions
The three main steps in each iteration for the construction of solutions require the
following raw data (shorter form “R”):
• Step 1: Identify the important basic events.
– R1: the importance of basic events for the identification.
• Step 2: Apply and test the risk reduction hypothesis by system modifications.
– R2: the type of modification: substitution or redundancy.
– R3: the value of modification: change of failure probability of the initial
basic event.
– R4: the cost of modification.
• Step 3: Evaluate results of risk reduction.
– R5: the failure probability of the top event of the updated CFT model.
This is used to decide whether the reduced system risk is acceptable.
– R6: the impact on the top event by design modification. This is used
to identify the optimal modification that causes the most risk reduction
(section 2.1.6.1).
– R7: the cost-effectiveness of the design modification. This is used to
identify the optimal modification that is the most cost-effective (section
2.1.6.1).
– R8: the gap between the updated failure probability of the top event and
the goal value. This is important context that shows how much failure
probability still needs to be reduced.
The safety improvement process involves much different data that cannot be si-
multaneously visually presented. We focus on the data that directly influence the
identification of the modification (R1, R5, R6, R7, R8), and the data that are es-
sential for analyzing the existing modifications (R2, R3, R4).
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Modification N Modification0 Modi.1 ... Modi.n
Connection Link
Basic event N
Modification type N
Modification value Q
Modification cost Q
Cost-Effectiveness Q
New failure probability of TE Q
Single impact on TE Q
Goal of the improvement Q
Table 4.8: Data table for design modifications.
4.3.1.2 Data with respect to the Analysis of Solutions
The analysis of existing solutions is aimed at reviewing the related data and an-
alyzing the statistical information of the data, e.g., the total cost. A solution is
completely constructed when it reduces the failure probability of the top event to
a given acceptable value. We focus on the reduction up to the goal value rather
than the exhaustive risk reduction. The overloaded reduction may lead to a large
improvement; however, it may simultaneously also generate a high cost. In our work,
we assume that any completely constructed solution reduces the initial risk to the
same goal value. In this case, all complete solutions have the identical effect of risk
reduction. Thus, when identifying the most cost-effective solution, we analyze the
total cost of each solution instead of the total cost-effectiveness.
4.3.2 Data Transformation
We transform the raw data into case-by-variables tables: the table for the importance
(Table 4.3) (referring to R1), and the table for design modifications (Table 4.8) with
the following variables:
• Variable “Modification” represents the design modification with the ID.
• Variable “Connection” represents the connection between modifications.
• Variable “Basic event” indicates the basic event related to the modification.
• Variable “Modification type” (referring to R2) describes the type of the mod-
ification.
• Variable “Modification value” (referring to R3) represents the reduction of fail-
ure probability of the addressed basic event. Depending on this variable, engi-
neers may investigate the improvement of the vulnerability being addressed.
• Variable “Modification cost” (referring to R4) represents the quantity con-
sumed for the modification, e.g., money, time, and human resources. The type
of the cost needs to be determined at the beginning of the safety improvement
process. It is an important piece of information for optimizing modifications
(section 2.1.6.1) as well as the meaningful context for analyzing solutions.
• Variable “New failure probability of TE” (referring to R5) describes the new
risk state of the updated CFT model with respect to the failure probability
88 4.3. REGARDING THE SAFETY IMPROVEMENT PROCESS
Solution N Solution1 Solution2 ... Solutionn
Included Modification N
Total cost Q
Total steps Q
Table 4.9: The case-by-variables table for data of solutions.
of the top event. According to the principle described in section 4.3.1.2, when
the system risk becomes acceptable by a modification, we assign the given goal
value rather than the actual value to variable “New failure probability of TE”
of the modification.
• Variable “Single impact on TE” (referring to R6) represents the impact on the
top event by a single modification without considering the summed influence
of the previous modifications.
• Variable “Cost-Effectiveness” (referring to R7) measures the modifications by
taking the balance between cost and the single impact on TE into account. We
define the cost-effectiveness as the ratio between the reduction of the failure
probability of the top event and the cost of the corresponding modification.
• Variable “Goal of the improvement” (referring to R8) is used for estimating
the gap between the actual risk and the goal value.
FT structure provides meaningful information for the safety improvement pro-
cess. This supports the understanding of the causal dependencies between failure
mechanisms and the way a failure propagates through the system. We apply CFT to
our visualization instead of the ordinary FT because CFT components correspond to
the components of the system architectural model. This supports the identification
of the critical (physical) parts in the system model corresponding to the important
basic events. In addition, the CFT structure supports to analyze the effect of mod-
ifications along the way a failure propagates through the system when reviewing
solutions. Thus, we associate the CFT structure with the visual safety improvement
process. The data of the CFT structure are described in Table 4.5.
We transform the data of existing solutions into Table 4.9. For visualizing a
solution, the included modifications are essential data. In order to support the iden-
tification of the optimal solutions, we additionally derive the statistical data from
modifications: total cost, and total steps.
4.3.3 Visual Mapping for Solution Construction
The results of the safety improvement process, i.e., modifications, are sequentially
connected according to the order of the identifications. The connection has a tree
structure and is usually treated as a decision tree. For this reason, we treat a decision
tree that organizes the modifications as the basic structure of our visualization. Be-
cause the process starts at a non-modified system design, we add a root node to the
decision tree in order to represent the initial system design (Figure 2.10: root is on
the left side). Other variables of the modification are visualized and integrate with
the decision tree node. The decision tree needs to be interactively constructed during
the safety improvement process. As a result, we finally design a risk-reduction plot
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(Figure 7.2 (2)) to integrate the variables of the design modification with the deci-
sion tree. The following sections depict the design concepts of the spatial substrate
illustrated in Figure 4.6.
4.3.3.1 Decision of Layout
There are various layouts for representing the tree structure. We discuss the node-
link diagram, the treemap layout, the sunburst layout, the icicle diagram, and the
matrix layout.
The evaluations [69, 70, 113] proved that the matrix view was not suitable to
represent complex paths. Barlow et al. [13] evaluated the readability of the treemap
layout, the sunburst layout, the node-link diagram, and the icicle diagram. The
results showed that the node-link diagram and the icicle diagram were the most
favorable. We still consider whether the layouts are suitable to represent attributes
of nodes, i.e., properties of modifications. The node-link diagram is more suitable
because this layout has sufficient space to visualize and integrate multiple attributes
of nodes. In contrast, the compact layouts, i.e., the icicle diagram, the treemap, and
the sunburst layout do not have good potential for the integration. The aspect ratio
issue may be caused when using the compact layouts and the nodes deeper on the
tree do not have sufficient space for integrating the attributes [194]. In addition, we
discuss the node placement in section 4.3.3.1.1 in order to represent the important
information of modifications using the node position. Thus, we prefer to use the
node-link diagram to represent the decision tree rather than the compact layouts.
The node-link diagram is the basic layout of our visualization.
We still need to argue the Cartesian coordinates and the radial layout. A study
[32] evaluated the Cartesian traditional tree layout, the Cartesian orthogonal tree
layout, and the radial layout for the node-link diagram. The authors compared
these layouts in terms of finding common ancestors, the exploration behavior, and
the effect of tree orientation. The results showed that the Cartesian layout was more
preferred with respect to readability while the radial layout was more space-efficient.
The study also argued that the top-to-bottom orientation was more effective than
the other alternatives. In our work, the top-to-bottom direction can perceptually
represent the reduction process of the failure probability. For those reasons, we
apply a top-to-bottom Cartesian node-link diagram to the decision tree.
4.3.3.1.1 Node placement. The structure of the node-link diagram depend on
either the semantic rules or the structural rules [182]. The most significant data of
a design modification are related to two aspects: the cause (i.e., the important basic
event) and the effect (i.e., impact on top event). The corresponding data are the
“Basic event” and “New failure probability of TE” (Table 4.8). We propose a 2D
scatter plot, called the risk-reduction plot, where the x-axis has a nominal scale of
basic events, and the y-axis represents the failure probability of the top event from
the initial value to the goal value of the safety improvement (Figure 4.6). The nodes
of the decision tree, i.e., modifications, are placed in the plot.
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Modification N → point
Connection Link → line
Basic event N → position
Importance of basic event Q → length
Modification type N → shape
Modification value Q → length
Modification cost Q → length
New failure probability of TE Q → position
Single impact on TE Q → length
Cost-Effectiveness Q → length
Goal of the improvement Q → position
Table 4.10: Graphical properties for the safety improvement process.
4.3.3.2 Association with the Importance Analysis
The importance of the basic event is a significant piece of data for the safety improve-
ment process. Because the construction of the decision tree is a dynamic iterative
process, in each iteration the updated importance of basic events needs to be com-
pared. In this case, the overview of the importance of all basic events is required.
We decide to integrate this data with the risk-reduction plot. Because the x-axis
of the risk-reduction plot represents all of the basic events, this is a suitable ba-
sis for integrating the importance values. Bars are appropriate for representing the
quantitative importance values and suitable to be integrated with the basic event
list on the top of the risk-reduction plot (Figure 4.6). This way, in each iteration
of the safety improvement process, engineers may start at the identification of the
important basic event(s) by analyzing the bars.
4.3.3.3 Summary of Graphical Properties
Besides the visualized data above mentioned, we also design graphical properties for
other data relevant to the improvement process. We visualize the data in Table 4.10
and compose these visualizations using a risk-state node (Figure 7.1) that provides
a compact representation for the modification in the risk-reduction plot.
In this way, the overview of the sequential connections of modifications and the
visualized essential data of each individual modification are combined by the risk-
reduction plot. Thus, engineers may focus on the details of the specific modifications
while maintaining an overview of the relations between modifications. This allows
engineers to intuitively analyze interesting modifications and explore patterns. For
example, answering the questions: which modification generates the highest cost in
a specific solution. The details of the visualization properties and interactions are
introduced in Chapter 7.
4.3.4 Association with CFT Structure
Due to the significant help of the CFT structure for the safety improvement pro-
cess, we associate the enhanced CFT structure for the importance analysis with the
risk-reduction plot by the horizontal positions of basic events that appear in both
views (Figure 7.2 (1)). In this way, the logical relations between the basic events
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corresponding to modifications can be treated as context information for reviewing
the improvement process.
4.3.5 Visual Mapping for Solution Review
For analyzing the existing solutions, we decide to build additional plots associated
with the risk-reduction plot (Figure 7.2 (3)). The plots provide clear views for the
trend of the solutions by representing the statistical data of solutions. These views
support to analyze the existing solutions and identify the optimal ones.
Chapter 5
Visualization of Minimal Cut Sets
Based on the design concepts discussed in section 4.1, we propose a matrix-based
visualization approach called MCS Matrix [209] in order to facilitate the analysis of
the MCSs of the CFT.
5.1 MCS Matrix
5.1.1 Matrix View
The core of the MCS Matrix is a matrix view that is compound with additional
columns and rows. The central matrix view (Figure 5.1, area (1)) represents the
relations between MCSs and basic events, where rows represent MCSs and columns
represent basic events. A cell at the intersection of a row and a column is filled when
an MCS of the row includes the basic event of the column, else the cell is empty. For
estimating the basic events, cells are filled with colors that encode the unreliability
levels of basic events. The schema of the colors is introduced in section 5.1.2. In this
way, a color-filled cell represents two points: the existence of the relation between
an MCS and a basic event, and the unreliability level of the basic event.
The additional columns on the left side (Figure 5.1, area (2)) represent the failure
probability and the order of the MCSs. We use the bar graph to represent the failure
probability. The larger the value is, the longer the bar is. In order to draw readable
bars for the very small probabilistic values, we provide a configurable scale for the
bar length instead of the initial scale between 0 and 1. The lower and upper bounds of
the scale are defined as the minimal and maximal failure probabilities of the MCSs.
In this case, the bar represents a relative measure rather than the absolute value.
We provide an alternative logarithmic scale for the bar because the linear scale is
not suitable to represent the large exponential interval, e.g., [1e-10, 1e-5]. The bar
graph increases the amount of the displayed rows on a limited screen because it
takes up less display space than textual representations.
In many cases, the qualitative estimation for the failure probability provides a
way to quickly assess MCSs. Bars for the failure probability are assigned colors
according to the unreliability levels of MCSs. Using the color-filled bars, engineers
may quickly estimate the criticality of MCSs while quantitatively comparing the
MCSs according to the failure probability. Similar to the bars for failure probability,
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the bars representing the order of the MCSs are also proposed. The smaller the
order of an MCS is, the shorter the bar is, i.e., the more critical the MCS is. The
gray color of the bars is only used for visibility and does not provide any semantic
meaning.
For the additional rows on the bottom (Figure 5.1, area (3)), we also use bars to
represent the failure probability of the basic events and the number of occurrences
of basic events. The unreliability levels of basic events are represented using colors of
the bars. Colors of the bars for the number of occurrences do not have any meaning.
5.1.2 Unreliability Levels
In many cases, engineers purpose to quickly estimate the failure probabilities of the
MCSs according to the risk acceptance. This estimation may facilitate the identi-
fication of the critical MCSs. A commonly used qualitative rating method is the
traffic-light rating system [2] that classifies data into three classes and uses colors to
encode the classes. We apply this method to classifying the unreliability (i.e., failure
probability) into three levels based on the specified thresholds, and assign colors to
the levels:
• critical level (red): the failure probability is extreme high. The failure needs
to be addressed as soon as possible.
• moderate level (yellow): the failure probability is still higher than a commonly
accepted value. The failure should be addressed but not urgently.
• acceptable level (green): the failure probability is in a safe range and may be
neglected.
The unreliability level concept is also available for basic events. There may be re-
spective configurations (i.e., threshold and colors) of the unreliability level for MCSs
and basic events. When applying the same configuration to basic events and MCSs,
engineers may analyze the quantitative relations between an MCS and its basic
events, e.g., a critical basic event (red) and a moderate basic event (yellow) may
together lead to a failure scenario (i.e., MCS) that has a moderate level probability
(yellow). The values of the “cause” (i.e., basic events), and the value of the “effect”
(i.e., the MCS), can be intuitively investigated.
5.1.3 The Grouping Methods
Without appropriately indexing, engineers have to manually identify the important
MCSs by looking through all rows. If there are a large number of MCSs, this task
will require a great deal of effort. We provide the grouping methods respectively for
rows and columns by using the orderability of the matrix layout.
5.1.3.1 Grouping of Rows
We introduce the grouping methods by means of depicting the grouping by the fail-
ure probability of MCSs. First, the MCS rows are sorted by the failure probability
in descending order. The MCS rows are naturally aggregated based on the unrelia-
bility levels. Each resulting aggregation is treated as a group. There is a one-to-one
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Figure 5.2: Merged cells in the first column are used as indicators of groups.
mapping between groups and unreliability levels. Colors are treated as indicators of
the groups. Then, the column representing the failure probability is moved to the
first position in order to announce that MCS rows are sorted by the failure proba-
bility (Figure 5.1, in area 2). The series of manipulations is called grouping ; more
precisely, the grouping by failure probability. In case engineers much more focus on
the criticality of MCSs rather than the quantitative estimation, they are allowed to
merge the cells in the column of failure probability based on the colors (Figure 5.2).
The merged cells can provide the better indication for MCS groups without confu-
sion caused by the length of bars. The grouping by the order of MCSs is basically
the same. In simple terms, MCS rows are sorted by the orders of MCSs in ascending
order, and then the relevant column is moved to the first place.
MCS Matrix provides a second-level sorting for the grouping method. This is
particularly useful for the analysis of the order of MCSs. Figure 5.3 shows an exam-
ple. Rows are primarily grouped by the order of MCSs. In each group, MCSs have
the same order. In this case, the second-level sorting prioritizes the MCSs inside
each group. As a result, the MCSs of the first group (with the order of 1) are clearly
classified into three sub-groups (Figure 5.3 area (1)). The green sub-group may be
neglected because the probability of occurrence is very low, even though the MCSs
having the order of 1 are usually critical.
5.1.3.2 Grouping of Columns
We also provide grouping methods for columns in order to prioritize the basic events.
Similar to the grouping of MCS rows, we propose the grouping methods for columns
according to either the failure probability of basic events or the number of the
occurrence of basic events. Figure 5.1 shows a view by grouping failure probability
for both rows and columns.
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5.1.3.2.1 Associated ordering. In many cases, engineers care much more
about the basic events related to the critical MCSs. The columns representing the
basic events included by the critical MCSs may be sparsely distributed by using the
normal ordering, e.g., columns are grouped by the failure probability in Figure 5.4,
and the columns related to the critical MCS (i.e., red rows) are sparsely distributed
because of the columns (marked by the blue circles) that are not related to the
critical MCSs. In this case, these columns take up a lot of display space, but do not
provide meaningful information for the critical MCSs. Thus, we need to find a way
to preferentially display the meaningful columns on the screen.
To address this issue, we propose an associated ordering concept for columns that
takes the criticality of MCSs into account. First, the columns are sorted according
to the criticality of the related MCSs rather than the criticality of the basic events.
If a basic event is related to multiple MCSs, we only consider the highest criticality
of the MCSs. It guarantees that the columns related to the important MCSs can be
preferentially displayed. If two columns have identical priority, columns are again
sorted by the failure probability of the basic events.
Using the associated concept, columns may be more rationally displayed. In
addition, the pattern may be identified. Figure 5.4 shows that columns are sorted
by the failure probability of basic events. In order to analyze the basic events related
to the critical MCSs, we need to go through all of the columns (area (1)). Figure 5.5
shows a view by using the associated ordering. The columns related to the critical
MCS are aggregated in area (1). The area that must be concentrated on for analyzing
the critical MCSs becomes smaller.
In a similar way, the columns related to the moderated MCS rows are distributed
in area (2). The area in Figure 5.5 is smaller than that in Figure 5.4. The relations
(i.e., filled cells) are aggregated in the corresponding areas that are arranged like a
stairstepping. The more important the MCS group is, the smaller the corresponding
area is. In this way, when engineers analyze an MCS group, they only have to focus
on the specific area corresponding to the MCS group rather than the whole matrix.
In Figure 5.5, area (1) may be treated as the most important area because this shows
the relations between the critical MCSs and the critical basic events. The associated
ordering reduces the effort required for investigating the basic events related to the
critical or moderate MCSs because of the smaller interesting areas.
5.1.4 Integration of Textual Data
Although engineers may quickly estimate the probability values by colors and bars,
in many cases, the exact textual values still play an important role. The textual
value may be used for confirming the estimation based on the graphical properties.
Thus, MCS Matrix allows textual data to be displayed within the matrix cells.
To avoid the visual conflict between the text and the bar in a cell, we provide an
alternative method to separately display the bar in the upper part and the text in
the lower part of the cell. For the failure probability of the MCSs, the text value
is an important complement of the graphical representations. There are different
purposes: colors indicate the criticality of the MCSs for a quick estimation; bars
only provide the relative measurement for the comparison; texts provide the exact
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values for confirming the above estimations.
5.1.5 Scaling
An overview of MCSs provides context information when focusing on the specific
MCSs or basic events. In addition, it is helpful for pattern analysis that facilitates
engineers to analyze the general safety situation of a system. For this reason, a
method representing a satisfactory overview of a large number of MCSs is needed.
On the other hand, detailed information is also significant, e.g., the exact failure
probability values of MCSs. The ID is a piece of particular information that may
not provide semantic information, but is very useful for navigating MCSs and basic
events. The detailed information is the meaningful complement for the overview,
and vice versa. Thus, effectively presenting detailed information in a satisfactory
overview of MCSs becomes a new goal. We provide flexible scaling concepts for this
purpose by applying the basic concept of the table lens technique that is introduced
in section 2.4.1.1.
5.1.5.1 Uniform Scaling
In order to present as many MCSs as possible on a limited screen, we provide an
uniform scaling for the matrix view. Row height may be uniformly reduced in order
to adapt to the display space. Row height has the minimal value of 1 pixel (Figure
5.3). When displaying textual data in cells, the text font can be automatically ad-
justed to fit the size of cells. The uniform scaling strongly increases the visible rows
in a limited screen. On a 22-inch monitor with a resolution of 1680x1050, the matrix
view can effectively display a maximum of 700 rows with a height of 1 pixel. Similar
to rows, engineers are allowed to uniformly reduce the column widths, too. With
the help of uniform scaling, the matrix view may present a satisfactory overview of
MCSs with the associated information.
5.1.5.2 Individual Scaling
Uniform scaling generates a satisfactory overview by reducing the geometrical size of
rows and columns. However, some significant information is missing. The bars and
textual values of MCSs are barely readable when row heights are greatly reduced.
In contrast, showing this information may take up a lot of display space. A way to
balance the detailed information with the overview is needed.
Our concept is to primarily maintain a satisfactory overview without showing
detailed information until it is requested. We provide a table-lens-like interaction
called individual scaling (Figure 5.6) that shows the detailed information including
text and bars when mouse-clicking or hovering over rows. The row height has a de-
fault value (default: 16 pixels) that is large enough to display the text and graphical
representations. Similar to rows, in order to clearly display the textual data of basic
events, we also provide the individual scaling concept for columns. By using the
individual scaling, engineers can effectively investigate detailed information while
maintaining a satisfactory overview.
102 5.1. MCS MATRIX
Figure 5.6: Individual scaling. This concept provides the appropriate width and
height to the desired cells for clearly representing the detailed information.
5.1.5.3 Scaling by Groups
The more important an MCS is, the more valuable the information of the MCS is.
Thus, it needs to display as much information of the important MCSs as possible in
a limited screen while maintaining a satisfactory overview of MCSs. We propose an
interaction called scaling by groups applying the DOI concept to the matrix view.
The level-of-detail (LOD) and the DOI function need to be defined. In terms of the
failure probability, the unreliability levels corresponds with the LOD:
• LOD(Rows of the critical level) = 0. Both graphical and textual representa-
tions are displayed in order to quickly and exactly investigate the associated
data of MCSs.
• LOD(Rows of the moderate level) = 1. Graphical representations are clearly
shown in order to quickly assess and precisely navigate the rows.
• LOD(Rows of the acceptable level) = 2. It shows only an overview of MCSs
as context by applying a very small row height.
The DOI function describes how to render the visitable items according to the
LOD. We define a discrete DOI function for row height rather than the commonly
used continuous geographical changes.
• If LOD = 0, row height is 16 pixels. It is sufficient to show both graphical and
textual representations.
• If LOD = 1, row height is 5 pixels. It guarantees that graphical representations
are shown clearly.
• If LOD = 2, row height is 1 pixel. It strongly reduces the display requirement
for only showing a rough overview as a context.
For example, in Figure 5.7, MCSs are scaled by groups according to the failure
probability. The graphical and the textual information of the critical MCSs is clearly
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Figure 5.8: Identification of the partner basic events by analyzing the row of the
common MCS.
identified. The graphical representations of the moderate MCSs are able to be clearly
read, but the textual values are not visible. For the acceptable MCSs, there is only
an overview where engineers can just roughly investigate the pattern of these MCSs.
Using the scaling by groups, engineers may allocate enough display space for the
valuable data and effectively reduce display space of the less important information.
This way, engineers can focus on the valuable information while maintaining an
overview of the unimportant information.
5.1.6 Representing Relations between Basic Events
The analysis with respect to the specific basic event is significant in many application
scenarios [136]. A significant case is to analyze a specific basic event that has a high
failure probability and is difficult to improve. In order to reduce the likelihood of the
occurrence of the failure scenarios that are caused by this basic event, engineers need
to intensively address the “partner basic events” that may cooperate with this basic
event to lead to the occurrence of the top event. For example, for a given MCS =
{E1, E2}, if E1 has a high failure probability and is difficult to address, the partner
basic event “E2” needs to be addressed in order to reduce the failure probability of
the MCS.
The relations between basic events depend on the commonly related MCSs. For
a specific basic event, engineers need to identify the partner basic events and analyze
the causes of the relations. The identification process may be described as a path:
specific basic event→ MCSs→ partner basic events. The matrix view can represent
the path by going through the color-filled cells. Figure 5.8 shows an example of
identification of the partner basic events by analyzing the row of the common MCS.
The specific critical basic event is “C1.M2.SC1.E35” (marked with a circle). We
analyze the MCS “197” that includes this basic event in order to identify the partner
basic events. Along the row of the MCS, two partner basic events are identified.
Along the columns we get the IDs of the partner basic events in corresponding
header cells. However, when the amount of the related MCSs is large, it is difficult
to effectively identify the partner basic events.
Thus we decided to find a way to represent the relations between basic events.
CHAPTER 5. VISUALIZATION OF MINIMAL CUT SETS 105
(a) The specific-BE port and the partner-BE ports. (b) The MCS
ports.
Figure 5.9: Relation ports.
Edges were integrated with specific layouts in previous studies (section 2.4.1.2) in
order to represent the additional relations. The edges clearly represented the specific
relations between the objects that were represented by other visualization layouts.
We provide rectangular relation ports to represent the specific basic events, their
partner basic events, and the common MCSs. We propose a large-sized port called
a specific-BE port to represent the specific basic event and a small-sized port called
a partner-BE ports to represent the partner basic event (Figure 5.9 (a) and Figure
5.10 (a)). A specific-BE port is connected with one or more partner basic event
ports by curved lines in order to represent the relations between the specific basic
event and its partner basic events. The connected relation ports forms a relational
graph centering on the specific basic event. Multiple specific-BE ports are allowed
to simultaneously represent different specific basic events (Figure 5.10 (b)).
The partner basic events may be by prioritized taking the criticality of MCSs into
account. Referring to the path “specific basic event→MCSs→ partner basic events”
when a common MCS related to the specific basic event is critical, the partner basic
events included by this MCS need to be preferentially addressed. We propose a
medium-sized port called an MCS port to represent the related MCS (Figure 5.9
(b) and Figure 5.10 (c)). The color of a MCS port represents the unreliability levels
of the MCSs. When there are many MCS ports for a specific basic event, we need
to effectively arrange these ports in order to adapt to the limited display space. We
horizontally present these ports from left to right (Figure 5.9 (b), the number is the
order of MCS ports). If one line does not fully display these ports, we use multiple
lines that are arranged from bottom to top. In this case, the list of these ports starts
at the lower left corner of a header cell of the matrix view, and ends at the top right
corner. In short, the arrangement of the MCS ports ranks the MCS ports according
to their failure probabilities and preferentially presents the important MCS ports
in a limited header cell. Using the MCS ports, engineers may prioritize the partner
basic events according to the criticality of the MCS ports. To reduce the visual
clutter, the MCS ports appear on only one header cell at a time, and the curved
lines are translucent. In addition, because ports cannot present more details of the
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MCSs, we show the detailed information of the corresponding MCS rows in the
matrix view (Figure 5.10 (b) and (c)).
5.1.7 Integration with CFT Structures
In order to analyze the failure propagation with respect to MCSs, engineers inves-
tigate the failure flow of basic events along the CFT structure. Based on the design
concept (section 4.1.3.5), MCS Matrix integrates logical structures of CFTs into
the matrix view using the focus+context technique in combination with semantic
zooming concept. CFT components are used as black boxes and a basic event only
directly works inside its parent CFT component. For this reason, engineers usually
focus more on the failure flow of a specific basic event within the bounds of the
direct parent CFT component.
Based on this consideration, when a color-filled matrix cell is double-clicked,
the cell is enlarged and displays an embedded view. The embedded view shows the
internal logical structure of the direct parent CFT component of the basic event
corresponding to the enlarged cell (Figure 5.11). Regarding the space requirement,
only one embedded view can be shown at a time. In the embedded view, the critical
path representing the failure flow is highlighted using blue. Nodes are assigned colors
according to their unreliability levels. The nodes along the critical path are filled with
colors, whereas other nodes only have a colored border: the basic events included
by the MCS of the current row (but not of the current column) have a thick border
and the rest of the nodes are marked with a thin border. In this way, engineers are
able to focus on the failure flow while maintaining the overall MCSs as the context.
In addition, we provide a global path view on the left side of the matrix in the
current row. There are two motivations for applying this view. First, the embedded
view can provide the critical path of only one basic event at a time, so it still needs
an overview of the critical paths of all basic events included by a specific MCS.
Second, the embedded view only provides a local path within one CFT component.
It still needs to show the paths over the whole CFT. This global path view is a good
complement for the embedded view.
The global path view presents the overall critical paths of the basic events in-
cluded by a specific MCS (Figure 5.12). Each node has the same shape and color as
those in the CFT structure. In order to reduce the complexity of the global path, we
directly link the nodes between different CFT components without using in-/out-
ports. Considering the identification of CFT components, we use translucent gray
blobs to indicate the scope of CFT components, so that the nesting of CFT compo-
nents can be clearly represented. It should be noted that the CFT component of the
system level (i.e., the top-level component) does not have a blob. Figure 5.12 shows
an example that the global path view includes a CFT component of the system level
(no blob), a sub-component, and three sub-sub-components.
The detailed information of the nodes of the global path view is dynamically
displayed with a tooltip. Similar to the CFT structure shown in the embedded view,
the global critical paths of the specific basic event are dynamically highlighted in
blue. We provide interaction for the cooperation between the embedded view and
the global path view. When selecting a basic event node in the global path view, the
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Figure 5.11: Critical path of basic events. (a) The embedded view shows the logical
structure of the CFT component that contains the basic event of the current column
(“E7”). The critical path is highlighted by a blue border. Nodes are assigned colors
according to the unreliability levels. The nodes along the critical path are filled
with colors. Other nodes only have a colored border: the basic event that is not
of the current column and is included by the MCS of the current row has a thick
border (“E9”); the rest of the nodes have a thin border. (b) The overview of critical
paths of an MCS. The node-link layout represents the global critical paths of the
current MCS. There are four basic events in the MCS. Translucent blobs represent
the ranges of the CFT components. The blue border highlights the paths related to
“E7”. An enlarged view is presented in Figure 5.12.
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Figure 5.12: The global path view. Nesting relations among CFT components are
represented in the global critical path view. The system level CFT component in-
cludes a sub-CFT component, and this sub CFT component includes three sub-sub-
CFT components.
cell corresponding to the basic event will be enlarged to show the embedded view.
In this way, engineers are able to analyze the logical relations between this basic
event and other basic events within a CFT component while maintaining the overall
global critical paths with respect to the specified MCS.
We additionally provide an alternative view for the embedded view in order to
show the detail data of the currently column (Figure 5.13), e.g., parameters of the
basic event corresponding to the current column. Engineers may investigate the
detailed data directly in the matrix without needing to switch views.
5.1.8 Representing Relations between MCSs and CFT
Components
In some cases, engineers focus on CFT components rather than basic events with
respect to the following questions:
• how many and which CFT components are involved in a given MCS?
• how many and which scenarios (MCSs) may be caused by a specified CFT
component?
MCS Matrix aggregates basic events according to the CFT components and merge
heads of the aggregated columns as a whole to present IDs of the CFT components
(Figure 5.14). Each merged column represents a CFT component. The basic events of
a CFT component are represented as sub-cells in order to show the relations between
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Figure 5.13: Embedded view - the detailed data of the analyzed basic event. This
view consists of an icon graphically representing the basic event (upper side). The
color depends on the unreliability of the basic event. A data table presents the
detailed data of the basic event (lower side).
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Figure 5.14: Matrix view with respect to CFT components (540 MCSs and 3 CFT
components in total). Columns are aggregated and merged according to the CFT
components. The merged columns represent CFT components. Basic events are rep-
resented as sub-columns.
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Figure 5.15: Critical paths of the CFT component. The embedded view presents the
logical structure of the CFT component. The paths of the basic events “E7” and
“E9” are simultaneously highlighted because both of them are included by the CFT
component of the current column.
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basic events and MCSs. To represent the failure propagation with respect to CFT
components, the embedded views and global path view are also available (Figure
5.15). An example in section 5.2.2 depicts the analysis of the relation between MCSs
and CFT components.
5.2 Application Scenarios
In this section, we present examples of the application scenarios that show the usage
of our visualization approach to fulfill the tasks of MCS analysis.
5.2.1 Example 1
The overview of MCSs may show a pattern that facilitates the understanding of
the system safety as well as identifying of the serious basic events. The goal of this
example is to search for information from the pattern and identify the basic events
that have high priority to be addressed.
5.2.1.1 Dataset and Configuration
RAVON [164] is an autonomous mobile robot made by the University of Kaiser-
slautern, which is used as an example by the ViERforES project [201]. A set of CFT
models of RAVON was generated using ESSaRel [193] for the safety analysis. The
resulting models are then explored using MCS Matrix. We apply a CFT model that
was generated depending on the braking system of RAVON in the first three exam-
ples. Based on this CFT, we generate 891 MCSs and 104 basic events. The examples
are presented on a monitor with a resolution of 1920x1080. The unreliability levels
are defined as follows:
• critical level (red): (1e-6, 1]
• moderate level (yellow): (1e-10, 1e-6]
• acceptable level (green): (0, 1e-10]
Because the failure probabilities of the applied MCSs cover different exponential
intervals, we use the logarithmic scale for the bars representing the failure proba-
bilities. The upper bound is based on the largest failure probability, and the lower
bound is the smallest failure probability. The bar representing the order of MCSs
still has the default linear scale. The upper bound is the largest order of the MCSs,
and the lower bound is “1”.
5.2.1.2 Analysis Process
The following steps are performed in order to accomplish the goal:
1. We group rows by the failure probability, and group columns with the associ-
ated ordering concept.
2. We apply the uniform scaling. Row height is compressed to maintain a sat-
isfactory overview in order to analyze patterns. By analyzing the overview,
as a result, Figure 5.16 shows that there are a few critical MCSs (red) and a
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few more moderate MCSs (yellow). Most of the MCSs are acceptable (green).
We may roughly understand that the safety of the overall system is not bad
because most of the failure scenarios (i.e., MCSs) are acceptable.
3. Then we investigate the critical MCSs. Figure 5.17 shows the results that all
the critical MCSs are the single point of failure because each MCS has only
one basic event. Thus, the red rows definitely indicate the most important
MCSs either by quantitative estimation (the failure probability ) or by qual-
itative estimation (i.e., the order of MCSs). The basic events of these MCSs
are dangerous and need to be addressed as soon as possible.
4. We then analyze the moderate MCSs by exploring the corresponding area.
Figure 5.17 shows that there are four basic events that frequently appear
in most of the moderate MCSs (manually marked with a blue frame). These
basic events need to be preferentially addressed. Addressing these serious basic
events may efficiently improve the MCSs of the moderate level.
By investigating the overview, the important MCSs are quickly identified. Addi-
tionally, the serious basic events are intuitively identified according to the important
MCSs.
5.2.2 Example 2
In some cases, engineers analyze the relations between MCSs and CFT components.
Because CFT components reflect the system components, the vulnerable system
components can be identified by analyzing the CFT components. The goal of this
example is to estimate the criticality of the CFT components and investigate the
failure propagation within the CFT components. In this example, we focus on the
critical and moderate MCSs. To achieve the goal, the following steps are needed:
1. We perform the uniform scaling for obtaining a satisfactory overview of MCSs.
2. We aggregate columns according to the inclusion relations between basic events
and CFT components. In this way, columns represent CFT components (Figure
5.18).
3. We then analyze the relations between MCSs and CFT components. The fol-
lowing results are obtained:
• The critical MCSs (red rows) relate to four CFT components:
“C1.M1.SC13”, “C1.M1.SC11.SC2”, “C1.M1.SC11.SC3”, and
“C1.M1.SC5”. The corresponding system components need to be
addressed urgently.
• The moderate MCSs (yellow rows) may be caused by three CFT compo-
nents: “C1.M1.SC9”, “C1.M1.SC8”, and “C1.M1.SC3”. Specifically, most
of the moderate MCSs are caused by the combinations between CFT
components “C1.M1.SC9” and “C1.M1.SC8”. As long as one of these
components is addressed, the system safety may be improved.
• The CFT components “C1.M1.SC11.SC4”, “C1.M1.SC11.SC5”, and
“C1.M1.SC11.SC1” are only related to the acceptable MCSs. The fail-
ures of the corresponding system components do not seriously influence
the system safety.
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Figure 5.18: Application example 2. Columns represent the CFT components.
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4. We finally investigate the internal failure propagation of the specific CFT com-
ponent. As an example, we focus on the CFT component “C1.M1.SC3” that
may cause MCSs without cooperating with other components. This component
represents the main actuator of the breaking system of the robot. We show
the structure of this CFT component in the embedded view (Figure 5.19). By
dynamically displaying the labels of nodes, the meaning of the failure flow in-
side this component may be understood as follows. There are two basic events
that respectively represent the problems of “Front wheels (E28)” and “Rear
wheels (E29)”. Both of the basic events cause the intermediated failures of the
front steering engine and the rear steering engine. When both steering engines
fail at the same time (i.e., at gate “G21”), the main actuator cannot correctly
provide the reaction (i.e., at gate “G15”).
The example illustrates the pattern analysis for relations between MCSs and CFT
components. The CFT components are treated as the entities contributing to MCSs.
This helps to identify the vulnerable system components that may cause the critical
failures of a system.
5.2.3 Example 3
For an MCS, failure propagation of its basic events describes how the top event is
triggered in the failure scenario of this MCSs. The failure propagation shows the
generated intermediate failures and the failed CFT components in the scenario. Be-
cause the CFT component reflects the system components, the failure propagation
analysis may facilitate the analysis of the impacts on the system components in case
a specific failure scenario appears. This example is presented for this application.
The goals are: identification of the most critical MCS(s) that have the largest fail-
ure probability; identification of the failure propagation cased by the MCS(s). The
following steps are performed in order to fulfill these goals:
1. We investigate the red rows in order to identify the most critical MCS. How-
ever, the failure probabilities of the first three MCSs look very similar.
2. We then perform the individual scaling and investigate the failure probabilities
of the first three MCSs (Figure 5.20). This way, texts clearly show that only
the first MCS, which has the ID “15”, has the largest failure probability. The
basic event included by this MCS is “C1.M1.SC11.SC3.E7”.
3. By double-clicking the color-filled cell at the intersection between the MCS
“15” and its basic event, embedded view is displayed that shows the logical
structure of the parent CFT component of the basic event (Figure 5.21).
4. The critical path of the basic event included by the MCS “15” is highlighted
with a blue border in the embedded view: “E7 → G11 → G8”. The meaning
of the failure propagation is identified by node labels: “Real-time detection
issue (E7)” → “Rotation Direction issue (G11)” → “Unfiltered 3D Obstacle
Detection (G8)”.
5. We then analyze the failure propagation between CFT components in the
global path view (Figure 5.22). The top event of the system-level component
may be caused by the following failure propagation:
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• The CFT component “C1.M1.SC11.SC3” outputs its top-level failure to
CFT component “C1.M1.SC11.SC2”. An intermediate failure is gener-
ated at gate “G15” (Figure 5.22 (a) and (b)).
• The CFT components “C1.M1.SC1.SC3” and “C1.M1.SC11.SC2” are
contained by CFT component “C1.M1.SC11” (Figure 5.22 (c)).
• The CFT component “C1.M1.SC11” outputs its failure to the CFT com-
ponent “C1.M1.SC13” (Figure 5.22(d)). Inside this CFT component, the
intermediate failure causes the output failure by gate “G7”.
• The failure from the CFT component “C1.M1.SC13” leads to an inter-
mediate failure at gate “G14” of the system-level CFT component. The
failure at gate “G14” directly leads to the top event.
In short, the paths with respect to the meaning of the failure propagation is described
as follows: the failure of the system component “Unfiltered 3D Obstacle Detection”
flows into the part of the robot “RavonBase”, and causes the software failure of
this part. Then the failure causes the problem of the avoiding system of the robot.
Finally, the mobile robot may not be able to break because of the failure of the
avoiding system.
This example shows how to analyze the failure propagation of MCSs using the
node-link critical paths. Additionally, the example again presents the use of the
individual scaling in terms of the exact comparison in the analysis.
5.2.4 Example 4
The MCS analysis with respect to a specific basic event is significant in many sce-
narios. A significant case is to deal with a specific basic event that has a high failure
probability and is difficult to improve. In this case, engineers need to intensively
address the partner basic events that may cooperate with the specific basic event
to cause failure scenarios (i.e., MCSs). This example illustrates this scenario. We
estimate the basic event according to the failure probability. The objective of this
example is to identify the partner basic events of the most critical basic event(s).
5.2.4.1 Dataset and Configuration
We use a CFT model based on RAVON that contains 52 basic events. There are
212 MCSs generated based on this CFT. The configuration is the same as that of
the data used in the first three examples.
5.2.4.2 Analysis Process
To achieve this goal, the following steps are required:
1. We group columns by the failure probability in order to rank the basic events.
As a result, the basic event “C1.M2.SC1.E49” of the first column is the most
critical (Figure 5.23 (a)).
2. We show the relational graph of the most critical basic event (Figure 5.23 (a)).
As a result, the partner basic events are identified by the partner-BE ports
along the curved lines on the matrix header:
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• the basic event “C1.M2.SC4.E5”
• the basic event “C1.M2.SC4.E3”
• the basic event “C1.M2.SC4.E1”
• the basic event “C1.M2.SC3.E9”
• the basic event “C1.M2.SC3.E5”
• the basic event “C1.M2.SC3.E1”
• the basic event “C1.M2.SC3.E3”
• the basic event “C1.M2.SC3.E7”
3. We show and analyze the MCS ports of the most critical basic event. Figure
5.23 (b) shows the following results. There are four critical MCSs (red ports)
including the critical basic event. There are six moderate MCSs (yellow ports).
We do not need to focus on the partner basic events connecting the green ports
because the risk of the relevant MCSs are acceptable.
4. We then investigate the most significant partner basic events (Figure 5.23 (c)).
Because the MCS ports are sorted by the failure probability, the first red port
(at the lower left corner) represents the most critical MCS. By selecting the
port, curved lines indicate the partner basic events included by the most critical
MCS: “C1.M2.SC4.E3” and “C1.M2.SC3.E9”. These are the most significant
basic events that may cooperate with the most critical basic event to cause
the most critical failure scenario.
The example presents the identification of the partner basic events of a specific
basic event by using the relation ports. Engineers may identify the relations between
basic events without needing to investigate the cells of the matrix view.
5.3 Evaluation
In order to evaluate our visualization approach, we performed a user experiment.
The experiment focuses on the completion time for efficiency analysis and accuracy
of MCS analysis for effectiveness analysis. The terms efficiency and effectiveness are
defined in [98]:
• efficiency is defined as the relationship between the result achieved and the
resources used.
• effectiveness is the extent to which planned activities are realized and planned
results achieved.
5.3.1 Hypotheses
Hypotheses for the experiment were defined as follows.
• Hypothesis 1: MCS Matrix is more efficient than the reference tool. It relates
to the efficiency by measuring the completion time. The null hypothesis H1,0:
MCS Matrix is NOT more efficient than the reference tool.
• Hypothesis 2: MCS Matrix is more effective than the reference tool. It focuses
on the effectiveness by measuring the accuracy. The null hypothesis H2,0: MCS
Matrix is NOT more effective than the reference tool.
126 5.3. EVALUATION
5.3.2 Experiment Environment
5.3.2.1 Reference tool.
ESSaRel [193] was used as the reference tool because it perfectly supports the CFT
analysis and the MCS analysis.
5.3.2.2 Participants.
There were 14 participants from the local university who have Master’s degrees in
computer science or engineering. They did not have any experience with the tools
prior to the experiment. The participants were divided into two groups equally:
group A using MCS Matrix and group B using ESSaRel.
5.3.2.3 Apparatus and software.
The experiment was performed on a computer with an AMD Athlon 64 x2 Proces-
sor 5000+ with 2GB of memory and an NVIDIA Quadro NVS210S graphic card
with 64MB video memory. The tools were running on a 19” TFT monitor with a
resolution of 1680x1050. Windows XP and the necessary software were installed on
the computer. The applied tools were initially configured and would not change the
settings during the experiment, so that all participants can have the same initial
software environment.
5.3.2.4 Dataset.
We applied a CFT model of the robot RAVON. The MCSs were generated using ES-
SaRel and then visualized using MCS Matrix. Under consideration of the workload
and the actual difficulties of the experiment, e.g., the duration of each participant,
a CFT model having 118 MCSs for the experiment were selected and applied.
5.3.3 Experiment Procedure
Initially, an inner test experiment was performed in order to check whether the
experiment design was feasible. After correcting the found problems, two domain
experts were invited for an expert review. They provided feedback not only about
our tool, but also about the experiment design, such as the difficulty of the task and
the time needed for completing the task. After the modifications made based on the
experts’ comments, the participants carried out the evaluations one at a time.
There was a moderator and an observer present. The moderator focused on the
process of evaluation. He guided the participants through all steps of the evaluation
and answered their questions. The observer was responsible for recording the com-
pletion time of each step and the behavior of subjects in protocols. The tool was
restarted at the beginning of every experiment in order to restore the software to
its initial state.
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5.3.3.1 Training.
At the beginning of the experiment, the participants were asked to read tutorials
for the tools. Then we allowed them to experience the tools for a trial period. The
time of the training phase was recorded but not limited in order to give participants
enough time to become familiar with the tools.
5.3.3.2 Task.
After training, participants started to perform a task. Both groups fulfilled the same
task. The goal of the task was to draw the logical structures of the CFT components
that relate to the MCSs having the critical failure probability. The participants
completed the task by accomplishing the following sub-tasks:
• Identify the MCSs that have a critical unreliability level, i.e., the critical MCSs.
• List the failure probabilities, the orders, and the basic events of the critical
MCSs.
• Identify the most critical ones from the identified basic events.
• Draw logical structures of the CFT components that have the most critical
basic events.
In the task, the tools may be analyzed in two essential aspects of the MCS analysis:
• aspect 1: identification of the important information of MCSs (the sub-task 1,
2, 3).
• aspect 2: investigation of the failure propagation of MCSs along the CFT
structure (sub-task 4).
The time of all sub-tasks was recorded but not limited in this phase. The participants
stopped working when they were completely satisfied with their results.
5.3.3.3 Questionnaires.
Finally, participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire for the qualitative evalu-
ation. It had a five-point Likert scale to represent how good/bad the achievements
of the tools were.
5.3.4 Results and Discussion
5.3.4.1 Quantitative Evaluation
The efficiency was evaluated by analyzing the average summarized time for complet-
ing the task. Group A using MCS Matrix spent 37 minutes of average on the task,
and group B using ESSaRel spent 72 minutes. Using MCS Matrix, the task was com-
pleted 48.61% faster than using ESSaRel (Figure 5.24 (a)). In order to identify the
significant difference between both results, an ANOVA F-test [129] was performed.
The result of the F-test: F = 9.655, p = 0.011. Because p < 0.05, the difference in
the time needed for completing the task was significant. The null hypothesis H1,0
with respect to the efficiency was rejected. We deduced that MCS Matrix was more
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(a) Summarized time. (b) Average accuracy.
Figure 5.24: Quantitative results of the experiment.
efficient than ESSaRel. The time of the sub-tasks was also summarized in order to
analyze the tools in different aspects. For aspect 1, using MCS Matrix, the sub-
tasks were completed 47.78% faster than using ESSaRel. By ANOVA F-test, the
results were F = 7.294, p = 0.022 < 0.05. We deducted that it was significantly
faster using MCS Matrix than using ESSaRel for identifying the important MCSs
and the associated information. For aspect 2, using MCS Matrix, the sub-task was
completed 62.5% faster than using ESSaRel. By ANOVA F-test, the results were
F = 6.585, p = 0.028 < 0.05, and thus we deducted that it was significantly faster
for identifying the failure propagation of the MCSs using MCS Matrix than using
ESSaRel.
Further, effectiveness was evaluated by analyzing the average accuracy of the
task answers. Group A using MCS Matrix had 87.5% of the average accuracy, and
group B using ESSaRel had 77% of the average accuracy. That is to say, the MCS
Matrix group had a 10.5 % higher accuracy than that of the ESSaRel group (Figure
5.24 (b)). The results of an ANOVA F-test were F = 1.012 and p = 0.338. Because
of p > 0.05, there was no significant difference in accuracy between both results.
The null hypothesis H2,0 with respect to the effectiveness had to be accepted. We
deduced that the accuracy of MCS Matrix was not significantly better than ESSaRel.
Analyzing the time in individual aspects, there was no significant difference.
In short, we concluded that when using MCS Matrix, engineers may analyze
MCSs much faster than using traditional approaches and obtain the results with
similar accuracies.
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Figure 5.25: Subjective comparison between MCS Matrix and ESSaRel.
5.3.4.2 Qualitative Evaluation
A Likert-scale questionnaire was designed for the comparison between MCS Matrix
and ESSaRel. The items of the questionnaire depended on the tasks of the user ex-
periment. The participants subjectively evaluated the tools according to the abilities
of tools for solving the problems. We assign points from 0 to 4 to the estimation
levels from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. The better the comment, the
higher the points awarded. The mean of the points were calculated and shown in
Figure 5.25. It showed that most items was favorably reviewed.
The participants basically commented that MCS Matrix was helpful to obtain a
satisfactory overview of MCSs that was helpful for analyzing the pattern of MCSs,
e.g., roughly estimating the current risk state of a system. Additionally, they would
like to navigate MCSs in the matrix view rather than in plain text. The participants
commented that colors and the grouping concepts can effectively support to estimate
MCSs (and basic events), and identify the important information. The concept com-
bining the uniform scaling and the individual scaling was favorably reviewed. The
participants thought that it was practical to view the detailed data of both MCSs
and basic events in the overview of a large number of MCSs. The “scaling by groups”
was preferred but not very greatly. The participants argued that the benefit of the
concept would be reduced when there were a lot of critical MCSs. In this case, the
screen space would be occupied by the rows of the critical MCSs, so the overview of
the MCSs would be damaged. The participants thought that the individual scaling
is more practical than the scaling by groups. The participants considered that they
can intuitively and quickly compare the MCSs using bars. Most of the participants
commented that representing the critical path inside the matrix view facilitates the
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analysis of failure propagation because this concept reduces the effort for switch-
ing different views. Some participants argued that the embedded view takes up too
much space and reduces the readability of the overview of MCSs. They suggested a
pop-up window for representing the requested logical structure.
In addition, the participants thought that MCS Matrix was able to effectively
represent the relations among basic events with respect to the common MCSs. Rep-
resenting the relation between MCSs and CFT components using a matrix was
treated as a novel concept because there were few considerations of this relation
in the ordinary concepts. Generally, the participants commented that MCS Matrix
had great benefits in terms of the identification of the important information from
a large number of MCSs.
Chapter 6
Visualization of Importance
Analysis
The importance analysis is a significant quantitative measure that evaluates the
respective contributions of basic events to the top event. According to the design
concepts discussed in section 4.2, we propose a visualization approach, called VisQSA
(Visual Quantitative Safety Analysis), which visually supports the importance anal-
ysis.
6.1 Visual Quantitative Safety Analysis
Our approach dynamically integrates the architectural view representing the results
of the importance analysis with the enhanced node-link logical structure of CFT
components representing logical failure flow.
6.1.1 Architectural View
We propose an iceray-layout-style architectural view (Figure 6.1) for representing
the nesting relation between CFT components. A gray rectangle represents a CFT
component. The ID of the CFT component is printed on the left side of the rectangle.
Basic events with importance values are represented using the importance bars. The
filled part of a bar represents the importance value of the basic event. The importance
bars are sorted in descending order and vertically listed under the parent rectangle
on the far-left side. The rectangles representing the sub-components are horizontally
listed beside the list of importance bars.
In some cases, the importance values for a system are too small to be represented.
To address this issue, engineers are allowed dynamically to define the lower and
upper bounds of the importance bar between 0 and 1. An alternative logarithmic
scale may be applied to the importance bar when the importance of basic events are
distributed in a large exponential interval, e.g., [0.001, 0.1]. The architectural view
represents various situations of the containing relations (e.g., Figure 6.2):
• the CFT component contains both basic events and sub-CFT components,
e.g., the CFT component “SC43”.
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(a) Architectural view. Gray rectangles represent CFT components. The basic events with impor-
tance values are represented using the importance bars.
(b) Ordinary representation concept (generated using ESSaRel [193]). The logical structures of CFT
components are presented in three separate views.
Figure 6.1: Architectural view. (a) The architectural view. (b) The ordinary repre-
sentation of the CFT model represented in (a).
CHAPTER 6. VISUALIZATION OF IMPORTANCE ANALYSIS 133
Figure 6.2: Different cases of the containing relations.
• the CFT component does not contain basic events, but has sub-CFT compo-
nents, e.g., the system-level CFT component “C1.M1”.
• the CFT component does not contain sub-CFT component, but has basic
events, e.g. “SC34”, “SC35”, “SC105”, and “SC109”.
• the CFT component has neither basic events nor sub-CFT components, e.g.,
“SC28”.
6.1.2 Integrating the CFT Structure
The logical structure of the CFT component is the basis of representing the failure
flow and logical relations between basic events. According to the layout composi-
tion rules (section 4.2.3.3), the logical structure of the specific CFT component is
displayed, when requested. The visible logical structure may be treated as the ex-
pansion of the architectural view. In order to adapt to different demands, we provide
two expansion concepts: referencing expansion and in-place expansion.
6.1.2.1 Referencing expansion.
The referencing expansion concept (Figure 6.3 (b)) is developed based on case 2 (d)
in Table 4.7. When expanding a specific CFT component, the importance bars and
the architectural views of the sub-components are embedded in the visible logical
structure. In the architectural view, a vertical rectangular indicator is drawn to
replace the initial part representing the CFT component. A dashed curve links the
visible logical structure and the indicator. By using the ordinary representation
concept, when investigating a desired sub-CFT components, engineers need to show
all the higher-level parent components as the example shown in section 3.2.2.3. If
this component is nested in a deeper hierarchy, it may take a lot of effort for the
iterative investigation. In contrast, using the referencing expansion, engineers are
allowed to directly show the logical structures of the deeper-nested components
without needing to consider the higher-level parent components.
6.1.2.2 In-Place expansion.
The in-place expansion implements case 4 in Table 4.7. This way, the architectural
view of a CFT component is simply replaced with the corresponding logical struc-
ture. The benefit is that engineers can obtain the continuous logical failure flow.
For example, Figure 6.3 (c) shows the continuous failure flow of the basic event
”E1” (highlighted by blue border). In contrast, the ordinary representation concept
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(a) Architectural view.
(b) Referencing expansion. (c) In-place expansion.
Figure 6.3: Expansion concepts. The importance bar and critical path of the most
important basic event “E1” are highlighted in blue. The importance bar and critical
path of the second important basic event “E3” are highlighted in light blue. (a)
Architectural view. The blue importance bar represents the most important basic
event and the light blue bar represent the second most important basic event. (b)
Showing structure of CFT component “SC7” using referencing expansion concept.
A gray blob indicates the scope of the CFT structure. (c) Showing structure of
the sub-CFT component “SC5” using in-place expansion concept. The continuous
critical path is displayed.
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separates the CFT component structure over independent views. It is difficult to
represent the continuous paths of failure flow.
6.1.3 Highlighting Methods
In order to represent the failure propagation of the important basic events, we pro-
vide two highlighting mechanisms: highlighting regarding the important basic events
automatically determined by a criterion, and highlighting with respect to the specific
basic event.
6.1.3.1 Highlighting the important Basic Events
The important basic events may be automatically determined by a two-level estima-
tion criterion: the most important basic event(s) and the secondary level important
basic events. Engineers are allowed to configure the thresholds of the criterion. We
use colors to highlight the borders of the important basic events and their critical
paths. In order to avoid the conflict with the colors of unreliability levels, we select
blue (for the most important basic events), light blue (for the second-level important
basic events), and black (for the unimportant basic events). Figure 6.3 (a) shows the
highlighting of the importance bars, and Figure 6.3 (b) and (c) represent the path
highlighting.
6.1.3.2 Highlighting the specific Basic Event
A CFT component may be influenced either by the failure of the nested critical
sub-CFT components or by the input failure. When selecting a basic event in the
architectural view, the influenced components are highlighted by using gradient cyan
areas on the left side of the rectangles (Figure 6.4 (a)). This represents the influence
along the nesting structure of components. This highlighting concept is useful for
analyzing the specific important basic event with respect to not only the influenced
CFT components, but also the logical faliure flow. Figure 6.4 (a) shows an example.
We select a basic event belonging to the CFT component “SC48”, and the cyan
areas indicate the influenced CFT components: “SC48”, “SC55”, “SC74”, “SC13”,
and “C1.M2”. Additionally, when showing the logical structures of the parent CFT
components of the selected basic event, the critical path of this basic event will be
highlighted by a cyan border (Figure 6.4 (b)). In this way, for a selected basic event,
engineers may investigate the logical failure in particular parent components while
maintaining the overview of the influenced components in the architectural view.
6.1.4 Adapting CFT Structure
For representing the failure flow with respect to the important basic events, we
visualize the logical structures of CFT components (i.e., the CFT structures) using
a hierarchical network based on the concept of the Sugiyama algorithm [183].
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(a) Highlighting the influenced components in the architectural view
using cyan areas.
(b) Highlighting the critical path.
Figure 6.4: Highlighting the specific basic event. The selected basic event is high-
lighted by a cyan border.
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(a) Ordinary representation for the logical structure of the system-level CFT “C1.M1”.
(b) The logical structure with embedded architectural views.
Figure 6.5: Embedding architectural views into the CFT structure.
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6.1.4.1 Visual Features of the CFT Structure
The failure probability of CFT elements is a meaningful context to analyze the
quantitative failure propagation. We visualize the unreliability level of the nodes of
the CFT structure using colors defined in section 5.1.2. We visualize the ordinary
nodes with the US style (Figure 9.1). A sub-component is symbolically represented as
a box that was defined in [108]. One or more in- and out-ports of the sub-component
are represented as triangles. The architectural views of the sub-components may be
optionally embedded in the logical structure instead of the original boxes (Figure
6.5). The architectural views provide more meaningful information and the boxes
require less display space. The importance bars are respectively put under the basic
event nodes.
We use a translucent gray blob to indicate the scope of the logical structure of a
CFT component (Figure 6.6). Previously, Collins et al. [47] proposed an approach for
drawing contours for representing the dataset relations. Simonetto et al. [176] pro-
posed an algorithm for drawing translucent blobs in order to identify the overlapping
datasets. Smith et al. [178] used blobs to represent the molecule compartment hier-
archies in biochemical domain. Byelas et al. [33] proposed a concept using textured
blobs to represent metrics for UML diagrams. Elmqvist et al. [62] have surveyed the
concepts that used blobs to represent hierarchies of data.
Because our blobs are translucent, the nesting of CFT components can be in-
tuitively represented. For example, in Figure 6.6, the blobs present a multi-level
nesting structure. Additionally, the ID and short description of the CFT component
may be optionally displayed on the blob in order to present the basic information.
Engineers are allowed to adjust the parameters of the blob contour for adapt-
ing to the irregular shape of the CFT structure. This is helpful for addressing the
overlapping issue. Using the simple convex contour engineers may quickly identify
the scope of the components while using the complex multi-sided polygon contour,
engineers may exactly identify that information (e.g., Figure 6.7). The method of
drawing blobs is based on the algorithm proposed in [47] that is suitable to draw
the complex contours for different sub-graphs in the node-link diagram.
6.1.4.2 Alignment of Basic Events
There are few studies that concentrate on enhancing the arrangement of nodes of the
FT/CFT structure. Usually, the ordinary concepts provide the unorganized layout
for the FT/CFT structure. Besides the default arrangement of the basic event nodes
(Figure 6.8 (a)), we propose two additional alignment concepts for basic event nodes
in order to support the comparisons:
• Default alignment layout. CFT nodes are arranged depending on the initial
hierarchical network drawing algorithm. This concept requires a small amount
of display space. This layout helps to identify the distance (i.e., the number of
levels in the tree) between the top event and a basic event while maintaining
an efficient use of space.
• Local alignment layout (Figure 6.8 (b)). To facilitate the comparison of basic
events inside the individual CFT component, we propose a concept, where
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(a) CFT structure without using blobs.
(b) CFT structure using blobs.
Figure 6.6: Blobs for the CFT components. Blobs indicate the scopes of the logical
structures of CFT component. The nesting of CFT components are identified by
the translucency of blobs. Brief descriptions or IDs of the components are may be
printed on the blobs.
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(a) Simple convex contour.
(b) Complex multi-sided polygon contour.
Figure 6.7: Contour of blobs.
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aligning the basic event nodes at the bottom of the logical structure of each
CFT component.
• Global alignment layout (Figure 6.8 (c)). To simplify the comparison of basic
events across CFT components, we developed a global comparison layout. All
basic event nodes are aligned at the bottom of the overall CFT structure.
Using this layout, engineers may quickly scan the horizontal list of the basic
events without the need to locate events within the complex CFT structure.
6.1.5 Importance Plot
Regarding the CFT structure, the comparison among the large number of basic
events is not effective. For addressing this issue, we propose a linked view called
the importance plot that is adjacent to the CFT view (lower part of Figure 6.15).
Basic events in the importance plot are represented as circle icons and filled with
the same color as that in the CFT structure. In the importance plot, a basic event is
shown by its current horizontal position on the CFT structure along the x-axis and
its importance along the y-axis. The importance plot represents the distribution of
basic events over both the importance value and the position in the CFT structure.
The rectangle icon on the plot represents the sub-component node symbolically rep-
resented in the CFT structure (i.e., the unexpanded CFT component). The vertical
position of the rectangle icon depends on the maximal importance value of its basic
events. In this way, engineers may quickly determine whether an important basic
event exists in the component. Another significant use of the importance plot is to
support the highlighting of the important basic events. Engineers may dynamically
set the position of a horizontal line in the importance plot after identifying the im-
portant basic events. The nodes above the line are considered as the important basic
events and their critical paths are automatically highlighted.
6.2 Application Scenarios
In order to present the use of our visualization, application examples are presented
in this section.
6.2.1 Dataset and Configuration
We apply a CFT model that contains 1031 basic events and 45 CFT components
in the examples. The model was generated depending on the safety analysis for the
robot RAVON [164,201]. The unreliability levels are defined as follows:
• critical level (red): (1e-2, 1]
• moderate level (yellow): (1e-4, 1e-2]
• acceptable level (green): (0, 1e-4]
The lower and upper bounds of the importance bar are respectively set to “1e-4”
and “1”. In order to effectively represent the importance values in this interval, we
use the logarithmic scale for the importance bars and the importance plot.
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(a) Default alignment concept. (b) Local alignment concept.
(c) Global alignment concept.
Figure 6.8: Basic event alignment layouts. The layouts offer trade offs between space
compactness and ease of comparison of the basic events.
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6.2.2 Example 1
A significant task of the importance analysis of the CFT is to identify the CFT
components influenced by the important basic events. The goal of this example is
to identify the CFT components influenced by the most important basic event and
to understand how the components are influenced.
6.2.2.1 Analysis Process
The goal is achieved with the following steps:
1. We first identify the most important basic event and the most critical com-
ponent that contains. As a result, Figure 6.9 shows that the obviously impor-
tant basic events are distributed in seven CFT components: “SC13”, “SC49”,
“SC28”, “SC114”, “SC19”, “SC53”, and “SC45”. These are the critical CFT
components. The CFT Component “SC49” contains the most important ba-
sic event. Thus, the “SC49” is the most critical component and needs to be
primarily addressed.
2. We identify the CFT components influenced by the most important basic
event. By selecting the most important basic event in the CFT component
“SC49”, the influenced CFT components are highlighted by small cyan areas
on the left side of the rectangles.
Figure 6.10 shows the analysis results. The parent CFT component “SC49”
of the most important basic event is certainly influenced. The components
“C1.M1”, “SC62”, “SC13”, “SC74” and “SC55” are influenced because they
directly or indirectly contain the most critical CFT component “SC49”. The
failure of “SC49” is transferred along the nesting structure. On the other
hand, we cannot effectively understand how components “SC73” and “SC12”
are influenced that do not have nesting relations with the most critical CFT
component “SC49”. Even, the CFT component “SC12” is the sub-component
of “SC49”. Thus, we need to investigate the corresponding failure flow along
the logical structure of the CFT.
3. We investigate the influence by the logical failure flow. In order to understand
the influence on the CFT component “SC73”, we display the logical structure
of its parent CFT component “SC74’ using the referencing expansion. The
result is shown in Figure 6.11 and Figure 6.12. With the help of the high-
lighted paths, we identify that the failure coming from the CFT component
“SC55”, which indirectly contains the critical CFT component “SC49”, flows
into “SC73” by going through gate “G7”. This explains how the CFT compo-
nent “SC73” is influenced.
Then we investigate the influence on the CFT component “SC12”. Because
“SC12” is the sub-component of “SC49”, we need to show the logical struc-
ture of “SC49” (Figure 6.13). The failure of the most important basic event
“E2” flows into the sub-component “SC12”. This is why “SC12” is one of the
influenced components.
In the analysis process, we optionally show the (sub-)architectural views of the
sub components according to the requirements. Only if a (sub-)architectural view
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provides meaningful information, do we display it instead of the simple rectangu-
lar symbol, e.g., “SC55” in Figure 6.12. Otherwise, we prefer the simple rectangle
because of its small space requirement, e.g., “SC73” in Figure 6.12. This example
depicts how to identify the significant components and how to understand the failure
propagation using our visualization.
When using the ordinary concept, it is difficult for us to obtain a pattern with
respect to the distribution of the important basic events over the hierarchical system
model. When identifying the influenced CFT components, we have to go through
all higher-level parent components step by step. Additionally, using the traditional
concepts, we cannot analyze the logical failure flow while maintaining the overview
of the importance of basic events.
6.2.3 Example 2
An overview of multiple critical paths brings meaningful content for understanding
the complex failure propagation along the logical structure. For example, critical
paths of two important basic events are logically connected by an AND-gate. This
facilitates to identify the logical function with respect to the important basic events.
This example shows the analysis of multiple failure flow of the important basic
events. The objective of the example is to identify and analyze multiple critical
paths.
6.2.3.1 Analysis Process
The objective can be achieved by performing the following steps:
1. We identify the critical CFT components (Figure 6.9). The architectural view
clearly shows the resulting components: “SC13”, “SC49”, “SC28”, “SC114”,
“SC19”, “SC53”, and “SC45”.
2. We show the logical structures of the critical components. Figure 6.14 shows
that “SC49” is included in “SC13”. Because the structure of the CFT com-
ponent “SC13” does not provide meaningful information for the goal, we only
display the structure of “SC49” without showing the structure of the parent
component (Figure 6.16). In the same way, the structure of the CFT compo-
nent “SC19” is displayed (Figure 6.17).
3. We determine the important basic events using the importance plot (lower part
in Figure 6.15). According to the overview of the importance of basic events in
the plot, we identify a few nodes obviously having the higher importance. We
set the horizontal line between these nodes and others. Then the corresponding
basic events and the critical paths are automatically highlighted in the CFT
structure. The results are shown in Figure 6.16, Figure 6.17, and Figure 6.18.
The blue path indicates the most important basic event and light-blue paths
indicate the second most important basic events.
4. We then investigate the critical paths the most critical CFT component
“SC49”. We perform a top-down analysis for this component with respect
to multiple failure flow. The dynamically displayed node labels in Figure 6.19
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describe the following semantic meaning of the failure propagation. This com-
ponent may fail because of three highly possible failures: the intermediate
failures of “G18 (DSP provides incorrect data)” (marked with a red circle),
“G25 (Rotating element works incorrectly)” (marked with a red circle), and
failure of the sub-component “SC28 (Scan-ID-Extractor)” (marked with a red
circle).
5. We prioritize the critical paths. First we may identify that the path of the
“G18” is the most critical because the path is highlighted with blue (Figure
6.19). The path of “G25” and the path inside “SC28” are the secondary level
most critical because they are highlighted in light-blue. We compare the im-
portance bars between basic events “E26” and “E1”. The result shows that
the failure of “G2” (referring to “E1”) is more critical than the failure of
“G25” (referring to“E26”). We then analyze the failure propagation as follows
according to the priorities of the paths:
• We analyze the failure of “G18 (DSP works incorrectly)”. This failure
may be caused by the failure of the CFT component “SC12 (DSP)” or the
failure of “E21 (DSP adapter is defective)”. According to the highlighted
critical path, we notice that “SC12” is more risky.
We then focus on the CFT component “SC12” that represents the DSP.
We show the logical structure of this component and investigate the in-
ternal failure flow (Failure 6.20). The highlighted critical path shows that
the incorrect data of DSP is generated most likely by the incorrect pivot-
ing angle (“G4”). The incorrect angle is most likely caused by the input
failure that comes from the basic event “E2 (Distance sensor is defec-
tive)”. Thus, this result explains that the incorrect data coming from
DSP (“SC12”) is mostly due to the failure of the distance sensor (“E2”)
rather than the DSP itself. When improving the CFT component “SC49
(Rotating Laser Scanner)” in future, the sensor rather than the DSP
needs to be focused on.
• In order to analyze the failure coming from the CFT component “SC28
(Scan-ID-Extractor)” , we investigate the logical structure of the compo-
nent. The highlighted critical path shows that the failure of the Scan-ID-
Extractor is most likely caused by the basic event “E1 (Extractor chip is
defective)”.
• Finally we analyze the failure of “G25 (Rotating element incorrectly
works)”. The highlighted path shows that this failure is most likely caused
by the basic event “E26 (Rotating element is defective)” rather than the
basic event “E27 (Linking part is defective)”.
Using our visualization, we may simultaneously analyze multiple highly pos-
sible failures that may trigger the CFT component “SC49 (Rotating Laser
Scanner)” to occur. The highlighted and continuous critical paths may pro-
vide meaningful context information.
The example shows the effective investigation of the multiple critical CFT com-
ponents and multiple critical paths by cooperating between the CFT view and the
importance plot. At the beginning of the analysis, the architectural view is used
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to quickly identify the significant CFT components that have the important basic
events. Then, engineers are free to focus on the identified CFT components with-
out wasting effort on the irrelevant components. The importance plot provides an
overview for ranking the basic events belonging to the critical components. It offers
support in quickly and interactively determine the multiple important basic events
for identifying the critical CFT components. The highlighting of the multiple paths
is helpful for the parallel analysis of the failure flow.
6.2.4 Example 3
The system-level component contains the primary (sub-)CFT components. Engi-
neers want to investigate the overall distribution of the important basic events over
the primary components while analyzing the logical structure of the system-level
component. In this example, we analyze the importance of basic events with respect
to the logical relations between the primary components. In addition, we focus on
the failure propagation of the specific basic event.
6.2.4.1 Analysis Process
We perform the task by following steps:
1. We analyze the distribution of the important basic events over the primary
components. The visible structure (Figure 6.21) shows that there are eight
primary components (with labels on the top rectangles of the architectural
views): “SC62”, “SC122”, “SC123”, “SC128”, “SC118”, “SC126”, “SC57”,
and “SC114”. The basic events of the system-level CFT components have only
low importance. The architectural views of the primary components show the
distribution of the important of basic events (Figure 6.22):
• the primary CFT component “SC62” contains critical (sub-)CFT com-
ponents: “SC13”, “SC49”, and “SC28”;
• the primary CFT component “SC123” has a critical (sub-)CFT compo-
nent: “SC53”;
• the primary CFT component “SC126” has a critical (sub-)CFT compo-
nent: “SC45”;
• the primary CFT component “SC114” itself has the important basic
events and also has a critical (sub-)CFT component “SC19”.
2. We investigate the influence of the specific important basic event. As an ex-
ample, we focus on the most important basic event in the CFT component
“SC19”. By clicking the first importance bar that represents the most impor-
tant basic event, the cyan areas of the rectangles indicate the influenced CFT
components. Figure 6.23 and Figure 6.24 show the result. Inside the primary
CFT component “SC114”, the failure is transferred along the nesting struc-
ture. The path is “SC19 → SC33 → SC18 → SC7 → SC114”. The outcoming
failure of “SC114” flows into the primary components “SC123” and “SC128”.
In the CFT component “SC128”, the (sub-)CFT component “SC36” is also
influenced by the input failure. The primary CFT component “SC123” is also
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Figure 6.25: Experts’ review.
influenced by another flow from the CFT component “SC114”. Both com-
ponents “SC123” and “SC128” output their failures to the top event of the
system-level component by passing gate “G6”.
This example illustrates how to explorer the information of the importance of basic
events and the failure propagation when focusing on the logical structure of the
system-level CFT component. In contrast, using the ordinary representation concept
engineers have to frequently switch views when estimating basic events in the CFT
structure, as well as invest a lot of effort into analyzing the deeper-nested sub-
components.
6.3 Evaluation
In order to estimate our visualization, an expert review was carried out. There
were six participants with degrees in computer science that worked on the CFT
analysis at the university. We introduced our visualization approach and then they
were allowed to go ahead and experience using it. We provided tasks based on the
importance analysis of the user experience. Finally, we asked the participants to fill
out a Likert-scale questionnaire.
Basically, the participants gave positive feedback on our visualization (Figure
6.25). The participants commented that the critical CFT components can be easily
identified with the help of the architectural view. There were also doubts regarding
the iceray diagram. A participant suggested to use the sector diagram instead of the
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iceray diagram for reducing the space requirement. Some participants pointed out
that the node-link layout of the logical structure was too sparse and takes up too
much space. The importance bar received positive comments, due to its intuition
and the universal comparability. The participants commented that the quantitative
failure flow along the CFT structures can be intuitively analyzed by the color of
CFT nodes.
The participants considered that analysis for multiple critical paths was per-
formed well by the highlighting of critical paths. Three participants suggested to
use rainbow colors instead of blue and light blue for multi-level critical paths. The
component expansion concepts were also strongly preferred because the investiga-
tion of continuous failure flow was possible and the analysis for the deeper-nested
sub-components did not need to go through all parent components. The concept
of aggregation blobs was regarded as being effective for identify the range of com-
ponents. The participants also commented that the dashed curve linking the CFT
structure to the architectural view was not suitable because it confused the refer-
encing lines with the input lines. The participants thought that the importance plot
was a effective auxiliary view for determining multiple important basic events. The
basic event alignment concepts were also positively evaluated because of the intu-
itive layout for comparison. But the participants also pointed out that both layouts,
particularly the global layout, required a significant amount of screen space and may
not be suitable for large scaling.
Chapter 7
Visualization of Safety
Improvement Process
7.1 Visual Support for Safety Improvements
The safety improvement process works on the construction of solutions in order to
reduce the failure probability of the top event to an acceptable value. Each solution
consists of a group of system design modifications. According to the design concept
discussed in section 4.3, we propose a visualization approach associating a core risk-
reduction plot with a set of linking views in order to visually support the safety
improvement process. In this section, the implemented visualization is introduced
with respect to the application scenarios of the safety analysis.
7.1.1 Representing Improvement Solutions
The core of the visualization approach is the risk-reduction plot combining a deci-
sion tree, a scatter plot, and other graphical properties (Figure 7.2 (2)). The risk-
reduction plot is visually associated with the CFT structure for the meaningful
context information. We associate the CFT view of the visualization of the impor-
tance analysis (VisQSA) introduced in section 6.1 with the risk-reduction plot. This
allows to link information between the risk-reduction plot and the CFT view. Basic
events are projected horizontally along the x-axis of the risk-reduction plot accord-
ing to their locations in the CFT view. The achieved change in risk in terms of
failure probability is projected along the y-axis.
To conveniently identify the important basic events (referring to the data R1
introduced in section 4.3), bars are presented along the x-axis on top of the plot
as indicators of basic events (the more important a basic event, the longer the bar)
(Figure 7.4). Labels are printed on the indicators. In case the basic events are hidden
in the unexpanded CFT components in the CFT view, we only present the labels
of the unexpanded components rather than those of the invisible basic events. The
bar for an unexpanded component depends on the maximal importance of the basic
events included by the component. More interactive associations between the risk-
reduction plot and the CFT view are introduced in section 7.1.2.2.
The important basic events correspond to the vulnerable (physical) parts of the
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Figure 7.1: Risk-state node. (0) Risk state of a system with respect to the failure
probability of the top event. Color indicates the unreliability level of the top event.
(1) Modification type. A circle indicates substitution concept; a small triangle indi-
cates redundancy concept. (2) Modification value. (3) Modification cost. (4) Cost-
effectiveness of the modification. (5) An edge connecting a node with its predecessor
node. The vertical part represents the resulting reduction of failure probability of
the top event. (6) Modification ID.
system. Based on domain knowledge, engineers may determine possible design mod-
ifications in order to address the vulnerabilities. In order to integrate the significant
data of the individual modification (Table 4.8), we propose a risk-state node that
comprises of a central triangle icon and four attached visual items (Figure 7.1) as
follows:
• Triangle icon: the actual risk state of the system (referring to require data R5).
This is the most significant data based on the updated CFT. The fill color of
the triangle represents the unreliability level of the top event. Using colors, one
may quickly estimate the criticality of the risk state of a specific modification.
When the color becomes green, the risk reduction can be finished and the
corresponding solution is completely constructed. This icon also represents the
milestones of the risk reduction during the safety improvement process, e.g.,
by which step the failure probability is reduced from critical level to moderate
level. Figure 7.2 (2) shows an example that regarding the highlighted solution
“S5”, the system safety may be reduced from the critical level (red) to the
moderate level (yellow) after performing the third modification “M17” (i.e.,
the yellow node on the far left). The ID of the modification may be presented
under the risk-reduction node (Figure 7.1 (6)).
• Item 1: modification type (referring to R2).
The types are nominal data that can be effectively represented by the graphi-
cal properties of position, color, texture, connection, density, and shape. The
graphical properties of position, color and connection have already been used
in our visualization. Because the size of the triangle icon is small, the graphi-
cal property of density is not suitable, too. Thus, we use shapes to represent
the basic types of design modifications: a circle represents a component sub-
stitution, whereas a small triangle represents the introduction of redundant
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components.
• Item 2: modification value (referring to R3).
This value represents a reduction between the failure probability of the original
basic event and that of the updated basic event (or sub-tree). We have designed
a bar graph in order to present this information in an intuitive way. The
bottom line of the bar indicates the failure probability of the initial basic
event. The filled part shows the new failure probability. If engineers replace
the original hardware, the filled part represents the failure probability of the
new part. If engineers apply the redundancy concept, filled part represents the
failure probability of the new sub-tree constructed for the redundant parts.
The bar reflects the reduction proportion of the failure probability. The item
provides information about the context under which the modification has been
applied. For example, following the substitution approach, it is possible to
intuitively compare the existing part with the substitution part in terms of
failure probability.
• Item 3: modification cost (referring to R4).
We propose a scale bar to visualize the cost not only for the comparison of
modifications, but also for the investigation the absolute cost value. Engineers
are allowed to define the scale of the bar, i.e., the unit value of the block of
the bar, e.g., each block represents 10 dollars. Engineers are allowed to use an
alternatively logarithmic scale instead of the linear scale.
• Item 4: cost-effectiveness of the modification (referring to R7). A bar is intro-
duced to represent the cost-effectiveness of the design modification. The more
cost-effective the modification, the larger the bar. Engineers are allowed to
adjust the parameters of the bar, e.g., the unit Length of the cost-effectiveness
value, in order to adapt to different systems. Liner scale and logarithmic scale
are applied to the bar.
Additionally, if a node is currently the last step of a solution, the ID of the
solution is printed next to the node For example, in Figure 7.6 modification “M2”
is currently the last step of solution “S1”.
We design the risk-state node taking the following concepts into account. There
are two possible ways to compose the central triangle icon and the visual items: the
inside composition strategy and outside composition strategy. When placing the vi-
sual items inside the central icon, the icon needs to be enlarged. In this case, a large
icon cannot precisely indicate its position (in the plot) that represents significant
semantic meanings of the analysis process. Thus, we apply the outside composition
strategy. We place the four visual items closely around the central icon. The visual-
ization properties with respect to the method of a modification (items (1) and (2))
are placed in the left side; the factors for evaluation of the modification are repre-
sented in the right side (items (3) and (4)). This way, engineers may investigate the
modification method and the evaluation of the modification in their respective sides.
We connect a new risk-state node with its direct predecessor using a two-part
orthogonal edge (Figure 7.1). A horizontal line between the predecessor node and
the horizontal position of the new risk-state node represents the subsequence of the
modifications. The vertical part of that line represents the reduction of the failure
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probability of the top event resulting from the corresponding modification (referring
to R8). We use a rounded corner to connect both parts in order to address the edge
crossing issues. When there are alternative modifications for a basic event, multiple
risk-state nodes are allowed to be created. In this case, between these nodes, there
are equal distances for addressing the overlapping issues of nodes as well as edges
(Figure 7.7: “M2” and “M3”).
We additionally provide a horizontal green line in the lower part of the risk-
reduction plot in order to indicate the goal value of the overall safety improvement.
This facilitates to assess how far the failure probability of the top event at a specific
node from the goal value is. When the system risk becomes acceptable by a modifi-
cation, the top event will have the failure probability that equals to the goal value.
In this case, the risk-state node stops at the green horizontal line. In addition, when
selecting a solution, its risk-state nodes and the connecting lines will be highlighted.
7.1.1.1 Identifying optimal Modifications
Engineers may identify the optimal ones from the alternative modifications in the
construction process according to the criteria described in section 2.1.6.1. Either the
visual item (4) of the risk-state node or the vertical part of edges can be used for
identifying the optimal modifications. The non-optimal modifications are rejected
and the corresponding branches are terminated by filling up the last node with
black color. When reviewing these nodes, engineers may quickly understand that
the corresponding modification ideas have been considered and treated as unsuitable
(Figure 7.7). Thus, engineers no longer consider successors of the modification.
7.1.2 Reviewing CFT Adaption
7.1.2.1 Adapting the main CFT Structure.
A design modification leads to the adaption of the corresponding CFT that is rep-
resented by changing failure probabilities and/or the logical structure. Our system
automatically updates the CFT model according to modifications in the background
during the analysis process. In order to preserve the overview of the vulnerable basic
events involved in a solution, the initial logic structure of the CFT view is maintained
during the safety improvement process. This helps to avoid disturbances caused by
subsequently updating the CFT. When applying a modification, the color of the
initial basic event node is adapted to the failure probability of the substitutional
part or to the new constructed sub-tree for redundant parts. To show the influences
of modifications along the CFT structure, the colors and the size of the correspond-
ing nodes along the critical path are adapted. When selecting a risk-state node in
the plot, the corresponding basic event node in the CFT structure is dynamically
highlighted using a thick border.
7.1.2.2 Adapting CFT Components
When a CFT is large, the compact views (i.e., architectural views and simple rect-
angular symbols) are more space-efficient than the logical structures. We provide a
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Figure 7.2: Visualization of the safety improvement process. (1) The associated CFT.
(2) The risk-reduction plot. (3) The solution overview plots. This field consists of
two alternative plots where the x-axis represents (a) the cost of solutions; (b) the
steps of solutions.
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method to adapt the risk-reduction plot to the compact views. A CFT component
represented using a compact view has an indicator on the top of the plot. The basic
events of this component are aggregated under the indicator. In this case, in order
to space efficiently display the nodes, the complete risk-state node is replaced with
a simple triangle icon without additional attached visual items (Figure 7.3). Only
when the node is focused on, the complete risk-state node will appear.
A solution is related to a group of basic events. In order to indicate the CFT
components that directly include these basic events in the architectural view, the
rectangles representing these components are marked with blue borders. Figure 7.3
shows an example. Solution “S1” is selected. The basic events relevant to this solu-
tion are distributed in the CFT components that are represented as rectangles with
blue borders.
7.1.2.3 Reviewing the Change of the CFT Structure
We provide a details-on-demand pop-up view to represent the updated logical struc-
ture regarding the specific risk-state node (Figure 7.11). The pop-up view shows the
structure of the CFT component that has the basic event corresponding to the
currently selected risk-state node. The part related to the current modification is
enclosed with a dashed border. This is particularly useful to intuitively review the
design modifications that utilize the concept of redundancy.
7.1.3 Analyzing Improvement Solutions
We provide two linked plots to present the overview of the solutions with respect to
the criteria of optimization of solutions (Figure 7.2 (3)). The y-axes of these plots
represent that failure probability of the top event. The x-axis of the plots respectively
represents the following data:
• cost of solution: for the criterion of the maximal cost-effectiveness. Because any
complete solution reduces the failure probability of the top event to the same
goal value, i.e., the effectivenesses are same, engineers may compare the total
cost instead of the total cost-effectiveness for identifying the optimal solution.
• steps of solution: for the criterion of the minimal modification steps.
Each modification has a simple triangle node on the linked plots. Engineers may
analyze patterns of the risk reduction with respect to cost and the number of modi-
fications in the linked plots. Colors of nodes are same as those in the risk-reduction
plot. A brushing-and-linking interaction is provided between the risk-reduction plot
and the linked plots in order to analyze solutions from different points of view.
7.2 Application Scenarios
There are application examples intended to illustrate the use of our visualization
approach with respect to two important aspects: construction of solutions and the
analysis of existing solutions.
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Figure 7.4: Application example 1. The initial state. The importance of basic events
are estimated by analyzing the bars on the top of the risk-reduction plot. The basic
event “E32” is the most important because its bar is larger than other basic events’.
7.2.1 Example 1
This example presents a scenario for constructing the improvement solutions. The
goal is to identify the most cost-effective solution(s).
7.2.1.1 Dataset and Configuration
The applied data originates from a CFT of a safety-critical sub-system of the robot
RAVON as an example by the project ViERforES [201]. This CFT contains 30 basic
events and 4 CFT components. This data are used in Example 1 and Example 2.
The initial failure probability of the top event amounts “6.7e-14”, and the specified
goal value is “1.5e-14”. We apply the linear scale to the y-axis of the risk-reduction
plot in the example. For the risk-state node, we apply the logarithmic scale to the
bar representing cost-effectiveness and the bar representing the modification value
because the bars for small values are difficult to read when using linear scale. We
set the unit value of the cost bar (of the risk-state node) to “10”, i.e., each block of
the bar represents 10 cost units. The unreliability levels are defined as follows:
• critical level (red): (2e-5, 1]
• moderate level (yellow): (1.5e-14, 2e-5]
• acceptable level (green): (0, 1.5e-14]
7.2.1.2 Analysis Process
There are following main steps in the improvement process for reducing the risk of
the system to the goal value.
1. In the first iteration, by the initial system, the basic event “E32” is treated
as the important one by examining the bars on the top of the risk-reduction
plot (Figure 7.4). Based on the domain knowledge, we decide to replace the
identified vulnerable physical part having a failure probability of “4e-4” with
one having a value of “2.5e-4”. The cost of this modification amounts to 20
units. The CFT is automatically updated according to the modification. As a
result, a risk-state node for modification “M1” appears on the risk-reduction
plot (Figure 7.5). The vertical position of the node shows that the overall
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Figure 7.10: Application example 1. Overview of the results of the risk-reduction
process.
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failure probability is reduced to “4.9e-14”. Solution “S1” containing “M1” is
being constructed because “M1” leads to a new branch. The ID of “S1” appears
next to the node. The risk is not acceptable yet because the color of the node
is not green. Then we need to perform the next round.
2. In the second iteration, the important basic event “E3” is identified (Figure
7.5, pointed by a red arrow). There are two possible design modifications to
address the basic event: one is to add an homogeneous redundant component
(Figure 7.6: “M2”) that reduces the failure probability of the top event to
“2.03e-14” and causes the costs of 12 units; another one is to use a substitute
(Figure 7.7: “M3”) that reduce the failure probability of the top event to
“4.1e-14” and causes the costs of 40 units. The cost-effectiveness bars show
that “M2” is more cost-effective than “M3”. Thus, “M3” is rejected and the
corresponding branch is terminated. After this iteration, the failure probability
of the updated CFT is not acceptable yet.
3. In the third iteration, two important basic events “E1” and “E11” are identified
(Figure 7.6, pointed by red arrows). Although the basic event “E32” has a
high importance, we do not consider it because this basic event has been
previously addressed. The color of the bar on the top of the plot reflects this
information: bar of “E32” is light gray (the practicable basic events have dark-
gray bars). Based on the domain knowledge, we identify modification “M4”
for “E1” causing the cost of 30 units (Figure 7.8) and modification “M5” for
“E11” causing the cost of 15 units(Figure 7.9). By either modification the
system risk can achieve the required goal value of the top event.
4. As a result, there are two available solutions constructed in the safety improve-
ment process with respect to the cost-effectiveness (Figure 7.10) (solution “S2”
has been rejected). We still need to determine the optimal solution. We com-
pare the total cost of the solutions. The fact that the cost of solution “S3” is
less than the cost of solution “S1”. It concludes that solution “S3” is the most
cost-effective way to improve the system safety.
This example illustrates the complete procedure of identifying the optimal im-
provement solution using our visualization. Additionally, in Figure 7.10, the labels
of the CFT components printed in the blobs show that the basic events related to
solution “S3” are distributed over two CFT components: “SC1” and “SC4”. The
system components corresponding to these CFT components need to be focused on
in order to improve the system design with respect to the safety.
7.2.2 Example 2
This example presents an application that engineers review the modifications of
solution “S3” constructed in Example 1. The objective is to investigate the design
modification that introduces the largest impact on the top event.
7.2.2.1 Analysis Process
The objective is achieved by the following steps:
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1. We identify that modification “M2” causes the largest reduction of the top
event (Figure 7.11) by directly comparing the vertical line of the edges linking
to “M1”, “M2”, and “M5”.
2. The symbol representing the modification type (the small triangle on the left
upper of the risk-state node) explains that the modification applies a redun-
dancy method.
3. By clicking on the node, the pop-up windows is shown for representing the up-
dated structure of the CFT component “M2” (Figure 7.11). A sub-structure
inside a polygon with a dashed border represents the redundancy relations of
basic events. The sub-structure has two basic events: the original basic event
“E3” and the new basic event corresponding to the added redundant compo-
nent. An AND-gate connects both basic events to build a parallel redundancy.
This example shows how to analyze the existing modifications.
7.2.3 Example 3
Reviewing the constructed improvement solutions with respect to the CFT structure
may support the understanding of design modifications for the future analysis or
optimization. This example demonstrates an analysis task that is to identify the
CFT components related to the optimal solution having the minimal cost. The
pattern with respect to the distribution of design modifications belonging to the
optimal solution over the CFT components is also of interest in the example. In
addition, we also try to analyze the influence of the specific modifications along the
logical structure of CFT components.
7.2.3.1 Dataset and Configuration
In this example, we apply a CFT model based on the robot RAVON that has 145
basic events. There are 8 previously constructed improvement solutions. The initial
failure probability of the top event amounts “0.014”, and the goal value is “1e-2”.
The lower and upper bounds of the importance bar are respectively set to “4e-4”
and “1”. We use the logarithmic scale for the importance bars. The unreliability
levels are defined as follows:
• critical level (red): (0.5, 1]
• moderate level (yellow): (1e-2, 0.5]
• acceptable level (green): (0, 1e-2]
7.2.3.2 Analysis Process
The tasks are completed by performing the following steps:
1. We first identify the optimal solution. By viewing the cost plot, solution “S1”
having the minimal cost is identified (Figure 7.12 (2)). Although solution “S6”
(on the left of “S1”) has the an equally low cost, this has been rejected and
not a available solution. We learn this from the black color of the triangular
node.
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Figure 7.12: Application example 3. The CFT view shows the primary components.
A partially enlarged view is shown in Figure 7.13.
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2. We then identify the CFT components related to the optimal solution “S1”.
For this step, we show the primary components using architecture views in
order to efficiently use the screen space (in area 1). The CFT components
involved in solution “S1” are indicated by blue borders in the architectural
views. The resulting components are “SC5” (nested in “SC100”), “SC84”,
“SC88”, and “SC89”.
3. Then we investigate the detailed distribution of the modifications included by
the optimal solution over the CFT components. There are two ways to iden-
tify the distribution: viewing the corresponding relations between the risk-state
nodes and the architectural views in step 2 (Figure 7.12), or investigating the
enlarged basic event nodes in the CFT view where gray blobs indicate CFT
components. The first way provides a space-efficient view for the identification
and the second way is more effective for the complex cases. For the second way,
we need to show the logical structures of those four CFT components iden-
tified in last step. The visible logical structures show that the enlarged basic
event nodes “E14”, “E5”, “E12”, “E19”, “E2”, and “E15” are related to the
design modifications belonging to solution “S1” (Figure 7.14). The resulting
distribution is:
• modification “M1” is related to the CFT component “SC88”.
• modifications “M2” and “M6” are related to the CFT component “SC89”.
• modification “M4” is related to the CFT component “SC5”.
• modifications “M3”, “M5”, and “M7” are related to the CFT component
“SC84”.
According to the distribution, we may future perform the modifications di-
rected towards the related components rather than sequentially modify the
system design, if the related basic events are stochastically independent.
4. We finally investigate the failure flow of the basic events. This may provide
a meaningful context for analyzing the effect of the design modifications with
respect to the logical failure flow. By selecting any risk-state node, we may
identify the corresponding basic event node in the CFT view, which is indicated
by a thick border (Figure 7.14). We analyze modification “M6” that is related
to the basic event “E2” as an example.
With the help of the label printed on the blob, we identify that the correspond-
ing CFT component represents “Actuator” (Figure 7.16). The basic event “E2”
represents the failure “Steering Wheels are defective”. The basic event may
cause the intermediate failure at gate “G5”, which represents “Front Steer-
ing Engine is defective”. The failure at gate “G17” below the out-port of the
component represents the failure “Actuator works incorrectly”.
In addition, we notice that the modification method is the application of the
redundant parts because the icon representing the type of modification “M6”
is a small triangle (Figure 7.14). The design modification “M6” may be under-
stood as follows: it needs to add identical steering wheels to the front steering
engine of the actuator in order to improve the safety of the mobile robot.
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Figure 7.16: A partially enlarged logical structure of the CFT component “SC89”.
The failure flow of the basic event related to modification “M6”.
This example presents that the association between the risk-reduction plot and
the CFT structure facilitates to obtain the overview of the design modifications of
the specific solution. In this way, engineers may also analyze the related critical
paths of the basic events involved in the solution.
7.3 Evaluation
We have performed an expert review for evaluating our visualization approach. We
invited four experts of the safety domain from the University of Kaiserslautern,
all having profound proficiencies in the field of (component) fault tree analysis.
We first introduced our approach to the participants, and then they were allowed
to personally try the visualization functionalities. Tasks with respect to the safety
improvement process were provided for the participants. Finally, the participants
filled out a Likert-scale questionnaire for a qualitative evaluation.
The results (Figure 7.17) showed that the feedback was mostly positive. The
risk-reduction plot was preferred because this visually provided a sequence of modi-
fications while intuitively presenting the important data of each modification in the
same view. When comparing modifications or analyzing patterns, using the risk-
reduction plot is more intuitive than investigating data in separate views. The bars
for the importance of BEs (on top of the risk reduction plot) also had good reviews
because they were easy to understand and dynamically linked to the visualizations
of design modifications.
Opinion was somewhat divided on the risk-state node visualizing the modifica-
tion data. Most complaints were concentrated on the small size of the node. The
graphical properties attached to the node are too small. A suggestion was to apply
an interactive fish-eye zoom to the node of interest. A participant commented that
a risk-state node looked crowded because there are many additional visual items at-
tached to the node. For example, although some attributes of modifications (i.e., the
modification cost, modification type, and modification value) provided significant in-
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Figure 7.17: Qualitative evaluation.
formation for analysis of the existing modifications, the graphical representations of
the data did not play an important role in the construction of a modification. He
suggested to dynamically represent the data: show specific graphic properties only
when requested.
The representations for the effects of modifications received good comments. The
participants could clearly understand how much the risk was reduced by applying a
modification and how much the actual risk still needed to be reduced. The partici-
pants also positively commented on the overview plots of the solutions. Regarding
the adaptation of the CFT structure, the participants thought that the views for
showing the CFT structure small, for both the pop-up view and the main CFT view.
In short, the invited domain experts preferred our approach because they be-
lieved that the proposed visualizations and interactions may effectively facilitate
the identification and analysis of the improvement solutions.
Chapter 8
Framework
The visualization concepts proposed in this dissertation were implemented by de-
veloping a visualization system ViSSaAn (Visual Support for Safety Analysis) [209]
using Java and the Prefuse library [77]. ViSSaAn accepts data generated by ES-
SaRel [193] that contains CFT models and textual results of the MCS analysis. Java
Swing is used for most of the views and the node-link layouts are implemented with
the help of the Prefuse library. ViSSaAn consists of three main parts: the MCS
Matrix, the VisQSA system, and the General configuration view.
8.1 MCS Matrix System
MCS Matrix introduced in section 5 contains three parts (Figure 8.1 (a)). The central
part is the matrix view. The left part is an interaction panel consisting of two tabs:
a tree structure for navigating the grouped MCSs and a view where engineers may
control most interactions (this view is shown in Figure 8.1 (b)). The information
panel (the bottom part of Figure 8.1) displays statistical information, instant data,
and the general information of the applied dataset.
8.2 VisQSA System
The VisQSA system provides the visual quantitative analysis based on the CFT.
This system supports the visualization of the importance analysis introduced in
Chapter 6, and the visualization of the safety improvement process described in
Chapter 7.
Figure 8.2 depicts the main view of VisQSA that contains the CFT view (section
6), the importance plot (section 6.1.5), the risk reduction plot (section 7.1), and
the auxiliary overview plots (section 7.1.3). Figure 8.3 shows the overview of the
VisQSA system including the main view and additional views. A data table presents
the quantitative data of the importance of basic events with filtering and sorting
functions (Figure 8.3 (b)). An additional plot where the x-axis represents the failure
probabilities of basic events and the y-axis represents the importance of basic events
(Figure 8.3 (c)). This plot supports to explore the relations between the failure
probability and the importance.
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Figure 8.2: Main analysis view of VisQSA. The upper part is the visualization of
the importance analysis. The lower part implements the visual safety improvement
process.
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Figure 8.4: General Configuration View. Unreliability levels and their colors may be
configured in the view.
When showing logical structures of multiple CFT components, the in-place ex-
pansion may make the view look too complicated. The conciseness of the original
CFT structure is missing. In this case, engineers look to view CFTs by mixing the
in-place expansion concept and the ordinary separate view concept. The traditional
concept using separate views is retained in VisQSA (Figure 8.3 (c)). Gray lines link
the separate external views to the rectangular symbols that represent the CFT com-
ponents in the main CFT view. Engineers may analyze the integrated and continu-
ous structure of the most interesting CFT components using the in-place expansion
while maintaining the logical structures of other CFT components in external views.
8.3 Configuration View
The starting point of ViSSaAn is a general configuration view (Figure 8.4). The
CFTs and MCSs generated by ESSaRel are loaded to ViSSaAn system. Engineers
are allowed to set the unreliability levels, and assign colors to the levels. After
the configuration of ViSSaAn, the sub-visualization systems, i.e., MCS Matrix and
VisQSA, can be undertaken.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
The FTA is widely used to analyze the safety of embedded systems. The CFT is
an advanced modeling concept of the FTA. There are qualitative and quantitative
analysis concepts based on the FTA. The previous research work focused on the im-
provements with respect to algorithms and processes. However, the representation
concepts are not efficient and effective enough for supporting the complex situations.
Our research work focuses on facilitating the analyses based on the CFT by enhanc-
ing the representations using suitable visualization methods and flexible interaction
techniques. We propose a visualization system called ViSSaAn to implement our
approaches that consists of the sub-system MCS Matrix facilitating the MCS anal-
ysis and the sub-system VisQSA facilitating the importance analysis and the safety
improvement process in visual ways.
9.1 Visualization of MCS Analysis
9.1.1 Summary of Contributions
MCS Matrix is aimed at facilitating the representation of the MCS analysis. It pro-
vides a matrix view to represent the relations between MCSs and basic events. Colors
are used to encode the criticality of the failure probability of elements of the FT.
In order to facilitate the investigation of the significant MCSs, MCs Matrix allows
to respectively aggregate MCSs and basic events using flexible grouping concepts.
MCS Matrix provides scaling concepts for handling large MCS data. Uniform scaling
and the individual scaling may cooperate to represent the detail information while
maintaining a satisfactory overview of the large MCS data. The scaling by groups
displays different levels of details of the information associated with MCSs (or basic
events) according to the unreliability levels of MCSs (basic events). In this way, the
limited screen space can be effectively used for primarily representing the significant
information. In order to effectively represent the failure propagation of MCSs, MCS
Matrix provides a concept that integrates the failure flow of MCSs with the matrix
view.
In general, MCS Matrix effectively represents the relations between MCSs and
basic events. An overview of a large set of MCSs may be maintained when inves-
tigating detailed information associated with MCSs. Engineers can easily identify
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the significant information with the help of information highlighting methods. The
hidden information, e.g., patterns of MCSs and relation between basic events, may
be discovered by using our visualization. Engineers may investigate the influence of
MCSs along the CFT structure directly in the matrix view. This greatly improve
efficiency of the MCS analysis in visual ways.
9.1.2 Future Work
For the current MCS matrix, the scaling by groups (Figure 5.7) may not provide
sufficient benefit because plenty of critical MCSs may take up a great deal of screen
space. In the future, we need a way to reduce the space of the critical MCSs and
show as much important information of these MCSs as possible. A possible solution
is the fish-eye technique. Another possible extension is the logical relations between
CFT components. Currently, we individually show the structure of the specific CFT
component in the embedded view of the matrix layout. In the future, we may focus
on simultaneously representing structures of multiple CFT components in different
embedded views without great increase of space requirement and show the logical
data flow between these components.
9.2 Visualization of Importance Analysis
9.2.1 Summary of Contributions
In the dissertation we propose a visualization method that represents insights for the
importance analysis of CFTs by composing the iceray tree and the node-link graph.
The iceray tree view is responsible for representing the overview of the importance
of basic events by taking the hierarchical architecture in system design into account
while the node-link diagram focuses on representing the CFT structure. In order
to effectively use the screen space, the structure of CFT components are visible
only when requesting by either referencing the deeply nested CFT components or
regrading the continuous critical paths. In order to indicate the failure propagation
of the important basic events, the critical paths are highlighted using border colors.
The translucent gray blobs are used to enclose the nodes of each expanded CFT
components in order to identify the CFT components. To facilitate the comparison
of basic events, we provide the aggregate method and alignment layout concepts to
visually enhance the CFT structure. We also provide an additional importance plot
to quickly compare a large number of basic events. In short, using our visualization
method, engineers may estimate and compare the importance of basic events while
analyzing the logical structure of the CFT. Additionally, engineers may quickly in-
vestigate the basic events in any CFT component by using the architectural view of
our method without being disturbed by complex nesting relations between compo-
nents.
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9.2.2 Future Work
There are still some meaningful work to improve the visualization of the importance
analysis in the future. A significant issue of our approach is that the CFT structure
takes up a lot of space (Figure 6.13) even though it provides an intuitive structure
for the failure flow and logical relations between the important basic events. The
critical path of the failure flow may only be a small part of the whole logical structure
of a CFT component. To address this issue, we need a mechanism that represents
the failure flow directly in the architectural view rather than along the complete
logical structure. We discussed this possibility in section 4.2.3.2 when designing our
visualization. Considering the intuition issue and the visual clutter problems, we
rejected this idea. However, as a complement, the embedded failure flow still makes
sense. We may show the simple failure flow of only a single specific basic event in
the architectural view in order to reduce the influence on the architectural view.
Our work currently focuses on only one importance analysis method, i.e., the
Fussell-Vesely measure. In the future, more measures may be integrated into our
visualization. In this way, basic events may be estimated and ranked according to
different metrics that are respectively suitable for various analysis demands. To refine
our visualization, a better algorithm for the blobs is desired to address the overlap-
ping issue and a more effective algorithm is needed for reducing the line-crossing of
the hierarchical logical structure of the CFT. In addition, the interactive association
between the MCS Matrix and the VisQSA will be a meaningful work. This way,
it may be possible to dynamically and smoothly switch views between qualitative
measure regarding the MCSs analysis and the quantitative measure regarding the
importance analysis in our visualization system.
9.3 Visualization of the Safety Improvement Pro-
cess
9.3.1 Summary of Contributions
To facilitate the iterative safety improvement process, we propose a visualization
method that provides a risk-reduction plot to integrate the significant data that is
distributed in separate views which hampers the efficient identification of solutions.
The risk-reduction plot is a combination between a decision tree representing the
identifying process of modifications and a scatter plot that represents the cause-
effect relation between the safety vulnerability related to modifications and the cor-
responding improvement results. The decision tree links the possible modifications
to form improvement solutions. The risk-reduction plot allows engineers to analyze
the essential data of the modifications of interest while maintaining the overall se-
quence of modifications for representing the identifying process of modifications.
This is helpful for analyzing and optimizing existing solutions and also has meaning
for new design modifications. Our visualization allows engineers to dynamically in-
vestigate the change of the structure of CFT components with a pop-up view. The
visual safety improvement process also provides the overviews of the solutions with
respect to different aspects in auxiliary plots. In this case, engineers are allowed to
identify optimal solution(s) from a large set of solutions with respect to the cost or
the modification steps. In general, the proposed visual safety improvement process
allows engineers to visually and interactively identify a series of design modifica-
tions, and facilitates the effective determination of the optimal modifications and
solutions with the help of appropriate graphical properties.
9.3.2 Future Work
An unresolved issue of our visualization is the alignment between the CFT structure
view and the risk-reduction plot. When all basic events of a CFT are shown in the
CFT view, the basic event node can be perfectly aligned with the x-axis of the risk-
reduction plot (Figure 7.10). However, if the structure of a CFT component is not
shown, the alignment will not work very well (Figure 7.14). We need to improve
the algorithm of the alignment in future. Additionally, dynamically showing the
graphical properties of the risk-state node is also a meaningful improvement to the
visualization. This method may help to clearly present a large number of risk-state
nodes on the screen.
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Fault Tree Symbols
Figure 9.1: Fault tree symbols (US style) (produced by [142]).
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